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Foreword 
The ‘Russia Workshop,’ a Growing Platform 
on Contemporary Russia
Giancarlo Bosetti, Reset DOC
In more than ten years of activity, Reset DOC has been able to 
inspire dialogue across cultural divides and the exchange of ideas 
through seminars, conferences, publications, and international 
events. The synergy emerged from networks of intellectuals with 
different cultural, religious, political backgrounds all around the 
Mediterranean, American and Asian regions gave impressive 
results and encouraged us to go ahead.
In the aftermath of the 2014 Crimean crisis, the Western world 
realized a general lack of knowledge and misunderstanding 
of a country that had historically been a key protagonist of 
European culture and that suddenly appeared as an unknown 
entity: Russia, a huge state that we are still trying to understand 
in its post-Soviet essence. In this era of tensions, instability 
and tougher relations between West and Moscow, Reset DOC 
launched in 2015 – under the scientific coordination of the 
Italian historian Andrea Graziosi – the Russia Workshop, an 
initiative aimed at attracting some of the foremost international 
scholars, intellectuals and experts on Russian studies. 
The first test of the Russia Workshop was the international 
workshop The Evolution of Russian Political Thought After 
1991 held in Berlin at the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswärtige 
Politik (DGAP) on June 22-23, 2015. This occasion was the initial 
stage in a much longer journey and its core significance was in 
the fact that it unlocked a number of subsequent events, such 
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as the concomitant roundtable entitled The Political Culture of 
Today’s Russia. The Power State Is Back? that was held at DGAP 
on June 25, 2015. This meeting offered the direct testimony 
of some prominent European policy makers in approaching 
Russia’s power policy issues. After the Berlin conferences, the 
Russia Workshop initiative had further accreditations, attracting 
the attention of additional partners and sponsors and the partic-
ipation of prestigious research institutes. The most relevant 
results of the first Berliner workshop had been collected in a 
homonym volume that we have published in the spring of 2016.1 
Therefore, Reset DOC organized in collaboration with the 
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) 
the second workshop Locating ‘Conservative Ideology’ in Today’s 
Russia at George Washington University (March 31-April 1, 
2016). This event focused on Russian ‘conservatism,’ defining 
its language, values and connotations in order to explain its 
influence on the Russian political system. On that occasion, the 
debate analyzed the diversity and plurality within the Russian 
‘conservative’ spectrum, its representatives in literature, art, 
social life and in the Orthodox Church, its geopolitical-ideo-
logical dimension (as Eurasianism), its statist approach and its 
vision of the world order. The Washington workshop gave new 
impetus to further develop a platform analyzing the Russian 
political discourse, its features and its cultural influence. Hence, 
in less than a year, Reset DOC organized a third event of the 
Russia Workshop in a place that has highly represented a bridge 
between West and East: on June 17-18, 2016 the conference 
The State and Political Discourse in Today’s Russia was held in 
Venice at the Fondazione Giorgio Cini.
This two-day workshop had a great participation in terms 
of speakers, discussants and audience, involving more dozens 
of international scholars, experts and students in a context 
of freedom and open dialogue. The debate focused on the 
multiplicity of the Russian state political discourses within 
its various organs, administration, media and party, so as to 
analyze those concepts and ‘sacred’ ideological references 
which are sponsored by Moscow. Finally, the event launched 
a discussion on the demise of liberalism and its pluralistic 
approach in Russia, bearing in mind the impact of the Soviet 
legacy, the expectation and influence of perestroika, in order 
to discuss the limits and the potentials for the future of 
democracy in Russia. This second volume aims at collecting a 
part of the conference proceedings and presenting some of the 
most relevant debates emerged in that framework.
The intellectual spillovers emerged in Venice encouraged us to 
go ahead with the Russia Workshop, an initiative that keeps getting 
further accreditations and attracting the attention of additional 
partners and sponsors, extending its ambitions, increasing the 
frequency of events and creating an effectively permanent 
platform on Russian political studies. In fact, in 2017 Reset DOC 
has already scheduled in Moscow several exploratory meetings 
aimed at creating greater synergy with Russian partners and a 
greater involvement of the National Academy, while in October 
2017 the conference Russian Liberalisms and their challenges will 
be organized in collaboration with the University of Turin.
The growing participation in these workshops gives us great 
hope for the future of such events. This ambitious project could 
evolve so fast because of its dynamic format that inclusively 
involves partners and respectfully considers every idea and 
perspective. Our goal is to overcome prejudices and divisions 
between ‘we’ and the ‘others;’ and we still have a great deal 
of difficult ground to cover. However, the Russia Workshop 
success is definite by the intentional desire for dialogue that 
has been shown by all the players involved in a game. Right 
now, the feedback we have had bodes well for future successes.
1 See Riccardo Mario Cucciolla (ed.), The Power State Is Back? The Evolution 
of Russian Political Thought After 1991, Reset, Rome 2016.
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The conference has been organized by Reset DOC in cooperation with 
Fondazione Giorgio Cini in Venice with the contribution of Nomis Foundation 
– Zürich and of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation. The organization of the event involved international partners: 
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), George 
Washington University; the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 
Harvard University; the Cold War Studies Program, Harvard University; the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE); the Wendy and 
Emery Reves Center for International Studies, College of William and Mary; 
National Research University Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE), 
Moscow. The Russia Workshop project is directed by Giancarlo Bosetti 
(Reset DOC) with the scientific coordination of Andrea Graziosi (Anvur, 
University of Naples Federico II) and a scientific committee composed of 
Alexey Barabashev (NRU-HSE), Stephen E. Hanson (Wendy and Emery 
Reves Center for International Studies, College of William and Mary), Mark 
Kramer (Cold War Studies and Davis Center), Marlene Laruelle (European, 
Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University); Andrei 
Melville (NRU-HSE), Alexandra Vacroux (Davis Center), Vladislav M. 
Zubok (LSE). After the welcoming addresses of Giancarlo Corò (Ca’ Foscari 
University) and Pasquale Gagliardi (Fondazione Cini), the conference had 
been divided in four session: the first session The State’s Political Discourse was 
chaired by Giancarlo Corò (Università Ca’ Foscari) and involveded Alexey 
Barabashev (NRU-HSE), Anton Barbashin (Intersection) and Olga Malinova 
(NRU-HSE) as speaker and Mark Kramer (Cold War Studies and Davis Center 
for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University) as discussant. The 
second session Concepts and Ideological References was chaired by Daniela Rizzi 
(Università Ca’ Foscari) and involved Maria Engström (Uppsala Universitet), 
Marlene Laruelle (IERES, George Washington University), Andrei Melville 
(NRU-HSE), Nikolay Mitrokhin (Center for East-European Studies, University 
of Bremen) as speakers and Stephen Hanson (Wendy and Emery Reves Center 
for International Studies, College of William and Mary) as discussant. The 
third session The Demise of Liberalism: Testing the Waters on the Subject 
was chaired by Andrea Graziosi (Anvur, University of Naples Federico II) 
and involved Nadezhda Azhgikhina (Russian Union of Journalists and Vice 
president of European Federation of Journalists), Nina Khrushcheva (Milano 
School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy, The New 
School), Andrey Kortunov (Russian Council of International Relations), Kirill 
Rogov (Liberal Mission Foundation) and Vladislav Zubok (LSE) as speakers. 
The fourth session was the roundtable Politics and Culture. The Future of 
Democracy in Russia chaired by Giancarlo Bosetti (Reset DOC) and involved 
Giuliano Amato (Judge of the Italian Constitutional Court and Former Prime 
Minister of Italy), Nina Khrushcheva (Milano School of International Affairs, 
Management and Urban Policy, The New School), Marlene Laruelle (IERES, 
George Washington University), Andrei Melville (NRU-HSE), Adam Michnik 
(Gazeta Wyborcza), Sergio Romano (Former Italian Ambassador in Moscow) 
and Roberto Toscano (Former Italian Ambassador in Teheran and New Delhi). 
The event has been organized by the Reset DOC’s structure: Chiara Galbersanini 
(Project Manager), Letizia Durante (Project Administrator), Cristina Sala (Event 
Management) in collaboration with Riccardo Mario Cucciolla (IMT Lucca). 
Preface
How Many Political Discourses 
are in Contemporary Russia?
Riccardo Mario Cucciolla, IMT Lucca
In seventy years of Soviet communism, the only official political 
discourse in the USSR was necessarily associated with Marxism-
Leninism. This narrative appeared at both party and state levels, 
affecting the political culture of Soviet society. In the USSR, 
political documents and speeches were forged on a rigid structure 
that imposed the communist semantic as an introduction to 
every political discourse; then, they were followed by essential 
cross-references or quotations of the General Secretary’s 
speeches made at congresses of the Communist party; and 
finally, references to Marxist-Leninist ideological values were 
included, defining a party narrative that was often also presented 
at bureaucratic, cultural and even academic levels. 
While communist political discourse appeared to some 
extent as an ‘ornamental’ feature, it was a clear and certain ideo- 
logical manifestation of dogmatic monolithism, concealing a 
plethora of alternative values and anti-systemic feelings – such 
as nationalism, religion, tradition, liberalism and individualism 
– that had been sublimated for decades. During perestroika – 
with the affirmation of glasnost, the abolishment of the primacy 
of the CPSU and the emergence of opposition forces – the first 
attempts to liberalize the Soviet system appeared, while freedom 
of speech and even freedom of thinking were legitimized after 
decades of intellectual repression and ideological orthodoxy. 
Hence, the enthusiasm for democratization was opening a 
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Pandora’s box from which emerged a plethora of alternative 
ideas – often recalling features of the pre-revolutionary Russian 
thought – that would inherently influence post-communist 
Russia. After the Soviet collapse, the fourth wave of democra-
tization seemed to also be an irreversible process for Russia. 
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of many citizens for a market 
economy and democratic transitions grew rapidly disenchanted 
by the unstable 1990s, characterized by internal wars, author-
itarian tendencies, oligarchism, economic crises, and radical 
reforms of the former Soviet system. 
This situation inexorably marked Russia’s destiny, brought 
about a decline in living standards, and distorted the process of 
political and economic liberalization. This period – popularly 
interpreted in terms of general decay – matured into further 
despair of an already exasperated population that had lost 
hope in the future while perceiving insecurity, anxiety and 
disillusioned promises of prosperity. In parallel, the loss of 
great power status and the fiasco in fully reforming the system 
and incorporating Russia into the Western world directed 
many Russian policymakers to advance the conception of 
Russia as a particular entity that would follow an alternative 
path of political transition and socio-economic development.
In the 2000s, the rise of Putin seemed to be a popular 
response to uncertainty and desire for revenge, while the 
Russian political discourse acquired more and more hetero-
geneous and conservative elements, rejecting a liberal alter- 
native that appeared fragmented, unsuccessful, and progres-
sively marginalized. Consequently, Putin continued to consol- 
idate his power though a political narrative that functionally 
touched some of the innermost feelings of Russians and still 
appears fragmented, polymorphic and, to many extents, 
contradictory. In the aftermath of the Crimean crisis, the 
evident Western underestimation of the Kremlin’s power policy 
originated from a lack of awareness of the Russian ideological 
transition. This led many analysts and experts to jump to 
hasty conclusions of Russia as a backward and imperialist 
country with all its idiosyncrasies and illogicalities. Hence, 
Russia – which during the Cold War represented the center of 
an alternative modernity for a segment of the Western intelli-
gentsia – appeared as an unknown and unfamiliar entity in many 
aspects, bringing further misconceptions that naively polarized 
a large portion of Western public opinion between those who 
approved of the Kremlin’s conservative and anti-postmodernist 
tendencies and those who were against Putin’s aggressiveness 
and authoritarianism. 
However the problem is much more complex and does not 
depend on a mere struggle between conservative and progressive 
ideological visions. First of all, it is necessary to define how 
many political discourses are effectively present, who their 
actors are and how they compete or coexist with one another. 
With Putin and perhaps beyond him, post-Soviet Russia’s state 
organization appears to be a complex, multi-layered apparatus 
that is able to shape new discourses and ideologies, interact 
with old ones, promote a narrative and image of Russia in the 
world and focus the world’s attention and concern on itself. 
In order to more clearly understand the problem and to 
bridge this gap of misconceptions and biases by restoring a 
dialogue based on understanding and awareness, Reset DOC 
organized the State and Political Discourse in Russia conference 
devoted to elucidating the many features of the contemporary 
Russian political discourse. In Venice, Russian and international 
experts identified the new and old ideological constellations that 
provide the backdrop for Putin’s words and political choices; the 
cultural and ideological references in Russian conservatism that 
support Putin and shape his political language; and the origins 
and the fate of the vanished liberal dreams in contemporary 
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Russia. Some of the main results of the Venice conference have 
been collected and edited in this volume.*
In the theoretical introduction, Mark Kramer reconstructs 
the evolutions of the debate within social sciences and concep-
tualizes political power, its relations with political thought, their 
dynamics, the actors involved in the Russian context, their role 
and how they are affected by the socio-political and time-spatial 
context in which they are embedded. Hence, the author 
evidences the limits of the behavioralist and structural theorists, 
and scrutinizes some of the social-psychological conceptual 
approaches on power and their adaptations to political power 
in order to evaluate the distribution of power in the Russian 
political system. Hence, Kramer detects a conceptual basis for 
understanding political power in Russia today perceiving it as a 
dispositional phenomenon rather that a behavioral one. 
Following his corollary, in Russia the only political actors 
who can have a lasting impact on the political discourse are 
key elites who have the capacity to attain high political office 
or to exert significant influence on the political system or on 
other major political actors, thus excluding the broader public 
and determining a narrower distribution than in the Western 
democratic countries. In fact, in Russia all the major political 
actors operate within a specific and limited sociopolitical 
structure: In the USSR, it was the rigid and exclusive Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) while in Russian Federation 
it is the President and the presidential apparatus. Despite some 
limitations during the Medvedev presidency and the major 
influence of Putin as prime minister (2008-2012), under Putin 
Russia emerged as a ‘super-presidential’ political system. 
Consequently, Kramer focuses on the power ‘resources’ – 
including money and credit, control over employment, control 
of mass media, high social status, knowledge and specialized 
expertise, popularity and public admiration of one’s personal 
qualities, legality, social access to community leaders, com- 
mitments of followers, staffing support, and control over the 
interpretation of community norms and values – that can be 
marshaled by key elites to exert influence or to achieve political 
goals. Henceforward, he evidences how these elements must be 
considered in the Russian context – taking sufficient account 
of the structural dimension of political power – and defines a 
methodology to determine whether – and how – these elements 
specifically fit the Russian context, how its Russian actors 
possess them and finally how to weigh the relative importance 
of the resources, figuring out which are likely to be most 
important in particular situations and for particular actors. 
Furthermore, Kramer proceeds his analysis on the limits of 
the ‘reputational assessments’ – that become a proxy for experi-
mental assessments of key elites’ perceptions of other elites’ 
power in terms of their affiliation power and temporal power 
– and enunciates the methodological problematics related to 
measuring them in terms of semi-structured interviews – that 
could prove misleading results – or also analyzing media and 
press coverages – considering that these means are controlled by 
the state and are under the pressure of the authorities. Thus, the 
author also implies the examination of some representational 
and symbolic indicators, revealing how in Russia power of key 
individuals might be reflected in (and strengthened by) their 
membership on Russia’s Security Council, their membership 
on various presidential (or prime ministerial) commissions and 
advisory bodies, their roles in key governmental organs, and 
their positions in the dominant political party (Edinaya Rossiya). 
As well, Kramer considers the symbolic trappings of influ- 
ence – such as an official chauffeur and limousine, an 
official residence, a large staff, frequent appearances or mentions 
on state television, and the receipt of official commendations * We thank Sara I. Rohani for the English revision of some parts of this volume.
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and awards – in order to estimate the effective relevance of some 
figures within the political system. Despite these indicators have 
to be cautiously used, they can be a valuable supplement to 
other metrics. Hence, Kramer finally enunciates techniques for 
assessing political power. Above all, he considers the observation 
of the consequences and the impact on decision-making and 
other forms of behavior. In this regard, despite evidencing a 
rivalry of administrative apparatuses, Kramer examines the 
‘conflicts’ between Putin and Medvedev during the latter’s 
interregnum, evaluating the initial divergences and then the final 
decisions that were mostly in line with Putin initial positions. 
Thus, his theoretical preamble on political power – in terms 
of the capacity to exert political influence or to achieve political 
outcomes – becomes the key to understand how the national 
political discourse is shaped in contemporary Russia. Thanks 
to this necessary premise on how the distribution of political 
power has changed over time, we can more clearly link those 
changes to variations in Russia’s prevailing political discourse, 
defining a set of ideas that become dominant because an 
extremely power political patron has decided to give them an 
official imprimatur.
The first part of the essays is dedicated to the State’s political 
discourse and ideological references in contemporary Russia, 
exploring the possible existence of a multiplicity of political 
discourses associated with the contemporary Russian state 
and its various organs. The discussions concern the plurality 
and fluidity allowed within the state political language, the 
relationship between the party, the presidential adminis-
tration, the bureaucracies, the media, the different places 
of ideological production, the role played by scholars and 
other intellectuals, etc. Thus, in the first chapter Alexey 
Barabashev analyzes the ‘hidden influence’ of bureaucracy 
on the Russian political discourse and its ‘procedural’ nature. 
As an example, the author reconstructs the experience of the 
non-public ‘working groups’ – the effective area of debates and 
negotiations among governmental bodies – that involve experts, 
scholars and the higher managers of the public administration. 
These groups are involved in long processes of preparation of 
‘tables of disagreements,’ a special kind of documents where 
emerge the limits of the populistic political announcements 
and their effective implementation at legislative or regulatory 
levels. Hence, the author evidences the differences between the 
‘hard’ (radical) political narratives and their ‘softer’ (moderate) 
versions within the state apparatus, marking the divergences 
within a state machine that appears as organic entity rather 
than a monolithic unit.
In the second chapter, Anton Barbashin investigates the 
Russian political discourse following the evolutions of Moscow’s 
foreign policy in Putin’s era. Hence, the author marks the 
narrative features of Russia that in 2000-2004 considered herself 
as an allied – not to say a part – of the West; and the rivalries 
emerged in the period 2005-2012 when Moscow began to 
pursue a parallel agenda finding hopes within the BRICS front. 
Thus, the author recalls how in 2012 – with the third presidential 
mandate of Putin – the Kremlin pursued an agenda aimed at 
affirming the ‘Greatpowerness’ of the country in the interna-
tional scenario and how, in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis 
in 2014, the political discourse changed from liberal to a more 
realist attitude while assuming much more revanchist tones.
In the third chapter, Olga Malinova surveys the role of the 
‘experts’ in determining the path of Russian political discourse. 
These expert organizations and think tanks are, directly or 
indirectly, representative of or related to specific political 
actors and are framed within the policymaking process, 
competing among each other for affirming their influence. In 
her historical perspective, the author evidences the multiplicity 
of these actors in the Russian political scenario and finds 
the specific features of their relations with state authorities 
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during the Medvedev-Putin ‘tandem’ period (2008-2011), 
their role in setting new public agenda over the president 
election (2011-2013) and after the 2014 Crimean crisis. Hence, 
the author marks the important role that these groups have, 
becoming a sort of ‘ideological agents’ that invest in a patriotic 
narrative functional to the official political discourse of those 
actors seeking to strengthen their positions.
Therefore, after detecting some of the effective players that 
contribute in the definition of Russian political discourse, the 
debate focus on the main ideological constructs sponsored 
by the current Russian state, their relation to similar notions 
existing in the West – in terms of mutual influences, adaptations, 
imitation or rejection – and the possible existence of “sacred” 
topics closed for discussion, besides the purity of the victory in 
World War II and the Orthodox Legacy. 
Thus, in the fourth chapter, Maria Engström focuses on the 
neo-conservative interpretation that sets Russia as Katechon – 
a ‘restrainer’ and protective agent – against the forces of chaos 
in the world. Hence, this interpretation treats orthodoxy as a 
political religion, emphasizing the connection of the Russian 
Church with war and building the myth of Russia that imposes 
its atomic orthodoxy and defends the supposedly ‘true’ Western 
world resisting to evil by force. This messianic ideologeme 
is claimed to be a national idea while its actualization and 
the extensive use of collective cultural memory in contem-
porary political discourse so become one of the main factors 
accounting for the popularity of Putin’s politics of ‘ideological 
sovereignty’ in foreign and security policy among the elite and 
ordinary Russian citizens.
Additionally, in the fifth chapter Andrei Melville tests neo- 
conservatism as a solid but controversial national idea for 
Russia, conceptualizing the ‘fortress Russia’ as the core of the 
(neo-conservative) ideological consensus between the ‘power 
state,’ the elites and the population. The author even includes 
the return to geopolitics and the new ideological warfare in the 
multipolar scenario where Russia found its dimension following 
a neo-conservative narrative; while at domestic level this 
discourse also become a key source of the domestic support. 
Nevertheless, despite this political discourse is aimed at legit- 
imizing the current regime and it is functional at keeping the 
status quo, it can be threatened by certain factors of crisis that 
may distort the needs of the populations that could choose to 
‘replace the TV with the fridge.’
These debates were significant in defining some of the key 
features of the Russian political discourses and their recent 
evolutions. Nevertheless, these developments are necessarily 
correlated with the failure of a political discourse that in 
the early 90s was welcomed as the only possible solution 
for Russia. Thus, the second part of the essays is focused on 
notions of liberalism and its demise, exploring the possible 
existence of a multiplicity of ‘liberalisms’ in contemporary 
Russia. The Russian liberal experiments are evident legacies of 
the historical pre-revolutionary culture and literature and were 
obviously influenced by the Soviet experience, perestroika and 
the early 1990s. As well, the impact of Western liberal domestic 
and foreign policies on Russia’s liberal ideas and expectations 
– and vice versa – and the role of the remaining institutions 
and actors encouraging political, economic, and constitutional 
liberalism are keys for testing the waters on one of the most 
cryptic subject related to contemporary Russia.
In the sixth chapter, Nina Khrushcheva examines the 
cultural contradictions of post-communist Russian illiberalism, 
revealing the cultural legacy and its influence on Russian 
political thought. In her historical reconstruction, the author 
finds some key elements as the fear for change, a general 
subjection to inertia and the perception of crisis in its merely 
negative connotation in order to find the roots of the trends of 
‘undemocratic liberalism’ of the Yeltsin years and to the ‘illiberal 
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democracy’ of the Putin’s era. Hence, she analyzes Putin 
under the philosophical traditions of Chicherin and Ilyin, 
marking the relevance of concepts of ‘liberal-conservatism’ 
and ‘dictatorship of law’ in a state that would invariably feel 
threatened by the global challenges.
In the seventh chapter, Nadezhda Azhgikhina gave her 
personal testimony in discussing the liberal trends – and liberal 
mythology – in contemporary Russian media. Recalling the early 
enthusiasm of perestroika and the intellectuals’ expectations for 
a changing society, for free press and for the first openings after 
decades of authoritarian regime, the author evidences the 1991 
coup attempt as a turning point that undermined the transition 
towards democracy disillusionment in the latest generation of 
Soviet intelligentsia. The progressive change of narrative in the 
political discourse, the authoritarian trends manifested since the 
early 90s, the situation in Russian media that is sadly well known 
while the liberal agenda appeared indefinitely postponed lead 
us to consider a contraction of freedom gained at the end of the 
80s while a just smaller group of professional journalists resists 
in defending the freedom of information and remained aimed 
at realizing a sustainable democratic regime.
Finally, in the eighth chapter Vladislav Zubok offers his 
conclusions, in historical perspective, reflecting on the roots 
of liberal ‘unsuccess’ in Russia. In his analysis, the author 
examines the role of the elites – comparing groups of 19th 
and early 20th centuries with those of the early 1990s – from an 
intellectual-cultural perspective, evidenced in the first ruptures 
with the 1917 revolutions and the missed opportunities to 
liberalize USSR. Then, he recalls how the repeated failures of 
reforms in Russia – especially during the 90s – created a sense of 
‘unsuccess,’ a fatal path dependency, and became a discredited 
set of value identified as ‘American’ ones while the majority 
of Russians would prefer to sacrifice their civic freedom for 
the sake of security and stability. Zubok so recalls the reasons 
of ‘unsuccess’ of liberalism in its complicated relations with 
nationalists and with the Yeltsin’s regime; in the Russian elite’s 
slow adaptability to quick reforms; in its failure in providing 
the basic ‘check and balance’ instruments and in creating the 
preconditions for state governability; and in its resistance in 
learning from its past failures and mistakes. Conversely, since 
2013 the Putin version of conservativism has advanced in 
the face of the cosmopolitan, postmodern, ‘decadent’ liberal 
practices of the West in a moment when, regrettably, the liberal 
alternative is particularly weak and under attack in the West.
Theoretical Introduction  
Political Power and Political Discourse  
in Russia: Conceptual Issues
Mark Kramer, Harvard University
In Russia, as in numerous other countries, political power is 
closely linked with political discourse. The dominant political 
figure in Russia over the past seventeen years, Vladimir Putin, 
has used his political power to shape the prevailing political 
discourse and to marginalize certain strains of thought and 
exclude them from the public arena, particularly those 
connected with liberal democracy, human rights, and free 
elections. Conversely, some thinkers in Russia have sought to 
empower their ideas by seeking links with the Putin adminis-
tration and by putting their ideas into a format congenial to 
the highest policymakers. This does not necessarily mean that 
these thinkers suddenly become informal advisers to policy-
makers or ever have direct contact with them, but their ideas 
can gain prominence and enter the political discourse because 
leading officials in the political arena, especially Putin, have 
chosen to adopt and empower those ideas.
To understand the link between political power and 
political discourse, we first need to specify what political power 
is and how it can best be understood in the Russian context. 
This essay begins by reviewing how the concept of power 
has been discussed in the social sciences from the early 20th 
century to the present. This synopsis of different theoretical 
frameworks allows us to appraise the relevance of particular 
frameworks to the political context in Russia. The essay looks 
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at the question of structure versus agency (i.e., how the power 
of individuals and groups is affected by the social context in 
which they are embedded) and distinguishes between power, 
on the one hand, and the exercise of power, on the other. 
1. The Concept of Power
The concept of power has preoccupied political philosophers 
since at least the time of Plato and Aristotle. Almost every major 
philosopher over the centuries – Machiavelli, Hume, Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, and many others – pondered the subject at length. 
Since the early 20th century, scholars in the social sciences – 
especially political science and sociology – have examined 
the concept of power in painstaking detail. Yet, despite the 
immense amount of thought that has gone into the subject, no 
consensus has emerged about even the most basic aspects of 
power. Scholars disagree about the nature of power (whether 
it is a latent attribute of an actor or is inherent to a social 
relationship), the purpose for which it is exercised (power over 
someone versus power to achieve a desired result), the extent to 
which power hinges on the expectations of key actors, and the 
feasibility of measuring power before it is actually exercised.1
    The definition of power put forth by the great German 
sociologist Max Weber in his posthumously published classic 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft is still highly influential.2 Weber 
conceived of power as the capacity of a social actor to achieve a 
desired outcome even if confronted by resistance. Specifically, 
Weber wrote: “Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer 
sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben 
durchzusetzen, gleichviel, worauf diese Chance beruht.”2 In the 
standard English translation of Weber’s works (the version almost 
always cited by American social scientists), this formulation has 
been imperfectly rendered as “Power is the probability that one 
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which 
this probability rests.” A more precise translation would be 
“Power is the opportunity within a social relationship to achieve 
one’s will against opposition, regardless of what this opportunity 
is based on.” Key elements of Weber’s definition – the notion 
that power exists only within a social relationship, is consciously 
directed toward a goal, and is exercised over others – are still 
widely invoked today.
Another early contribution to the study of power – albeit 
one of transitory significance – was made by the British 
political scientist Harold Lasswell, who in his 1948 book Power 
and Personality defined power as “relations in which severe 
1 For valuable recent anthologies and overviews of the vast literature, see 
Stewart R. Clegg and Mark Haugaard (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Power, Sage 
Publications, London 2009; Mark Haugaard (ed.), Power: A Reader, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester 2002; Martin J. Smith, Power and the State, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2009; John Scott, Power, Polity Press, Cambridge 2002; and 
Stewart R. Clegg, David Courpasson, and Nelson X. Phillips, Power and Organi- 
zations, Sage Publications, London 2006.
2 Weber died abruptly of pneumonia in 1920 before he could finish assembling 
the many different texts that were later published as a single book under the title 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Numerous scholars have shown that the wording and 
organization (and even the title) of the initial German editions of the book (not 
to mention the English translation) did not fully conform to Weber’s wishes. For 
convincing analyses demonstrating that the first several editions of the book departed 
significantly from Weber’s intentions, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Zur Entstehung von 
Max Webers hinterlassenem Werk Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Sociologie, Zeitschrift 
für Staatswissenschaft und Staatspraxis, 11/6, 2000, pp. 160-189; Wolfgang Schluch-
ter, Max Webers Beitrag zum Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, Kölner Zeitschrift für Sozio- 
logie und Sozialpsychologie, 50/2, June 1998, pp. 327-343; and Wolfgang Schluchter 
‘Kopf’ oder ‘Doppelkopf’ – das ist hier die Frage: Replik auf Hiroshi Orihara, Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 51/4, December 1999, pp. 735-743.
3 Max Weber (author) and Edith Hanke, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Thomas 
Kroll (eds.), Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen 
Ordnungen und Mächten, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen 2005, p. 128.
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deprivations are expected to follow the breach of a pattern of 
conduct.”4 Lasswell’s treatment of the subject, building on the 
analysis of a pioneering American political scientist, Charles 
E. Merriam, especially Merriam’s book Political Power (1934), 
influenced the work of the American social scientist Herbert A. 
Simon, who published an article in 1953 that explicitly addressed 
the question of how to measure power.5 Simon used the terms 
“power” and “influence” interchangeably – an approach that 
few analysts would condone today – and offered a strictly 
logical-positivist conception of power, which he defined as “an 
asymmetrical relation between the behavior of two persons [in 
which] a change in the behavior of one […] alters the behavior 
of the other.” Simon then considered how to gauge the distri-
bution of power in a particular social unit. He stressed that in 
a power relationship the participants’ expectations might, in 
principle, give a good sense of the actual distribution of power, 
but in practice each actor’s expectations were likely to change in 
accordance with the others’ anticipated reactions. This process, 
Simon acknowledged, was bound to complicate attempts to 
measure power. Simon’s essay was followed by numerous other 
articles in the 1950s and 1960s that dealt with the question 
of how to measure power. The surge of publications on this 
matter reflected the ascendance of “behavioralism” in the social 
sciences, especially in the United States. Scholars associated 
with the behavioralist school – Simon, John G. March, Robert 
A. Dahl, John Harsanyi, William H. Riker, Steven J. Brams, 
and others – sought to devise rigorous methods of measuring, 
comparing, and modeling political power.6
2. Behavioralism and the “Faces of Power”
Arguably the most influential behavioralist view of power was 
put forth by Robert Dahl, who, in an oft-cited formulation, 
contended that “A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”7 
This conception of power, unlike Weber’s definition, focuses 
solely on A’s power over someone else, rather than A’s power to 
achieve something desired. Yet Dahl, in his subsequent analysis, 
departed from his own definition and largely embraced Weber’s. 
Dahl maintained that the only way to measure the political 
power of individuals and groups is by looking at their “ability 
to affect decision-making.” He sought to gauge the distribution 
of political power in the United States by examining political 
4 Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality, W.W. Norton, New York 1948, 
p. 12. The same definition was offered in a book Lasswell co-authored with Kaplan 
two years later: Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: 
A Framework for Political Inquiry, Yale University Press, New Haven 1950.
5 Herbert A. Simon, Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political 
Power, The Journal of Politics, 15/4, November 1953, pp. 500-516.
6 John G. March, An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence, 
American Political Science Review, 49/2, June 1955, pp. 431-451; John R. P. French, 
Jr., A Formal Theory of Power, Psychological Review, 63/3, May 1956, pp. 181-194; 
John G. March, Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence, The Journal 
of Politics, 19/2, May 1957, pp. 202-226; Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 
Behavioral Science, 2/3, July 1957, pp. 201-215; John C. Harsanyi, Measurement of 
Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games, 
Behavioral Science, 7/1, January 1962, pp. 67-80; John C. Harsanyi, Measurement 
of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations, Behavioral Science, 7/1, 
January 1962, pp. 81-91; Steven J. Brams, Measuring the Concentration of Power 
in Political Systems, American Political Science Review, 62/2, June 1968, pp. 461-
475; and Alvin I. Goldman, On the Measurement of Power, Journal of Philosophy, 
71/8, May 1974, pp. 231-252. For three critiques from varying perspectives, see 
William H. Riker, Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power, American Political Science 
Review, 58/2, June 1964, pp. 341-349; Stefano Passioli, On Power, Its Intensity and 
Distribution, European Journal of Political Research, 1/2, June 1973, pp. 163-177; 
and Roderick Bell, Political Power: The Problem of Measurement, in Roderick Bell, 
David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner (eds.), Political Power: A Reader in The-
ory and Research, The Free Press, New York 1969, pp. 13-28, 353-354.
7 Dahl, The Concept of Power, pp. 201-215. Dahl modified his definition of 
power somewhat in later years but did not alter his contention that the only way to 
measure power was by observing changes in behavior. See, for example, Robert A. 
Dahl, Power, in David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
Macmillan-The Free Press, New York 1968, Vol. 12, pp. 405-415.
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decision-making on three “key issue areas” (urban redevel-
opment, public education, and nominations for public office) 
in the city of New Haven, Connecticut, which he saw as a 
microcosm of U.S. society. Dahl found that no single individual 
or group of elites in the city – not even the wealthiest business 
executives – regularly held sway on more than one of these 
three issues and that no group was entirely excluded from 
having at least some influence.8 Hence, in Dahl’s depiction, 
prominent elites and groups in New Haven could not automat-
ically marshal resources such as wealth to control decision-
making. Instead, a multiplicity of individuals and groups vied 
with one another to influence the outcomes. Definitions aside, 
the assumption underlying Dahl’s analysis – that the only way 
to measure political power, at least in the United States, is to 
explore how decisions are made on “key issue areas” – involves 
a conception of power as “power to” rather than “power over.” 
Other scholars have therefore characterized Dahl’s approach to 
the study of power as the “decision-making approach” or the 
“decision method.”
Much the same is true about many other social scientists 
who, to varying degrees, embraced Dahl’s initial formulation 
about power (the notion that A has power over B if he can force 
B to do something) but then ended up analyzing how power 
was exercised to achieve something. In a 1962 article, Richard 
M. Emerson argued that “the power of actor A over actor 
B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be 
potentially overcome by A.”9 This definition is an even starker 
conception of power as “power over,” yet Emerson went on 
to assess how A exercises power to achieve a desired end. 
Similarly, Dorwin Cartwright proposed a definition of power as 
simply the capacity to exert influence over someone: “When an 
agent, O, performs an act resulting in some change in another 
agent, P, we say that O influences P. If O has the capability 
of influencing P, we say that O has power over P.”10 Some 
econometric analyses of power have used this definition, which 
sees power as being exercised for its own sake. Cartwright 
himself, however, often treated power as the capacity to achieve 
goals, not just to exert influence. Dahl’s assessment of power 
in New Haven was designed in part as a response to sociol-
ogists like Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills, who insisted 
that political power and economic power in the United States 
were highly concentrated in the hands of a small ruling class 
(what Mills called a “power elite”).11 Dahl, Nelson W. Polsby, 
and many others pointed out that Hunter and Mills assumed 
in advance that power in the United States was very highly 
concentrated and that their analysis was tailored to fit a 
predetermined conclusion. Dahl and Polsby also faulted the 
“power elite” sociologists for assuming that the power structure 
in a community is stable and immutable and for developing an 
argument that was essentially non-falsifiable.12 Dahl’s aims were 
thus twofold: to develop a rigorous way of analyzing political 
power; and to present evidence that power in the United States 
8 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, 
Yale University Press, New Haven 1961.
9 Richard M. Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations, American Sociological 
Review, 27/1, February 1962, pp. 31-41.
10 Dorwin Cartwright, Influence, Leadership, and Control, in James G. March 
(ed.), Handbook of Organizations, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago 1965, pp. 1-47. 
See also Dorwin Cartwright, A Field Theoretical Conception of Power, in Dorwin 
Cartwright (ed.), Studies in Social Power, Institute for Social Research – University 
of Michigan, Ann Arbor 1959, pp. 183-220.
11 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1953; C. Wright Mills, The Power 
Elite, Oxford University Press, New York 1956; Roland Pellegrini and Charles 
H. Coates, Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure, Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 61/5, March 1956, pp. 413-419; and Robert O. Schulze, 
Economic Dominants and Community Power Structure, American Sociological 
Review, 23/1, February 1958, pp. 3-9.
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was much more diffuse than Mills and Hunter had claimed.
Dahl’s conception of political power initially proved 
influential but soon came under withering epistemological 
and ontological criticism. The validity of his “decision-making 
approach” was challenged early on by Peter Bachrach and 
Morton Baratz, who, despite agreeing with Dahl’s rebuttal of 
the “ruling elite” thesis, criticized him on two methodological 
grounds. First, they argued that by focusing exclusively on 
decision-making, he overlooked the possibility that “some 
person or association could limit decision-making to relatively 
non-controversial matters by influencing community values and 
political procedures and rituals.” If key elites were able to 
entrench their own preferred “social and political values and 
institutional practices” for their whole community, they could 
prevent any public consideration of issues that would be 
“seriously detrimental to [their own] preferences.” Bachrach 
and Baratz averred that this second “face of power” – the ability 
to set the political agenda, or what they infelicitously described 
as “nondecision-making” – was more crucial than Dahl’s 
first “face” (decision-making) in reflecting an actor’s power. 
As they put it: “To the extent that a person or group – consciously 
or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public 
airing of political conflicts, that person or group has power.”13 
The other objection raised by Bachrach and Baratz is that 
Dahl failed to provide any “objective criteria for distinguishing 
between ‘important’ and ‘unimportant’ issues arising in the 
political arena” – a shortcoming that magnified the pitfalls of 
his sole focus on overt decision-making. Although Bachrach 
and Baratz in their later writings on the topic did not clearly 
indicate whether efforts to manipulate and control the political 
agenda were apt to be mostly intentional or unintentional, their 
epistemological critique of Dahl landed some telling blows.14 
Even scholars who criticized Bachrach and Baratz on various 
grounds – for supposedly putting forth an untestable and 
unverifiable thesis, for making unsubstantiated assumptions, 
or for being methodologically lax – were wont to agree that 
agenda-setting must be given at least as much weight as 
decision-making in analyses of power.15
The Bachrach-Baratz “faces of power” argument was 
extended by the British political theorist Steven Lukes, who, 
in a short essay published as a booklet in 1974, averred that 
Bachrach and Baratz omitted a crucial “third dimension” of 
power, namely, the ability of actor A to shape the preferences 
and desires of actors B and C.16 Borrowing from Gramsci, 
Lukes argued that A can maintain power over B and C “by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such 
a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things.” 
12 In addition to Dahl’s critiques, see Nelson W. Polsby, How to Study Com-
munity Power: The Pluralist Alternative, The Journal of Politics, 22/3, August 1960, 
pp. 474-484; Nelson W. Polsby, Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power, 
American Sociological Review, 24/6, December 1959, pp. 796-803; Nelson W. Polsby, 
Community Power and Political Theory, Yale University Press, New Haven 1963; and 
Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City: Politics in the 
Metropolis, Russell Sage Foundation, New York 1960.
13 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, The Two Faces of Power, American 
Political Science Review, 56/4, December 1962, pp. 947-952.
14 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Decisions and Non-Decisions: An 
Analytical Framework, American Political Science Review, 57/3, September 1963, 
pp. 632-642; and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory 
and Practice, Oxford University Press, New York 1970.
15 For some of the harsher critiques, see Raymond Wolfinger, Nondecisions 
and the Study of Local Politics, American Political Science Review, 65/4, December 
1971, pp. 1063-1080; Geoffrey Debnam, Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces 
of Bachrach and Baratz, American Political Science Review, 69/1, March 1973, pp. 
889-899; and Frederick W. Frey, Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of 
Power, American Political Science Review, 65/4, December 1971, pp. 1081-1101.
16 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan, London 1974. An ex-
panded 2nd edition of the book, more than three times the original length, was pub-
lished in 2005 by Palgrave Macmillan.
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According to Lukes, this “third dimension” is “the supreme 
and most insidious” form of power because A exercises it “to 
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances.” 
The implication is that A, in exercising power over B and C, 
necessarily acts in a way “contrary to [their] interests.”17 Lukes’s 
three-dimensional view of power came under attack from 
many quarters, not least because of his insistence on designing 
an analytical approach that was inextricably bound up with 
normative questions. James Hyland, among others, argued that 
Lukes’s claim of being able to discern actors’ “real interests,” 
as opposed to their “subjective preferences,” underscored 
the “epistemological relativism” of his conception of power.18 
Some other scholars complained that Lukes’s third dimension 
of power (preference-shaping) was even more difficult to test 
than the Bachrach-Baratz notion of agenda-setting.19 This latter 
objection lost some of its force, however, after one of Lukes’s 
former students, John Gaventa, produced a sophisticated study 
of political power in the Appalachian Valley that seemed to 
show not only how the dominant local actors were able to affect 
political decision-making and agenda-setting but also how they 
could rely on ideological precepts, myths, and symbols to shape 
and reshape the local residents’ preferences.20
3. The Shift Away from Behavioralism
Debate about the “faces” (or “dimensions”) of power persisted 
well into the 1980s, but increasingly the whole paradigm came 
under challenge from scholars who rejected the behavioral- 
ist thrust of the existing scholarship and sought to develop 
structural conceptions of political power.21 The trend toward 
structural theories had been prefigured as far back as the late 
1960s and early 1970s not only in the work of Talcott Parsons, 
who in his later writings conceived of political power as a facili-
tating medium in a sociopolitical system (analogous to money 
in an economic system),22 but also in studies produced by a 
few scholars who focused on political power in urban settings. 
In particular, the sociologist Terry N. Clark expressed dissatis-
faction with the behavioralists’ focus on “dyadic formulations 
[that] tend to omit any reference to goals or to the broader 
structure […] within which power is exercised.”23 Clark offered 
a definition of power as “the potential ability of an actor or 
actors to select, to change, and to attain the goals of a social 
system.” This formulation, he argued, underscored the context- 
dependent nature of power, which he believed should be seen 
within the social context in which it is exercised. “An individual 
actor,” Clark wrote, “is considered powerful only in relation to 
a given social system because it is often extremely difficult for an 
actor powerful in one system (such as a legislature) to transfer 
17 Ibid., p. 27.
18 James L. Hyland, Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations, Manch- 
ester University Press, Manchester 1995, p. 203.
19 Robert J. Mokken and Franz N. Stokman, Power and Influence in Political 
Phenomena, in Brian Barry (ed.), Power and Political Theory: Some European Per-
spectives, John Wiley, London 1976, pp. 33-54, esp. 45; Barry Barnes, Power, in 
Ralph Bellamy (ed.), Theories and Concepts of Politics: An Introduction, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester 1993, p. 200; and Alan Bradshaw, A Critique of Steven 
Lukes’ ‘Power: A Radical View,’ Sociology, 10/1, January 1976, pp. 121-127.
20 John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an 
Appalachian Valley, University of Illinois Press, Urbana 1980.
21 On this trend, see Clarissa Rile Hayward, De-Facing Power, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 2000, pp. 22-26.
22 See, in particular, Talcott Parsons, On the Concept of Political Power, 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 107/3, June 1963, pp. 232-263. 
See also Talcott Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, The Free Press, 
New York 1967.
23 Terry N. Clark, The Concept of Power, in Terry N. Clark (ed.), Community 
Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses, Chandler Publishing Com-
pany, San Francisco 1968, pp. 45-81.
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his resources to a second system (such as another legislature).”24 
Although Clark did not systematically develop his framework 
and left some gaps and ambiguities, his conception of power 
adumbrated the structural theories that emerged later.
The advent of structural conceptions of political power was 
heralded in 1984 with the publication of Anthony Giddens’s The 
Constitution of Society outlining his theory of “structuration” 
and, even more, in 1987 with the appearance of Jeffrey Isaac’s 
wide-ranging ontological critique of the “faces of power” 
literature. Isaac argued that “the behavioralist foundations of the 
debate [over the works of Dahl, Bachrach-Baratz, and Lukes] 
constrained its participants from conceiving power as anything 
more than a behavioral regularity.”25 Isaac averred that the quest 
for “behavioral regularities” had taken scholarship in the wrong 
direction and that analysts of political power should instead be 
focusing on “the enduring social relationships that structure” 
individuals’ political behavior. He emphasized that even though 
the underlying social structures – institutions, rules, and practices 
– are relatively “enduring,” they are not permanent or immutable. 
This same point was stressed by Thomas Wartenberg, who, in 
several publications elucidating the concept of “situated power,” 
maintained that structural conditions can and do change, albeit 
very slowly most of the time.26 Isaac, Wartenberg, Giddens, Barry 
Barnes, and other social scientists explored how structural 
conditions can affect the exercise of power and entrench the 
power of key individuals and groups.27 To illustrate the point, 
Isaac noted that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) wielded great power over the Soviet population. “The 
CPSU,” he wrote, had “power over the Soviet masses by virtue 
of the structure of Soviet society in which political power 
[was] monopolized by a single party.” Scholars who simply 
embarked on “a search for behavioral regularities,” rather than 
analyzing “the nature of Soviet society,” would never gain a full 
understanding of political power in the USSR.28
Although the structural theorists abandoned the behav- 
ioralists’ exclusive focus on dyadic power relationships 
between A and B, they did so without resorting to the structural 
determinism that plagues the works of Michel Foucault, 
Pierre Bourdieu, and the structural Marxists. Even as Isaac, 
Wartenberg, and others took account of the broad social context 
in which A has power to do something that might affect B, they 
left ample room for A’s agency. A’s power, they argued, is part 
of his “inherent nature” (which encompasses his personal traits 
as well as his social power), but A’s decision whether and how 
to exercise his power is dependent on his free will as well as on 
the structural factors that circumscribe his actions. In the USSR, 
for example, an individual’s political power depended largely 
on his place in the Soviet social structure, but the individual 
chose for himself whether and how to exercise his power. In this 
case and others, as Isaac put it, political power was “distributed 
by the various enduring structural relationships in society and 
24 Ibid., p. 46. See also Terry N. Clark, The Concept of Power: Some Overem-
phasized and Underrecognized Dimensions – An Examination with Special Reference 
to the Local Community, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 48/4, December 
1967, pp. 271-286.
25 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Struc-
turation, Polity Press, Cambridge 1984; and Jeffrey Isaac, Beyond the Three Faces of 
Power: A Realist Critique, Polity, 20/1, Autumn 1987, pp. 4-31. See also Jeffrey Isaac, 
Power and Marxist Theory: A Realist View, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1987.
26 Thomas Wartenberg, The Forms of Power: From Domination to Transfor-
mation, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1990. See also Thomas Wartenberg, 
Introduction, in Thomas Wartenberg (ed.), Rethinking Power, State University of 
New York Press, Albany 1992, pp. xi-xxxvi.
27 For relevant work by Barnes, see Barry Barnes, The Nature of Power, Polity 
Press, Cambridge 1988; and Barry Barnes, Power, in Ralph Bellamy (ed.), Theories 
and Concepts of Politics: An Introduction, Manchester University Press, Manchester 
1993, pp. 197-219.
28 Isaac, Beyond the Three Faces of Power, p. 16.
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exercised by individuals and groups based on their location in 
a given [social] structure.”29 
Another structural conception of political power was 
developed in the mid-1990s by Colin Hay, who argued that 
power “is about context-shaping, about the capacity of actors 
to redefine the parameters of what is socially, politically, 
and economically possible for others.”30 Elaborating on this 
point, Hay emphasized “power relations in which structures, 
institutions, and organizations are shaped by human action in 
such a way as to alter the parameters of subsequent action.” This 
form of power, he argued, “is mediated by, and instantiated in, 
structures.” Examples of this phenomenon would include the 
legislature’s power to adopt a law and the president’s power to 
issue a decree. The ability to do these things – in the first instance 
a collective capacity and in the second an individual capacity 
– allows the parliament and president to shape the political 
context in a way that can influence both current and future 
action. Although Hay muddled his discussion by introducing 
what he called “direct power” into his framework and by 
occasionally conflating power with the exercise of power (the 
so-called exercise fallacy), his notion of context-shaping adds a 
valuable dimension to the question of structure versus agency.
The structural frameworks of political power highlighted 
a distinction that came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s 
between “power over” (the capacity to influence others, usually 
coercively) and “power to” (the capacity to achieve desired 
outcomes). This distinction was mentioned by Dennis H. Wrong 
in his wide-ranging book on power, first published in 1979, and 
was then developed much more systematically by Peter Morriss 
in his important “philosophical analysis” of power published 
in 1987.31 After surveying the diverse forms and uses of power, 
including political power, Wrong argued that power should be 
understood as “both a generalized capacity to attain ends that 
is unequally distributed among the members of a society as a 
result of the structure of its major institutions, on the one hand, 
and an asymmetrical social relation among persons manifested 
directly in social interaction or indirectly through anticipated 
reactions, on the other.”32 Morriss, Isaac, and other scholars 
pointed out that Dahl, Bachrach-Baratz, and Lukes had all 
emphasized conceptions of power that focused exclusively on 
A’s power over B, even though their subsequent analyses focused 
on power to do certain things, such as influencing decision-
making, controlling agenda-setting, and shaping preferences. 
Morriss aptly observed that the conceptual discussions offered 
by Dahl and the others had given the impression that “the 
subordination of B is the objective of A’s power.” This approach, 
Morriss argued, is “deplorable” because “our ability to kick 
others around (or to harm their interests, or get them to do 
things they don’t want to do) can scarcely encompass everything 
we understand as power in social contexts.” Moving beyond 
Wrong’s point about the ways of conceiving power, Morriss 
stressed that “power over” should be seen as just a special case 
of “power to”:
29 Ibid., p. 28.
30 Colin Hay, Divided by a Common Language: Political Theory and the Concept 
of Power, Politics, 17/1, February 1997, pp. 45-52.
31 Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses, Harper and Row, New 
Brunswick 1979, pp. 218-257 (especially pp. 219-221, 237-251); and Peter Morriss, 
Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1987, 
pp. 32-35. A second edition of Wrong’s book with a new preface (but the rest of the 
book unchanged) was published in 1988. A third edition, with another new pref-
ace, was published by Transaction Publishers in 1995. A second edition of Morriss’s 
book with a new foreword appeared in 2002. The distinction between power-to 
and power-over had been raised previously by some other scholars such as Talcott 
Parsons, but he conceived of power solely in collective (social) terms. Morris ex-
plores the distinction far more systematically and insightfully, making it a major 
theme of his book and applying it to individual as well as group power.
32 Wrong, Preface, in Wrong, Power (1988 edition), p. iv.
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If we are interested in the “conflictual aspect” of power, we can very 
easily look at someone’s power to kick others around, or their power to 
win conflicts. Everything that needs to be said about power can be said 
using the idea of the capacity to effect outcomes – unless we are mes- 
merized by a desire to get the notion of affecting into power at all costs.33 
Most theoretical discussions of political power in recent 
years have accepted Morriss’s (and Wrong’s) view on this 
matter. Indeed, Lukes himself, despite having focused solely 
on “power over” in the original edition of his book, put out a 
much-expanded 2005 edition that went along with Morriss’s 
interpretation of the basic point. Power-to and power-over, 
Lukes said in 2005, “are two distinct variants,” and “the latter 
[power-to] is a sub-species of the former.”34 What Lukes did 
not point out, however, is that this key distinction, if properly 
upheld, would cast serious doubt on the whole framework of 
his earlier analysis of power.
4. Social-Psychological Conceptions of Power
Over the past several decades, the field of social psychology 
has generated influential approaches to the study of power that 
potentially can be adapted for an understanding of political 
power. The groundwork for this literature was laid by the 
renowned German social psychologist Kurt Lewin, who 
emigrated to the United States in 1932 and produced a large 
body of work until his untimely death in 1947.35 Building on 
Lewin’s insights, John R. P. French and Bertram Raven published 
a seminal essay in 1959 that laid out what they saw as five distinct 
“bases of social power.”36 Defining power as a force exercised 
by O over P, they argued that power is context-dependent and 
therefore has to be assessed as different “types of power” in 
separate “systems” (dimensions) of social life. Each of their five 
types of power entailed a different relationship between O and P 
and different forms of compliance by P with O’s wishes:
(1) reward power, based on P’s perception that O has theability to 
mediate rewards for him; (2) coercive power, based on P’s perception 
that O has the ability to mediate punishments for him; (3) legitimate 
power, based on the perception by P that O has a legitimate right to 
prescribe behavior for him; (4) referent power, based on P’s identifi-
cation with O [and]; (5) expert power, based on the perception that O 
has some special knowledge or expertness.37
The French-Raven essay inspired a great deal of work by 
scholars who sought to operationalize the fivefold typology (i.e., 
to develop specific scales for measuring the five types of power).38 
Although most of the attempts at operationalization were of 
dubious validity (in part because the scales were too narrow 
or included only a single item), numerous researchers sought 
33 Morriss, Power, p. 34 (all italics in original).
34 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, revised edition, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester 2005, p. 94. Despite this concession, Lukes kept his original text in-
tact, reprinting it as the first third of his expanded edition. In a critique of the new edi-
tion, Morris argued that “although Lukes [now] says that ‘power-to’ is the more cen-
tral concept, and ‘the ability to produce effects’ is the better definition of power, when 
he develops and defends his account he follows the old three-dimensional approach, 
which denied both claims.” See Peter Morriss, Steven Lukes on the Concept of Power, 
Political Studies Review, 4/2, May 2006, pp. 124-135. See also Steven Lukes, Reply 
to Comments, Political Studies Review, 4/2, May 2006, pp. 164-173. For a defense of 
Lukes’s revised position, see Avery Plaw, Lukes’s Three-Dimensional Model of Power 
Redux: Is It Still Compelling?, Social Theory and Practice, 33/3, July 2007, pp. 489-500.
35 See, in particular, Kurt Lewin, Analysis of the Concepts Whole, Differentiation 
and Unity, University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, 18/1, 1941, pp. 226-261.
36 John R. P. French and Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in Cartwright, 
(ed.), Studies in Social Power, pp. 150-167.
37 Ibid, pp. 155-156.
38 Raven later added to the typology a sixth base of power – informational 
power – which had been discussed in the original essay but was not then regarded as 
a separate base of power. See Bertram H. Raven, Social Influence and Power, in Ivan 
D. Steiner and Martin Fishbein (eds.), Current Studies in Social Psychology, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, New York 1965, pp. 399-444.
State and Political Discourse in Russia 4342 Mark Kramer
to develop sounder and more sophisticated ways to discern 
combined effects.39 More recent studies have lent empirical 
support to the French-Raven typology.40 Raven himself put 
forth a revised and expanded version of the original model 
in 1992, transforming it into a “power/interaction model of 
interpersonal influence,” which was more detailed and offered 
a dynamic conception of power.41 The revised model took 
account of how a political actor (O) would weigh the costs 
and benefits of using a particular type of power to influence a 
target (P). The revised model also allowed for changes in O’s 
motivations, changes in O’s assessment of the types of power 
at hand, and changes in the O-P power relationship resulting 
from changes in P’s perception of himself or of O.
Subsequent modifications to the French-Raven framework 
were designed to take account of P’s perception of O’s credi- 
bility. The assumption underlying this modification was that 
“a person with high credibility would be perceived as more 
powerful than a person with low credibility.”42 In addition, other 
social psychology researchers devised alternative frameworks. 
Of particular importance was the branch of research that began 
with the publication in 1976 of David Kipnis’s The Powerholders, 
which used a model focusing on powerful individuals and 
how they were affected by holding and exercising power over 
others.43 The model devised by Kipnis stipulated that O’s 
choice of how to use power would depend on the resources 
(power bases) O had available and the inhibitions O faced 
because of the expected costs of using power, the expected 
resistance from P, the nature of O’s values and attitudes, and the 
impact of social norms. This model was distinctive in stressing 
O’s perceptions both of himself and of P, predicting that the 
stronger the influence exerted by O, the more negative his 
appraisal of the target of the influence, namely P. Conversely, the 
stronger the influence exerted by O, the more positive his self- 
appraisal was apt to be – a phenomenon that Kipnis described 
as “metamorphic effects.” Although these sorts of effects are 
best studied in experimental settings, the model is potentially 
useful in understanding certain power relationships in Russia, 
such as Vladimir Putin’s full-scale campaign against Boris 
Berezovsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
In a subsequent landmark study based on extensive surveys 
and investigative work, Kipnis and two co-researchers found 
eight types of “influence tactics” adopted by O in relation to 
superiors, to co-workers, and to subordinates: assertiveness, 
ingratiation, rationality, sanctions, exchange, upward appeals, 
blocking, and coalitions. Kipnis and his colleagues also devel- 
oped multi-item scales to measure each tactic.44 A few years 
later, Kipnis and Stuart M. Schmidt compiled a Profile of 
Organizational Influence Strategies (POIS) based on revised 
versions of the initial scales and items. The categories and scales 
devised by Kipnis and his colleagues were widely adopted by 
39 For a critique of the many attempts at operationalization, see Philip M. Pod-
sakoff and Chester A. Schriesheim, Field Studies of French and Raven’s Bases of Pow-
er: Critique, Reanalysis, and Suggestions for Future Research, Psychological Bulletin, 
97/3, May 1985, pp. 387-411.
40 See, for example, Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 6th edition, 
Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River 2006.
41 Bertram H. Raven, A Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence: 
French and Raven Thirty Years Later, Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 
7/2, June 1992, pp. 217-244.
42 Mitchell S. Nesler, Herman Aguinis, Brian M. Quigley and James T. 
Tedeschi, The Effect of Credibility on Perceived Power, Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 23/17, 1993, pp. 1407-1425. This point had been raised by earlier ana-
lysts, including practitioners of game theory as well as social psychologists. See, for 
example, John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups, 
Wiley, New York 1959, p. 101.
43 David Kipnis, The Powerholders, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1976.
44 David Kipnis, Stuart M. Schmidt, and Ian Wilkinson, Intraorganizational In-
fluence Tactics: Explorations in Getting One’s Way, Journal of Applied Psychology, 
65/4, August 1980, pp. 440- 452.
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other researchers to conduct their own studies and tests, and 
in 1990 two significantly revised versions of the framework 
were proposed – one by Chester A. Schriesheim and Timothy 
R. Hinkin, and another by Gary Yukl and Cecilia M. Falbe.45 
Schriesheim and Hinkin carried out rigorous analyses that 
suggested the need to delete some of the subscales devised by 
Kipnis and his colleagues and to add new ones. Yukl and Falbe 
undertook a more far-reaching refinement and extension of 
the framework, an effort facilitated by their decision to draw 
on reports from both agents and targets of influence (rather 
than just agents, as in the study by Kipnis et al.). Their new 
typology of influence tactics comprised pressure tactics, upward 
appeals, exchange tactics, coalition tactics, ingratiating tactics, 
rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, and consultation 
tactics. The social psychology literature focuses on behavior in 
interpersonal relations, groups, and organizations and is not 
directly connected to the way power is distributed in political 
systems per se. Nonetheless, the literature does shed valuable 
light on the way political power is exercised. Moreover, the 
“bases of social power” laid out in the modified French-Raven 
framework and the categories of influence tactics highlighted 
by Kipnis and other researchers can potentially be incorporated 
into measurements of political power.
5. Political Power in The Russian Context
From this discussion we can extract eight points about the 
concept of political power that are worth enumerating here.
These points provide a conceptual basis for understanding 
political power in Russia today. 
1.  First, political power should be thought of as a disposi-
tional phenomenon, not a behavioral phenomenon. It can 
be defined as the capacity to exert political influence or to 
achieve political goals. The capacity to do something is not 
the same as actually doing it, and power therefore should not 
be confused with the exercise of power – the major fallacy of 
behavioralist conceptions. Even if we could measure A’s and 
B’s power with absolute certainty, this would not tell us how 
effective A or B would be in exercising it.
2. Second, the only political actors in Russia who can 
have a lasting impact on the political discourse are key 
elites who have the capacity to attain high political office or 
to exert significant influence on the political system or on 
other major political actors. The role of the broader public 
is excluded. In that sense, the range of relevant actors in 
Russia is narrower than in Western democratic countries, 
where the public at election time collectively determines 
who will hold political office and thereby decisively shapes 
the distribution of political power. In Russia, national 
elections have become mostly a formality in recent years. 
Hence, even though the public does play at least some 
political role in Russia – a role that stems in part from the 
potential for mass unrest to break out, as it did in December 
2011 and the first few months of 2012, and in part from 
the weight given to popularity ratings for Putin, which far 
outdistance those of other political actors – there is ample 
reason to focus exclusively on key elites.
45 Chester A. Schriesheim and Timothy R. Hinkin, Influence Tactics Used by 
Subordinates: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis and Refinement of the Kipnis, 
Schmidt, and Wilkinson Subscales, Journal of Applied Psychology, 75/3, June 1990, 
pp. 246-257; and Gary Yukl and Cecilia M. Falbe, Influence Tactics and Objectives in 
Upward, Downward, and Lateral Influence Attempts, Journal of Applied Psychology, 
75/2, April 1990, pp. 132-140.
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3. Third, all the major political actors operate within a 
specific sociopolitical structure that plays a crucial role in 
the distribution of political power. In the Soviet Union, 
the existence of the Communist system predetermined a 
great deal about who had political power and who did not. 
Until the end of the 1980s, no one outside the CPSU had 
any chance of attaining political power. Even those who 
belonged to the party often had little if any chance of gaining 
significant political power. The rigidly hierarchical and 
highly centralized structure of the CPSU underlay the distri-
bution of power. Although government ministries existed 
in parallel with the central party institutions, all senior and 
mid-level officials in those ministries were members of the 
CPSU and owed their chief loyalties to the party. For a brief 
while in the spring of 1953, Soviet leaders contemplated 
making the government more equal with the Communist 
Party, but any further consideration of this matter ceased 
after Nikita Khrushchev consolidated his position as CPSU 
First Secretary in September 1953.46 From that point until 
the late 1980s, the party returned to its customary unchal-
lenged dominance in the Soviet polity. Western scholars 
who sought to identify the leading political authorities 
in the USSR had to take account of the CPSU’s internal 
structure, which included the Politburo and Secretariat as 
the highest executive organs that met regularly. The Central 
Committee, though nominally higher, rarely met and had 
little de facto power.47 No one in the USSR who was not on 
the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat could aspire to become 
the country’s leading political figure. Nowadays, in Russia, 
the structures in which political action takes place also 
play an important role. Even now, the structural legacy of 
the Soviet era remains conspicuous. Russia currently has 
a political system that gives immense formal power to the 
president, who is assisted by a large presidential apparatus. 
The president’s role in the system is roughly analogous to 
that of the CPSU General Secretary in the Soviet Union, 
and the presidential administration is roughly analogous to 
the administrative apparatus of the CPSU.48 A government 
headed by a prime minister exists alongside the presidential 
administration, in much the same way that the Soviet 
government existed alongside the CPSU. The clear-cut 
supremacy of the CPSU over the Soviet government has 
been largely emulated in the Russian polity, which has 
tended to give the president extensive sway over the prime 
minister and all other government ministers. The distri-
bution of political power in Russia is thus shaped by a 
system that provides simultaneously for a president, who 
possesses vast executive authority on paper and oversees a 
large administrative apparatus, and a prime minister who 
heads a cabinet and other government agencies. However, 
because political institutions in Russia are barely a quarter 
of a century old, institutions there are far more fluid than in 
a well-established polity. This means that an extraordinary 
individual who has attained high office might at times have 
46 See Mark Kramer, The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals 
in East-Central Europe (Part 1), Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/1, Winter 1999, 
pp. 3-55; Mark Kramer, The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in 
East-Central Europe (Part 2), Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/2, Spring 1999, pp. 
3-39; and Mark Kramer, The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in 
East-Central Europe (Part 3), Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/3, Fall 1999, pp. 3-66.
47 On this point, see Mark Kramer, Declassified Materials from CSPU Central 
Committee Plenums: Sources, Contexts, Highlights, Cahiers du Monde Russe, 40/1-
2, January-June 1999, pp. 271-306.
48 Fittingly, in Moscow the complex of buildings in Staraya ploshchad’ (Old 
Square) that housed the central apparatus of the CPSU are now the site of the pres-
idential administration. The president, like the CPSU General Secretary, has his 
office in the Kremlin.
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power disproportionate to what one would expect from the 
polity’s structure alone.49 This was most conspicuously the 
case when Putin served as prime minister from May 2008 
to May 2012 yet was still the most powerful political figure 
in Russia and was universally seen as such both inside and 
outside the country. Nonetheless, even in these exceptional 
cases, the dominant leader is still apt to be bound by the 
extant political structure and must make maximum use 
of it, as Putin did when he complied with the constitu-
tional ban on serving more than two consecutive terms as 
president and became prime minister while designating a 
loyal protégé to fill in for him temporarily as president.
4. Fourth, the amount of an actor’s political power depends 
on the context. Even though a leader might have the capacity 
to do something at a particular time or in a particular place, 
this does not necessarily mean that he or she will possess the 
same capacity to achieve the same results at a different time 
or in a different place. The results attained by the exercise of 
political power are necessarily context-dependent.
5. Fifth, except in cases of absolute domination, power 
relationships (dyadic or otherwise) are never one-way. A 
dyadic power relationship in the real world is inherently 
bidirectional, albeit unequal in most cases (and extremely 
unequal in some cases). Colin Hay has claimed that when 
“actor A may be regarded as occupying a position of domi- 
nation or power over B,” this “is not a reciprocal relation- 
ship.”50 Hay’s assertion is untenable unless by the term 
“reciprocal” he means a completely equal relationship. 
Short of that, his characterization cannot be sustained. Even 
in an extremely unequal relationship, as Herbert Simon 
pointed out long ago, “there is always some feedback from 
the influencee to the influencer.”51 Consider, for example, 
a situation in which A is pointing a loaded gun at the head 
of B, whose limbs are bound. Even in this grossly unequal 
relationship, B has at least a minuscule amount of what 
French and Raven describe as “referent power.” B’s power 
almost certainly will not prevent A from doing whatever he 
wants, but even in this extreme case – one of the most extreme 
imaginable – the A-B relationship is not 100% unidirectional. 
When we turn from this extreme scenario to more common 
situations – the types of situations that frequently characterize 
high-level politics in the Russian Federation – the reciprocal 
nature of power relationships (even relationships that are very 
asymmetrical) is much easier to discern.
6. Sixth, the quantification of a given actor’s political 
power – whether power to do something or power over 
someone else – lends itself to comparison. Unless A and 
B have identical capacities and are equally situated to 
use them in the same way, A is either more powerful or 
less powerful than B and is more or less able to shape the 
prevailing political discourse. To be sure, judgments about 
their relative power are far from straightforward if – as is 
likely – we find that A has the capacity to achieve some 
political outcomes B cannot achieve and B has the capacity 
to achieve some things A cannot achieve. In such instances, 
a comparison of their overall power will depend on the 
researcher’s assessment of the importance of the respective 
outcomes that A and B can achieve. Another researcher 
might appraise these outcomes differently, leading to a 
51 Simon, Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power, p. 504. 
49 On a few occasions in Communist systems, especially in China during the 
final years of Deng Xiaoping, this same pattern arose. Even though Deng had given 
up all of his major posts by the end of the 1980s, he was still widely (and correctly) 
regarded as the paramount leader.
50 Hay, Divided by a Common Language, p. 50 (emphasis in original).
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different judgment about whether A in moist cases is more 
powerful than B or vice versa.52 Hence, comparisons of A’s 
and B’s overall power can be misleading unless analysts 
clearly indicate how they evaluate the importance of the 
outcomes that A and B are able to achieve.
7. Seventh, the expectations and perceptions of those 
who have political power and those who might be affected 
by that power are crucial. This point has been highlighted 
by numerous scholars who have thought about how to 
measure power. Herbert Simon in his 1953 article repeatedly 
emphasizes that assessments of power are complicated 
by the “rule of anticipated reactions.”53 A’s preferences, 
Simon argues, are apt to be shaped not only by what B has 
done previously but also by what A expects B to do in the 
future. Conversely, B’s preferences will be affected by his 
expectations of what A will do. Simon notes that if A’s and 
B’s expectations are perfectly congruent, their relationship 
will not be affected because each will already have made 
all necessary adjustments. In such a case, neither A nor 
B would actually exercise power, and scholars would not 
be able to assess A’s and B’s relative power through direct 
observation. But if either A or B misjudges the other’s 
power or intentions, A or B (or both) will be inclined to act. 
Scholars in this case can watch what happens and thereby 
appraise A’s and B’s relative power. The importance of 
actors’ expectations in power relationships has also been 
stressed by Jeffrey Pfeffer, who points out the compli-
cations that arise for efforts to measure power: “The less 
powerful social actor may and, in fact, probably will take 
into account the likely response of the more powerful in 
framing action in the first place. Thus, an attempt to assess 
power must try to account for the extent to which initial 
expressions of preference already reflect the power of 
others.”54 The role of expectations in power relationships 
has been equally salient in social-psychological conceptions 
of power, starting with the French-Raven framework and 
the pioneering work by John W. Thibaut and Harold 
H. Kelley on the social psychology of groups.55 In the 
French-Raven typology, A’s perceptions of B’s abilities and 
attributes are intrinsic elements of B’s bases of power, and 
power is essentially equivalent to perceived power. That 
basic point – the notion that the amount of A’s power prior 
to his actual exercise of his power is equal to the amount 
of power that other actors believe or expect that he has – 
is largely in accord with Herbert Simon’s approach. Simon 
argues that “we can use such expectations, so long as the 
situation remains stable, to estimate where power lies.” In 
this sense, as he points out, the power dynamic can at times 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy:
Suppose we are able to ascertain that the people of Argentina 
really believe that Peron [Juan Perón, the strongman president 
of Argentina from 1946 to 1955] is dictator. It follows that they 
will expect sanctions to be applied to themselves if they do not 
accept the decisions of the Peron regime. Hence, so long as these 
expectations remain, they will behave as if Peron were dictator, 
and indeed he will be.56 
52 On the intricacies of comparing overall power, see Morriss, Power, pp. 86-97.
53 Simon, Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power, pp. 
505-506, 510-511, 515-516. The concept of a “rule of anticipated reactions” comes 
from Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston 1941, pp. 589-591.
54 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, Pitman Publishing, Marshfield 1981, 
p. 46. See also Wrong, Power, pp. 7-9.
55 Raven and French, The Bases of Social Power, pp. 150-167; and Thibaut and 
Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups, pp. 100-125 (especially 122-124).
56 Simon, Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power, p. 511.
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Similarly, if people expect that A (e.g., Dmitry Medvedev 
when he was president) is mostly a figurehead and that 
“real power” lies with B (Vladimir Putin, who was then 
“only” prime minister), A is apt to become a figurehead 
over time even if he did not start out that way. This is 
because other prominent individuals, believing that A is a 
figurehead, will come to treat A as such and will look to B 
as the real authority, as often happened during Medvedev’s 
tenure. Unless A convincingly demonstrates that he is not a 
figurehead, he will likely find it harder and harder to avoid 
becoming one. In other words, until A’s exercise of power 
shows that expectations and perceptions of A’s power were 
wrong, those expectations can serve as a rough indicator 
of A’s power. But this does not mean that such an indicator 
can be reliably produced in most cases. As I will discuss 
below, efforts to discern key political actors’ expectations 
are often highly problematic. Methods that rely on measures 
of reputation or expectations are commonly used, especially 
in studies of political power in local communities, but the 
pitfalls can easily outweigh the benefits.
8. Eighth, a few notes of caution should be mentioned 
here about attempts to see which political actors in Russia 
are powerful enough to shape the prevailing political 
discourse. The tallying of A’s and B’s resources can provide 
useful indirect evidence of A’s and B’s capacity to act, but 
such evidence must be used with great circumspection. Even 
the most detailed cataloguing of A’s and B’s resources does 
not necessarily tell us how well A or B will actually exercise 
power. Similarly, the temporal and contextual dimensions 
of power are crucial when we try to gauge power from the 
exercise of power. If we look at instances in which A has 
exercised power at time t1, this can serve as useful evidence 
of the amount of power A possessed at t1, but it does not 
necessarily tell us anything about the amount of power 
A possesses at t2, especially if t2 is a long while after t1. 
(Even if t2 and t1 are close, we cannot confidently gauge 
A’s power at t2. The greater the difference between t2 and 
t1, the more severe the inferential problems become.) For 
one thing, A’s exercise of power in some cases might result 
in the accretion of more power for A, but in other cases 
it might result in the squandering of power and the rise 
of alternative discourses. Moreover, A’s exercise of power 
in one context at t1 does not necessarily reveal anything 
about A’s power in a different context at t1 (much less in a 
different context at t2) and capacity to shape thecountry’s 
political discourse. Temporal and contextual factors cru- 
cially influence measurements of power.
6. The Limited Utility of Scales of Presidential Power
Various metrics have been devised to quantify presidential 
power. These sorts of indices, which trace their roots back to 
an analysis of the French Fifth Republic published in the late 
1970s by the French sociologist Maurice Duverger, have been 
applied to authoritarian as well as democratic polities.57 The 
first systematic index of presidential power was constructed 
by Matthew Søberg Shugart and John M. Carey in their 1992 
book on executive-legislative relations.58 The Shugart-Carey 
index has been widely adapted (and in certain cases refined) 
by other political scientists, some of whom have specifically 
tailored their versions of the index to measure the formal 
57 Maurice Duverger, Échec au roi, Albin Michel, Paris 1978.
58 Matthew Søberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: 
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, New 
York 1992, pp. 130-155.
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powers of chief executives in the former Communist world.59 
In most instances, these metrics have been used in studies 
comparing presidential, mixed, and parliamentary systems on 
the basis of as many as thirty-seven criteria (e.g., their possible 
impact on democratization, their potential connection with 
macroeconomic liberalization and stabilization and economic 
growth, their relationship to government expenditures, their 
correlation with mortality rates).60
The various scales of presidential power differ in the types 
of formal authority they cover and in the scoring methods 
they employ. The Shugart-Carey index uses ten categories of 
dichotomously scored variables, whereas some other indices 
(notably Ole Nørgaard’s Index of Presidential Authority) have 
incorporated as many as thirty-seven variables and have scored 
them on an ordinal scale of three or more gradations.61 Although 
most of the indices of presidential power yield roughly the same 
59 See, for example, Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup (eds.), Semi-Presidential-
ism in Central and Eastern Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2008; Do-
reen Spörer, Regierungssysteme und Reformen: Politkökonomische Analysen der exe- 
ekutiv-legislativen Beziehungen im postkommunistischen Raum, Springer-Verlag, Hei-
delberg 2006, pp. 7-34; Oleg Ivanovich Zaznaev, Indeksnyi analiz poluprezidentskikh 
gosudarstv Evropy i postsovetskogo prostranstva, Polis, 2, 2007, pp. 145-164; Mikhail 
Beliaev, Presidential Powers and Consolidation of New Postcommunist Democracies, 
Comparative Political Studies, 39/3, April 2006, pp. 375-398; Elgun Taghiyev, Measur- 
ing Presidential Power in Post-Soviet Countries, CEU Political Science Journal, 1/3, 
April-May 2006, pp. 11-21; Doreen Spörer, Ausmaß, Strukturen und Implikationen 
präsidialer Macht im postkommunistischen Raum, Swiss Political Science Review, 10/2, 
July 2004, pp. 157-179; Oleg Ivanovich Zaznaev, Indeksnyi analiz prezidentskoi vlasti 
(na primere Rossii), Vestnik Samarskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 38/4, 2005, 
pp. 20-26; Oleg Ivanovich Zaznaev, Izmerenie prezidentskoi vlasti, Uchenye zapiski Ka-
zanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta: Gumanitarnye nauki, 147/1, 2005, pp. 4-22; 
Alan Siaroff, Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Pres-
idential, and Parliamentary Distinction, European Journal of Political Research, 42/2, 
2003, pp. 287-312; Andre Krouwel, Measuring Presidentialism of Central and East 
European Countries, Working Paper 2/2003, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 2003; Lee 
Kendall Metcalf, Measuring Presidential Power, Comparative Political Studies, 33/5, 
June 2000, pp. 660-685; Ole Nørgaard, Economic Institutions and Democratic Reform: 
A Comparative Analysis of Post-Communist Countries, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Northampton 2000, pp. 152-161; Gadis Gadzhiev, Power Imbalance and Institutional 
Interests in Russian Constitutional Engineering, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Con-
solidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: Institutional Engineering, Oxford University Press, 
New York 2001, pp. 269-292; William A. Clark, Presidential Power and Democratic 
Stability under the Russian Constitution: A Comparative Analysis, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 28/3, Summer 1998, pp. 620-638; Timothy Frye, A Politics of Institutional 
Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies, Comparative Political Studies, 30/5, October 
1997, pp. 523-552; Ray Taras (ed.), Postcommunist Presidents, Cambridge University 
Press, New York 1997; Kurt von Mettenheim (ed.), Presidential Institutions and Demo- 
cratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore 1997; Matthew Søberg Shugart, Politicians, Parties, and Presidents: An 
Exploration of Post-Authoritarian Institutional Design, in Beverly Crawford and Arend 
Lijphart (eds.), Liberalisation and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Demo- 
cratic Transitions, University of California Press, Berkeley 1997, pp. 40-90; Joel Hell-
man, Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transitions, East Euro-
pean Constitutional Review, 5/1, Winter 1996, pp. 46-53; Thomas A. Baylis, Presidents 
versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe, World Politics, 
48/3, April 1996, pp. 297-323; Christian Lucky, Table of Presidential Powers in Eastern 
Europe, East European Constitutional Review, 2/4, Fall 1993, and 3/1, Winter 1994, 
pp. 81-94, and Matthew Søberg Shugart, Of Presidents and Parliaments, East European 
Constitutional Review, 2/1, Winter 1993, pp. 30-32.
60 In addition to the studies cited in the previous footnote, see Robert Elgie, The 
Perils of Presidentialism: Are They Exaggerated?, Democratization, 15/1, February 
2008, pp. 49-66; José Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democ- 
racy, Cambridge University Press, New York 2007; Robert Elgie, Semi-Presiden- 
tialism: Concepts, Consequences, and Contesting Explanations, Political Studies Re-
view, 2/3, September 2004, pp. 314-330; Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, The New 
Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes, Routledge, London 2000; Giovanni 
Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incen-
tives, and Outcomes, 2nd edition, Macmillan, London 1997, chap. 7; Timothy J. Power 
and Mark J. Gasiorowski, Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the 
Third World, Comparative Political Studies, 30/2, 1997, pp. 123-155; Juan J. Linz and 
Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, Baltimore 1994; Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frame-
works and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism, World 
Politics, 46/1, October 1993, pp. 1-22; Arend Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus 
Presidential Government, Oxford University Press, New York 1992; and Juan J. Linz, 
The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, 1/1, Winter 1990, pp. 51-69.
61 For an explication of the coverage and scoring of the Index of Presidential Au-
thority (IPA), see Nørgaard, Economic Institutions and Democratic Reform, pp. 152-161.
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general ranking of countries, a few notable discrepancies arise 
both with the ordering of results and with specific scores. Each 
tabulation method has advantages and disadvantages, and no 
broad consensus exists about the tradeoffs. The metrics that 
provide more detailed coverage of types of formal power have 
been problematic in the weighting they assign to particular 
categories. For example, in a scheme proposed by Joel 
Hellman and Timothy Frye, the president’s power to dissolve 
the legislature is given only one-tenth of the weight assigned 
to various aspects of the president’s appointment powers.62 
Similarly, the president’s ability to appoint a cabinet minister 
is given the same weight as the ability to appoint the prime 
minister. Some efforts have been made to overcome these 
problems, and scholars who analyze the peculiar features of 
presidencies in Russia and other former Soviet republics have 
tried to come up with more widely applicable metrics. Thus 
far, however, no fully satisfactory scale of presidential power has 
been devised.63 The Shugart-Carey index and its offspring are 
all based on a tallying of the formal powers of presidents. In that 
sense, the indices are focused more on the nature of the polity 
(the formal role it accords to the presidency) than on the person 
who serves as chief executive. The indices do not take account 
of the presidents’ political/social networks and personal traits, 
which often play a crucial part in their political power. 
The drawbacks of focusing solely on formal powers are 
illustrated by the situation that emerged in Russia from May 
2008 to May 2012. Until that time, especially during Putin’s 
initial two terms as president, Russia had often been described 
as having a “super-presidential” political system.64 Nothing 
changed in the formal powers of the Russian presidency after 
May 2008, but the office was clearly not as dominant during the 
four years of Dmitry Medvedev’s tenure. The reason is simple: 
Putin was serving as prime minister alongside Medvedev, 
creating a duumvirate and giving temporary preeminence to 
the office of prime minister. Surveys conducted by the Levada 
Center from 2008 to September 2011 consistently showed that 
a large majority of Russians (upward of 75-80%) regarded 
Putin at the top of “the most influential people in Russia.”65 
When Putin and Medvedev jointly announced in September 
2011 that Putin had decided to return to the presidency in 2012 
– a decision he claimed to have made “several years” earlier – any 
lingering doubts about who was the supreme political leader in 
62 Hellman, Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transi-
tions, pp. 46-53; and Frye, A Politics of Institutional Choice, pp. 523-552. 
63 Spörer, Ausmaß, Strukturen und Implikationen präsidialer Macht im post-
kommunistischen Raum, pp. 157-179; Taghiyev, Measuring Presidential Power in 
Post-Soviet Countries, pp. 11-21; Zaznaev, Indeksnyi analiz prezidentskoi vlasti, pp. 
20-26; and Metcalf, Measuring Presidential Power, pp. 660-685.
64 See, for example, Hans-Henning Schröder, What Kind of Political Regime 
Does Russia Have? in Stephen White (ed.), Politics and the Ruling Group in Pu-
tin’s Russia, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008, pp. 1-26; Henry E. Hale, Why 
Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State, Cambridge University 
Press, New York 2006; Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice, 2nd edition, Rout-
ledge, New York 2008; Richard Sakwa, Putin’s Leadership, in Dale R. Herspring 
(ed.), Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, 2nd edition, Rowman & Lit-
tlefield, Lanham 2007, pp. 13-36; Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, The Russian 
Predicament, Journal of Democracy, 16/3, July 2005, pp. 113-126 (especially 120); 
Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev 
to Putin, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2004, pp. 310-312; M. Steven Fish, Democ- 
racy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, Cambridge University Press, 
New York 2005; John T. Ishiyama and Ryan Kennedy, Superpresidentialism and 
Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, Europe- 
Asia Studies, 53/8, December 2001, pp. 1177-1191; Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 
rev. ed., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C. 2003; Lilia 
Shevtsova and Mark H. Eckert, The Problem of Executive Power in Russia, Journal 
of Democracy, 11/1, January 2000, pp. 32-39; and M. Steven Fish, The Executive 
Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics, in Valerie 
Sperling (ed.), Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Demo- 
cratic Governance, Westview Press, Boulder 2000, pp. 177-191.
65 See the monthly data in the Levada Center’s report: Levada Center, Samye 
vliyatel’nye rossiyane, September 2010, Moskva (based on nationally representative 
samples of 1,600 respondents in all of Russia’s regions). 
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Russia were dispelled. When Putin once again became president 
in May 2012, the office regained its erstwhile dominant position, 
but the downgrading of its status under Medvedev, despite the 
lack of any change in its formal powers, shows why a meaningful 
assessment of presidential power must take account of the 
officeholder’s informal as well as formal powers. An assessment 
that looks only at formal powers can be highly misleading, as 
in the case of the Russian presidency after May 2008. Even if 
scholars up to now have felt that measuring the formal powers of 
each country’s presidency was sufficient, the situation in Russia 
in 2008-2012 highlights the need for metrics that focus at least as 
much on the officeholders as on the office itself.
7. Power “Resources”
Terry Clark and other scholars who have studied political 
power in urban settings have enumerated “resources” that can 
be marshaled by key elites to exert influence. Because political 
power has been defined here as the capacity to exert political 
influence or to achieve political goals, these resources can be 
thought of as power resources. In principle, a tabulation of 
them – if they are deemed sound – could offer a rough gauge 
of an actor’s power. The resources often mentioned include 
money and credit, control over employment, control of mass 
media, high social status, knowledge and specialized expertise, 
popularity and public admiration of one’s personal qualities, 
legality, social access to community leaders, commitments of 
followers, staffing support, and control over the interpretation 
of community norms and values.66 All of these resources can 
enhance an actor’s capacity to shape the country’s prevailing 
political discourse. Clark sought to compare how easily each of 
these resources could be converted into the others and vice versa. 
To do this, he weighed the “buying power” and “selling price” 
of each resource to determine its “exchange value.” Resources 
with a low exchange value were likely to be “valuable to only 
a narrow range of persons” or could be “exchanged only in 
restricted markets,” whereas resources with a high exchange 
value would permit “more complex relationships and extensive 
exchanges.” Clark found that knowledge/expertise had the 
highest “exchange value,” followed by money/credit and 
control of mass media.67 He argued that “an actor commanding 
large quantities of any of these [three] resources [would be] 
in an excellent position to convert them into other resources,” 
creating the potential for greater influence.68
Clark acknowledged that “all of the resources have 
meaning only with respect to a given social system” and that 
his own “basic reference [had] been the local community 
and community-wide decisions in Western societies.” But he 
claimed that when he made “an attempt at reclassification” 
for other (presumably non-Western) contexts, this had “led to 
relatively similar results – which would seem to offer further 
evidence for the general tendencies of our conclusions.” 
However, he offered no specifics about this reclassification 
and conceded that his categories of resources “are to some 
extent arbitrary.”69 He also affirmed that “the prestige value of 
a resource”– the direct or indirect contribution a resource can 
make to the prestige of anyone who possesses it – is apt to “vary 
with the social system.” But he argued that there was “enough 
67 Clark, The Concept of Power, pp. 59-62.
68 Ibid., p. 62. On a related theme see Parsons, On the Concept of Political 
Power, pp. 232-263.
69 Clark, The Concept of Power, p. 60.
66 This list is adapted, with some modifications and compression, from Clark, 
The Concept of Power, pp. 57-58. For a similar compilation, see William A. Gamson, 
Reputation and Resources in Community Politics, American Journal of Sociology, 
72/2, September 1966, pp. 121-131.
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similarity to permit an approximate classification,” at least in 
the industrial countries.70 In an appraisal of the utility of the 
various resources in enhancing an individual’s political power, 
Clark found that the same three resources plus two others – 
legality and control over the interpretation of norms and values 
– were especially important. He also evaluated the durability/
expendability of resources, arguing that some were apt to 
prove transitory, whereas others were likely to be durable. This 
question is often complicated because if resources are used 
skillfully, they can result in a net increase in one or more types of 
resources. By contrast, if they are used poorly, they can mitigate 
other basic resources such as popular esteem. The quantity of 
resources at any given time is therefore likely to be in flux.
In thinking about what this means for the measurement of 
political power in Russia, we can posit a three-step process.71 
The first step is to determine whether and how the list of 
resources needs to be modified to be appropriate for the 
Russian context. The second step is to look at each of the 
key political actors in Russia and calculate how much of each 
resource he or she possesses. The third and final step is to weigh 
the relative importance of the resources and figure out which 
are likely to be most important in particular situations and 
for particular actors. In some circumstances a single specific 
resource might be both sufficient and indispensable, whereas 
in other cases a combination of most of the resources might be 
required. Each of these steps poses complications. Most of the 
resources specified by Clark are relevant to Russia, but in some 
cases they need to be made clearer or more precise, and certain 
other factors need to be added. Clark’s list, for example, does 
not take sufficient account of the structural dimension of 
political power. Among the resources one might list are A’s 
position and authority in the sociopolitical system, the scope 
and nature of A’s responsibilities, A’s social and political 
networks, and A’s control of vital information. Among the 
individual traits that might be added are A’s energy, physical 
and mental stamina, charisma, and toughness and willingness 
to confront challenges head-on.72 A full compilation for Russia, 
showing how they affect ability to shape the political discourse, 
would comprise up to 15-20 items.
The second step is even more problematic. Although some 
of the resources (e.g., popularity and public esteem) would be 
easy to quantify, others would defy simple measurement. For at 
least some of the latter group of resources, ordinal metrics could 
presumably be devised, but such metrics might entail analytical 
drawbacks of their own. A more serious pitfall is the prospect 
of deception. Some key actors in the Russia might feign having 
a high level of expertise or other desirable traits or might falsely 
claim to have control over valuable information. Close study 
of these actors over time might expose acts of deception, but 
scholars seeking to gauge the distribution of political power 
could find it difficult in some cases to separate reality from 
exaggerations and fabrications. One further complication is 
that even if we could accurately measure how much of each 
resource A possesses, this would not necessarily mean that A 
was fully cognizant of his own resources or would be inclined 
to use them. In such a case, the resources would not really 
contribute to A’s power, and measurements of them would give 
a misleading tally of A’s power.
The third step also poses significant challenges. Political 
power, by its nature, is context-dependent, and efforts to 
70 Ibid., p. 62. 
71 For a similar approach, see Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, pp. 48-49.
72 For an alternative list, see Jeffrey Pfeffer, Managing with Power: Politics and 
Influence in Organizations, Harvard Business School Press, Boston 1992, pp. 43-45.
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measure it will be especially intractable if they must be done 
indirectly by quantifying resources that, like power itself, are 
apt to vary with the context. As noted above, a single resource 
(e.g., high popularity ratings) of a particular figure (e.g., Putin) 
might be sufficient in some contexts to outweigh almost any 
combination of resources that possible rivals might command. 
For example, the fact that Putin’s approval rating as prime 
minister (i.e., during Medvedev’s presidency) held remarkably 
steady at around 75-80% in the Levada Center’s monthly 
surveys – invariably above the approval rating of Medvedev 
and far above the rating of anyone else73 – gave him formidable 
authority on all matters and enabled him to decide (more or 
less on his own) whether to reclaim the presidency in 2012.74 In 
other contexts, however, the same resource might be of relatively 
little importance or might be easily frittered away. One of the 
ironies of Putin’s return to the presidency in May 2012 is that 
his assumption of the office was followed by a steady decline 
in his popularity ratings – the very resource that had propelled 
him back to the top in the first place.75 Not until after the Sochi 
Olympics in February 2014 and especially his decisive action in 
annexing Crimea the following month did his popularity ratings 
return to the stratospheric levels of the past, where they have 
remained ever since. Hence, the precise weight of the resource 
is difficult to gauge. This problem is not necessarily insuperable, 
but it does suggest that appraisals of power “resources” should 
be used only in conjunction with other indices and metrics.
8. Reputational Assessments
For well over half a century, scholars attempting to assess 
political power have relied on numerous techniques – targeted 
interviews, panel discussions, focus groups, randomized, 
large-n surveys, and, in more recent years, systematic perusal of 
databases of media coverage – to determine who in a community 
is reputed to be a “top leader” or “influential figure.” Reputa- 
tional methods date back to the sociological studies of 
community power in the early and mid-1950s, which came 
under extensive (and often well-founded) criticism during the 
pluralist-power elite debate in the late 1950s and 1960s.76 One 
of the objections raised about the early reputational studies 
was that the questions biased the results. When respondents 
were asked who was at the top of the local power structure, 
the question presupposed that such a structure existed with a 
tiny group at the top. By shaping in advance the types of likely 
answers, the sociological researchers essentially created the 
very phenomenon they were supposed to be searching for. The 
criticism eventually spurred methodological improvements and 
rewording of questions that did not as readily predetermine the 
results, but critics of the methodology also complained about 
the lack of clarity regarding the number of people who should 
be deemed “influential” or “top leaders” (should it be 5 or 50 
or 500 or some other number?) and the frequent impracticality 
73 The closest the two men came was in October 2010, when Medvedev rose 
to 76% in the Levada Center’s ratings, just one point below Putin. But that was the 
only time Medvedev came so close. 
74 Levada Center, Reitingi odobreniya i polozheniya del v strane, monthly surveys, 
May 2008-September 2011, based on a nationally representative sample of 1,600 
respondents.
75 NG, Obshchestvo otlozhennoi otvetsvennosti: Gotovo li ‘putinskoe bol’shinstvo’ 
k ukhodu Putina?, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 August 2012, p. 3.
76 In addition to the studies cited in footnotes 11 and 12 supra, see overviews 
of the literature in Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, 2nd 
edition, Yale University Press, New Haven 1980; Bachrach and Baratz, Power and 
Poverty, pp. 11-24; Douglas M. Fox, Methods within Methods: The Case of Commu-
nity Power Studies, The Western Political Quarterly, 24/1, March 1971, pp. 5-11; M. 
Herbert Danziger, Community Power Structure: Problems and Continuities, Amer-
ican Sociological Review, 29/5, October 1964, pp. 707-717; Raymond Wolfinger, 
Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power, American Sociological 
Review, 27/5, October 1960, pp. 636-644.
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of distinguishing the “top leaders” from those a rung or 
two below. Such problems were mitigated once researchers 
acquired in-depth knowledge of the community’s dynamics 
and were able to examine how people understood what they 
were being asked about, but even the most finely honed survey 
results could occasionally blur these distinctions.
Another objection raised by skeptics was the tendency of 
researchers, especially those from the “power elite” school, to 
emphasize community leaders who wielded “general influence,” 
that is, people who had power on a wide range of issues. The 
pluralists argued that, in fact, prominent individuals tended to be 
influential on only a relatively small number of issues within their 
community. Critics also expressed concern that at least some of 
the people being interviewed (or taking part in panels or focus 
groups) were apt to merge attributes, confusing “influential” 
with “well-known” or “of high social standing.” This last 
problem was at least partly remedied by including suitable 
explanations with survey questions or in introductory remarks 
to the community panels, but occasionally a degree of confusion 
still cropped up. Nowadays, long after the pluralist-power elite 
debate has petered out, sociologists and political scientists have 
come to give new emphasis to reputational variables when 
assessing key actors’ political power. One of the chief reasons 
that the pluralists were so dismissive of reputation as an indicator 
of power is that they were preoccupied with behavioral metrics. 
The decline of behavioralism by the early 1970s changed the 
situation considerably.77 Other analytical schools that have gained 
ascendance in recent decades, such as rational choice theory and 
constructivism, have stressed the importance of reputation.78 
Keith Dowding and his coauthors have pointed out that “in a 
wide range of rational choice-influenced work, ‘reputations’ are 
identified as a key power resource for actors engaged in strategic 
interactions with others.”79 Bargaining theory, game theory, and 
Bayesian economics are among the social science fields that 
stress an actor’s reputation, especially in situations in which 
information is imperfect and asymmetric.80 Many studies in these 
fields have shown that leading actors have a stake in developing 
a reputation for toughness, persistence, and trustworthiness, 
among other positive qualities. This finding bears directly on the 
point mentioned earlier about the role of perceptions in political 
power. Perceptions and expectations, whether well-founded or 
not, are crucial to understand in their own right because they 
help to shape reality. If we were to depict A’s power as a function 
of relevant variables, one of the most important variables would 
be A’s reputation as measured by other actors’ perceptions of A’s 
77 For an early, albeit not fully successful, attempt to retool the reputational approach, 
see James F. Torres, A New (and Partial) Approach to Measurement of Political Power in 
Latin America Countries, Western Political Quarterly, 26/2, June 1973, pp. 302-313.
78 Jason Campbell Sharman, Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on 
Reputation, Political Studies, 55/1, February 2007, pp. 20-37.
79 Keith Dowding, Patrick Dunleavy, Desmond King, and Helen Margetts, 
Rational Choice and Community Power Structures, Political Studies, 43/2, June 
1995, pp. 265-277 (especially 272-274). The quoted passage is from p. 273.
80 George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: 
Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York 2006; Georgy Egorov 
and Konstantin Sonin, The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Demo-
cratic Succession, CEPR Discussion Paper 5092, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
London, June 2005; George J. Milath and Larry Samuelson, Who Wants a Good Rep-
utation?, The Review of Economic Studies, 68/2, April 2001, pp. 415-441; Oded 
Shenkar, Reputation, Image, Prestige, and Goodwill: An Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Organizational Standing, Human Relations, 50/11, November 1997, pp. 1361-1381; 
David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 27/2, August 1982, pp. 253-279; Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Ac-
tors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Westview Press, Boulder 
1997; Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 27/2, August 1982, pp. 280-312; Michihiro Kandori, 
Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players, The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 59/1, January 1992, pp. 81-92; and Jeffrey C. Ely and Juuso Välimäki, 
Bad Reputation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118/3, August 2003, pp. 785-814. 
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power. The new emphasis on reputational research has also been 
fueled by the advent of large on-line databases of press coverage. 
Dowding and his coauthors have stressed that the existence of 
these databases means that
it is possible to extract an objectively defined set of reputedly influen- 
tial policy makers in any functional area, or across all areas. The scale 
of any actor’s reputation can be mapped quantitatively in the scope 
and character of press coverage. Of course this coverage does not 
constitute the full measure of each actor’s reputation, and [supple-
mentary] analysis can be generated through semi-structured interviews 
in order to discover important actors screened from media purview. 
Nevertheless, the media do have an extensive coverage of certain types 
of issues, and the fact of being reported brings a certain reputation. 
This reputation is itself a power resource.81
A major virtue of this approach is that it yields data that can 
be scrutinized and tested by other scholars, who can attempt 
to reproduce the results in other settings. Monitoring the press 
coverage over time also allows researchers to discern trends in 
individuals’ reputations, rather than simply obtaining a snapshot 
of the current situation. All of this can be done with a simplicity 
and ease that would have been impossible in the past. Thus, even 
though reputational research in earlier decades was disparaged 
by the behavioralists as methodologically unsound, it has now 
come to be seen as “theoretically legitimate and important.”82
Nonetheless, one should note that some important obstacles 
to these techniques would likely arise in Russia, where the most 
popular media outlet, national television, has been controlled 
by the state since shortly after Putin came to power, and where 
journalists come under many forms of direct and indirect 
pressure, including the prospect of being sued, imprisoned, 
beaten, or murdered.83 More than 350 journalists in Russia have 
been killed or have disappeared in mysterious circumstances since 
the early 1990s, and many others have been severely beaten.84 The 
heavy hand of the state is bound to affect what journalists write, 
inducing a form of self-censorship, even if only sub-consciously. 
Russia has consistently ranked near the bottom of the roughly 
175 countries covered in the annual “World Press Freedom 
Index” compiled by Reporters Sans Frontières, declining to 146th 
place in 2016.85 Moreover, even though the Russian authorities 
still permit relatively lively newspaper coverage and website 
discussions (and clamp down mainly on television broadcasts), 
the Russian security agencies have increasingly been coercing 
bloggers as well.86 Moreover, many journalists are accustomed to 
accepting bribes from officials and other individuals who want 
to plant a story or shape the coverage of a particular issue. For 
all these reasons, scrutiny of the press and other media outlets 
in Russia might produce skewed results. In Western societies, as 
Dowding and his coauthors argue, “reputations for influence” 
as reflected in the media “constitute important power resources 
81 Dowding et al., Rational Choice and Community Power Structures, p. 274.
82 Ibid.
83 For an overview, see Christopher Walker, Muzzling the Media: The Return of 
Censorship in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Freedom House, Washing-
ton D.C., 15 June 2007. See also Reporters without Borders, World Press Freedom 
Index 2011, Paris, December 2011. Of the 175 countries ranked, Russia comes in at 
153 and Uzbekistan at 160.
84 International Federation of Journalists, Partial Justice: An Investigation into 
the Deaths of Journalists in Russia, 1993-2009, IFJ, Brussels 2010; and Committee 
to Protect Journalists, Anatomy of Injustice: The Unsolved Killings of Journalists in 
Russia, United Book Press, New York, September 2009, with updates to 2015 from 
the Journalists in Russia database (journalistsinrussia.org), listing individually every 
Russian journalist murdered since 1993.
85 Reporters Sans Frontières, 2016 World Press Freedom Index, RSF, Paris, 
August 2016. 
86 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Struggle Between 
Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries, Public Affairs, New 
York 2015. See also Mark Kramer, The Clampdown on Internet Activities in Russia 
and the Implications for Western Policy, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo n° 350, 
George Washington University, Washington D.C., September 2014.
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in their own right.”87 But in post-Soviet Russia, the relationship 
between media coverage and individuals’ reputations for influ- 
ence is less clear-cut.
Similar problems are likely to arise if researchers attempt to 
conduct “semi-structured interviews” in Russia. The interviews 
could prove misleading unless the respondents accurately 
understand the distribution of political power in their com- 
munity and are willing to talk openly about what they know.88 
Neither of these conditions is a foregone conclusion in Russia. 
Even in democratic countries, individuals responding to 
questionnaires or participants in a focus group might have only 
a tenuous grasp of the dispersion of political power in their 
local or wider community. Even the most expert of observers 
at times are apt to misjudge where power lies. This problem is 
bound to be far more acute in Russia, where the precise distri-
bution of political power is nearly as opaque as it was under 
the Soviet regime, especially during the Putin years. Even the 
most knowledgeable observers in these countries often can do 
no more than hazard a well-educated guess. Moreover, even if 
certain people in Russia do possess a thorough and accurate 
understanding of the actual mechanisms of political power 
and are willing to be interviewed, the task of getting them to 
speak candidly about what they know is likely to be daunting. 
Not only might they fear for their own safety and well-being if 
they disclose sensitive information that could be traced back to 
them, but they might also be reluctant to divulge information 
that could prove beneficial to their rivals.89 Despite these 
potential glitches and complications, researchers should do 
their utmost to pursue reputational assessments of political 
power in Russia. If such methods prove to be feasible in some 
or all of the countries, they will be an invaluable supplement 
to, and cross-check on, other means of gauging the distri-
bution of power and will facilitate a better understanding of 
which political figures are able to shape the prevailing political 
discourse. The careful use of reputational techniques will also 
give a fillip to attempts to operationalize several of the power 
bases from the social psychology literature, as discussed below.
9. Representational and Symbolic Indicators
Efforts to assess political power can be based in part on 
looking at who is represented on key political bodies and who 
possesses the symbolic manifestations of power. During the 
Soviet era, Western analysts knew that the members of the 
CPSU Politburo and CPSU Secretariat were the most powerful 
figures in the USSR. They also knew that symbolic rituals such 
as the positioning of party leaders on top of Vladimir Lenin’s 
mausoleum during holiday parades, the placement of leaders 
in official photographs, and the sequence of names in non- 
alphabetical listings of Politburo members, usually revealed the 
pecking order of the highest elites. Similarly, Western scholars 
were aware that certain honorifics in the USSR, such as the 
conferral of military (or state security) ranks on senior political 
officials, the bestowal of various Communist awards (Hero 
of Socialist Labor, Hero of the Soviet Union, etc.), and the 
naming of city districts or naval vessels or military units after 
high officials, were another reliable indicator that the recipients 
were politically strong. In addition, Western experts on the 
USSR developed elaborate means of gleaning clues from the 
Soviet press about the relative standing of key elites in Moscow, 
and some analysts also attempted to gauge the distribution 
87 Dowding et al., Rational Choice and Community Power Structures, pp. 273-274.
88 Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, pp. 55-56.
89 On a related point, see David Krackhardt, Assessing the Political Landscape: 
Structure, Cognition, and Power in Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
35/2, June 1990, pp. 342-369. Krackhardt argues that knowledge of the actual dis-
tribution of power is itself a source of power.
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of political power in one or more of the 15 union republics. 
  These representational and symbolic indicators began to 
disappear during the final two years of the Soviet regime, 
and the situation changed still further after the breakup of 
the USSR and the formation of an independent Russian state. 
Nowadays, the power of key individuals might be reflected in 
(and strengthened by) their membership on Russia’s Security 
Council, their membership on various presidential (or prime 
ministerial) commissions and advisory bodies, their roles in 
key governmental organs, and their positions in the dominant 
political party Edinaya Rossiya. Such positions “provide their 
occupants with power because of the control over information, 
resources, or other decisions that is inherent in these posi- 
tions.”90 Moreover, the power linked with key positions is 
usually self-reinforcing:
In most cases, positions which are given to powerful social actors as a 
consequence of their power also provide those actors with additional 
power due to the information and decisions that are within the 
purview of these positions. If these roles can be identified, then by 
observing the affiliations of the role occupants, one can diagnose the 
distribution of influence. 91
The power and political standing of key elites in the Russian 
Federation might also be manifested through symbolic trappings 
of influence such as an official chauffeur and limousine, an 
official residence, a large staff, frequent appearances or mentions 
on state television, and the receipt of official commendations and 
awards. During the Putin era, the margin of victory a candidate 
achieves in presidential elections also has come to be a symbol 
of power. The greater the margin of victory, the more powerful 
an individual is thought to be. In Russia’s 2008 presidential 
election, for example, the official tally showed that Putin’s 
protégé, Medvedev, received 71.25% of the votes, slightly 
lower than the 71.31% that Putin himself officially received 
in 2004. Although Putin’s vote tally in the 2012 presidential 
election was “only” 63.6%, that almost certainly was because 
the election was held soon after mass political protests in 
Russia had erupted as a result of fraud in the parliamentary 
elections. According to the Golos election monitoring group, 
the real vote tally for Putin was probably closer to 50%, 
and the 63.6% thus represented the maximum tolerable 
inflation.92 In democratic countries, free elections are vital 
in shaping the distribution of political power, whereas in 
Russia, which has not held fair and meaningful national 
elections since June 1991 for president and December 2003 for 
parliament, votes play a largely symbolic function, revealing the 
size of the popular following a candidate supposedly enjoys.93
The importance of representational and symbolic indicators 
as metrics of political power should not be overstated. It would 
be too simplistic to suggest that these criteria are perfectly 
correlated with political power. As Jeffrey Pfeffer has noted, 
“there are lags and imperfections in the use of such symbols as 
guides to the power distribution,” and a similar caveat applies to 
representational indicators of power.94 Nonetheless, if the indi- 
90 Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, p. 57.
91 Ibid
92 Golos, Doklad po itogam nablyudeniya khoda vyborov Prezidenta Rossii, 
naznachennykh na 4 marta 2012 g., Golos, Moskva, March 2012.
93 For further discussion of the role of local and national elections in non-demo- 
cratic countries (focusing mostly on China, Mexico, Egypt, and a few other non-CIS 
countries), see Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, Elections under Authoritar-
ianism, Annual Review of Political Science, 12, June 2009, pp. 403-422. See also 
William Case, Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena? in 
Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Compe-
tition, Lynne Rienner, Boulder 2006, pp. 95-112.
94 Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, p. 52.
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cators are used cautiously, they can be a valuable supplement to 
other metrics, just as they were in Soviet times. A full tally of them 
can be incorporated into a composite gauge of political power.
10. Adapted Metrics from Social Psychology
The six types of power in the French-Raven framework – reward 
power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, 
expert power, and information power – have been evaluated 
mostly in experimental settings, but scholars can devise 
alternative ways to measure the distribution of these types 
of power in Russia. The most obvious approach is to adapt 
the various techniques discussed in the earlier section on 
reputational metrics, using them as a proxy for experimental 
assessments of key elites’ perceptions of other elites’ power. To 
accomplish this task, we first need to determine which power 
bases we want to evaluate and the specific indicators to look for 
in each category. We then need to decide which measurement 
techniques (press surveys, interviews, etc.) are appropriate for 
the frequently inhospitable research environment in Russian 
regions. Even if one or two of the power bases can not be 
satisfactorily measured, assessments of even a limited number 
would be a valuable supplement to other metrics.
For the purposes of this essay, the original five (and later six) 
categories proposed by French and Raven are more suitable 
than the categories laid out in most of the alternative social 
psychology frameworks, including those developed by Kipnis 
and Schmidt, Schriesheim and Hinkin, and Yukl and Falbe, all 
of whom focused mainly on tactics rather than forms of power. 
But if we want to gain a more complete sense of political power 
in Russia, we need to supplement the six French-Raven power 
bases with two other categories, one of which was put forth 
in 1986 by Robert Benfari, Harry E. Wilkinson, and Charles 
D. Orth: namely, affiliation power.95 Affiliation power refers 
to A’s capacity to wield influence based on his/her affiliation 
with B, whom Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth characterize as 
an authoritative figure. They say that A might, for example, be 
an executive assistant or chief of staff acting on behalf of B, 
who is a high-ranking official. For such cases, principal-agent 
theory would lead us to expect that A might occasionally 
seek to use affiliation power for his/her own ends, rather 
than acting solely in strict accordance with B’s wishes.96 Hence, 
A’s affiliation power is dual in nature. In a modification of the 
Benfari-Wilkinson-Orth concept, we can propose that B, too, 
has affiliation power based on his/her ability to count on B’s 
loyalty and performance. That is, affiliation power need not apply 
only to the subordinate actor. Both A and B possess affiliation 
power by virtue of their affiliation, albeit for different reasons 
and in different ways. What we want to do is measure how much 
of it each of them is generally perceived to have.
The other category we need to add – temporal power – is a 
new one that has not been mentioned in the social psychology 
literature. It is included here to take account of the claim put 
forth in a 1991 book by two political scientists, Henry Bienen 
and Nicolas van de Walle, regarding the longevity of political 
leaders in non-democratic countries.97 After surveying the 
tenures of 2,256 top leaders in 167 countries (democratic as 
well as non-democratic) from 1900 to 1987, Bienen and van 
de Walle conclude that “the risk for leaders of losing power 
declines the longer that they have been in power.” Although 
95 Robert C. Benfari, Harry E. Wilkinson, and Charles D. Orth, The Effective 
Use of Power, Business Horizons, 29/3, May-June 1986, pp. 12-16. 
96 The literature on principal-agent theory is immense in both economics and po-
litical science. For a concise overview, see Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Prin-
cipal-Agent Models, Annual Review of Political Science, 8, March 2005, pp. 203-225.
97 Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, Of Time and Power: Leadership 
Duration in the Modern World, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1991.
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Bienen and van de Walle note that the downward trend in the 
risk of being ousted is not monotonic over time, they repeatedly 
stress that “once leaders are in place, they are difficult to 
remove.”98 Their analysis is impressive as far as it goes (and is 
commendable in treating time as a variable in its own right), 
but it suffers from omitted-variable bias. The validity of their 
argument is thus uncertain. A much more detailed econometric 
model will be needed to verify their findings, but no one has yet 
undertaken such a massive follow-on project (not least because 
of the daunting challenge of data-collection).99  That said, the 
results obtained by Bienen and van de Walle seem solid enough 
that they should be taken seriously, albeit circumspectly. Bienen 
and van de Walle adduce several possible reasons for the 
importance of the “duration effects” they find in authoritarian 
leaders’ tenure. One reason might be that unskilled leaders 
are apt to lose power relatively quickly, leaving only the most 
skilled leaders in office. The leaders who remain in power not 
only are more skilled but are also better able, as time passes, to 
build political patronage networks, accumulate and distribute 
resources, rely on organs of repression, and develop a loyal 
following. In addition, leaders who stay in power are bound 
to become increasingly familiar with the nuts and bolts of their 
political system, enabling them to maneuver more adeptly 
against rivals and to forestall any potential challenges to their 
authority. Alternatively, what may be happening is simply that 
“populations become more accustomed to leaders with whom 
they get more acclimated” and are therefore “more apathetic 
about leadership change.”100 All of these explanations seem 
eminently plausible, but the limited scope of the Bienen-van 
de Walle analysis means that none of the suppositions can be 
validated directly.
However, it is worth noting that in social psychology the 
notion that people would become accustomed to having a 
particular leader in power and would be increasingly unable to 
imagine what it would be like without such a leader has been 
amply borne out in experimental settings and focus groups.101 
Moreover, some of the other explanatory factors posited by 
Bienen and van de Walle also are relevant in the Russian context. 
In these respects, the element of time deserves to be regarded 
as a power base. Leaders do not automatically accumulate 
temporal power, and they can certainly fritter it away. But the 
evidence suggests that, on average, a leader can benefit from the 
passage of time. Scales of temporal power can be designed to 
indicate that time can help leaders in some circumstances and 
damage them in others.98 Ibid., pp. 9, 98. 
99 The only partial effort to re-test the Bienen-van de Walle finding about time – 
James E. Alt and Gary King, Transfers of Governmental Power: The Meaning of Time 
Dependence, Comparative Political Studies, 27/2, July 1994, pp. 190-210 – adds no 
new variables and looks only at some of the democratic countries covered by Bienen 
and van de Walle. Scholars who have considered why and how authoritarian leaders 
stay in power for many years have taken the Bienen-van de Walle finding as a giv-
en. They have not gone back and re-tested it. See, for example, Jennifer Gandhi and 
Adam Przeworski, Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats, Compara-
tive Political Studies, 40/11, November 2007, pp. 1279-1301; Shale Horowitz, Karla 
Hoff, and Branko Milanovic, Government Turnover: Concepts, Measures, and Appli-
cations, European Journal of Political Research, 48/1, January 2009, pp. 107-129; 
and Maria Gallego and Carolyn Pitchik, An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover, 
Journal of Public Economics, 88/12, December 2004, pp. 2361-2382. 
100 Bienen and van de Walle, Of Time and Power, pp. 11-12, 98-99. 
101 Joseph E. McGrath and Franziska Tschan, Temporal Matters in Social Psy-
chology: Examining the Role of Time in the Lives of Groups and Individuals, Amer-
ican Psychological Association, Washington D.C. 2004; Joseph E. McGrath and 
Janice R. Kelly, Time and Human Interaction: Social Psychology of Time, Guilford 
Publications, New York 1986; and Joseph E. McGrath and Janice R. Kelly, Tempo-
ral Context and Temporal Patterning: Toward a Time-Centered Perspective for Social 
Psychology, Time & Society, 1/3, December 1992, pp. 399-420.
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11. Assessing Power by Observing its Consequences
One of the most common, but also problematic, techniques for 
assessing political power is to observe its impact on decision-
making and other forms of behavior. Because the conception 
of power used in this essay has been dispositional rather than 
behavioral, the monitoring of behavioral indicators is only an 
indirect and retrospective means of gauging power. However, 
as discussed earlier, such indicators can be a valuable proxy for 
measurements of current political power if Δt (i.e., the difference 
between the time of the observed behavior, t1, and the current 
time, t2) is small. Ceteris paribus, the smaller that Δt is, the greater 
the connection is likely to be between the behavioral metrics and 
the actual distribution of political power.
Some of the pitfalls of relying on decision-making analyses 
to determine who the most powerful elites are have already 
been discussed. Approaching this task nowadays in the way 
the behavioralists did in the late 1950s and 1960s would be 
untenable. Indeed, it is not even clear that decisions should 
be a focus for this type of research at all. The vast literature 
on political decision-making indicates that many decisions are 
products of complex interactions, tradeoffs, and bargaining 
and do not necessarily reflect the relative power of the partic-
ipants.102 Even when decisions are directly shaped by the 
power of individual actors, tracing how those decisions were 
actually made might well be infeasible until the closed records 
become available many years later. The behavioralist studies 
of decision-making gave the impression that scholars can 
promptly discover how important decisions are made, keeping 
Δt very small. Anyone who has gone closely through formerly 
closed government records in archives knows that this is 
simply not true. In most instances, scholars who lack access 
to secret records cannot accurately determine the weight of 
particular individuals in decision outcomes.103 This point is 
particularly germane to countries in which political mechanisms 
are exceedingly opaque, as in the Soviet-bloc countries in the 
past and Russia now.
Other behavioral outcomes that have been proposed for 
scholarly scrutiny – agenda-setting and preference-shaping – 
pose problems of their own, many of which have been discussed 
earlier in this essay. Attempts to evaluate the distribution of 
political power by monitoring these indicators or by analyzing 
decision-making presupposes that key actors disagree about 
what should be done and that their relative power determines 
the outcome. But in fact this is often not the case. On many 
issues a rough consensus is apt to exist, or powerful individuals 
will not care enough about the matter to try to sway the 
outcome. Jeffrey Pfeffer has pointed out that “the only cases in 
which relative power can be observed” are “those instances in 
which preferences conflict” and in which the actors care enough 
102 For varying perspectives, see R. Harrison Wagner, The Concept of Power 
and the Study of Politics, in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison 
Wagner (eds.), Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research, The Free Press, 
New York 1969, pp. 3-12 (especially pp. 4-6); Ronnie Harding, Carolyn M. Hendriks, 
and Mehreen Fahruqi, Environmental Decision-Making: Exploring Complexity and 
Context, Federation Press, Sydney 2009; Hannu Nurmi, Rational Behavior and the 
Design of Institutions: Concepts, Theories, and Models, Edward Elgar, Northampton 
1998; and Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision-Making, rev. 
ed., Scott, Foresman/Little Brown, Glenview 2002.
103 For a few examples, see Mark Kramer, The Kremlin, the Prague Spring, and 
the Brezhnev Doctrine, in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Promises of 1968: Crisis, Illusion, 
Utopia, Central European University Press, Budapest 2010, pp. 276-362; Mark Kramer, 
Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981, Cold War International His-
tory Project, Washington D.C. 1999; Mark Kramer, Soviet Policy During the Polish and 
Hungarian Crises of 1956: Reassessments and New Findings, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 33/2, April 1998, pp. 163-215; and Mark Kramer, Ukraine and the Soviet- 
Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 (Part 1): New Evidence from the Diaries of Petro Shelest, 
Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 10, Spring 1998, pp. 230-246.
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to try to impose their will.104 But these instances may well be 
hard to assess. If the “winning” actor believes that power “is 
exercised most effectively when it is exercised unobtrusively,” 
efforts to learn what happened will be difficult.105
Pfeffer acknowledges the myriad hazards of attempting to 
gauge the distribution of political power from the apparent 
results of the exercise of power, but he argues that “if one knows 
the initial preferences, the attempts at influence undertaken, 
and then the final decision, [the distribution of] power can 
be more reliably diagnosed.”106 This may well be true in some 
instances, but the potential pitfalls of these sorts of measurement 
techniques have been highlighted by the Putin-Medvedev 
relationship in Russia from May 2008 to May 2012. By all 
indications, Putin’s choice of Medvedev as his interim successor 
in 2008 was based on the assumption that he and Medvedev 
were “of the same blood type” (i.e., that Medvedev’s views 
were essentially identical to his own) and that Medvedev would 
faithfully comply with Putin’s wishes.107 In an interview with 
Danish journalists in April 2010, Medvedev himself endorsed 
this view, insisting that he and Putin “represent the same 
political force, and our approaches to the country’s general 
political development are very similar.” Although Medvedev 
acknowledged that the two “might at times have different 
views on certain nuances” of particular issues, he stressed that 
he and Putin “share the same political convictions” and “do 
not represent what you might call a left and right flank.”108 
     These proclamations of similar outlooks and values were 
partly intended for public consumption, but they also help 
explain why attempts to evaluate the distribution of political 
power in Russia during the Medvedev interlude were so difficult. 
No doubt, Putin and Medvedev worked in harmony most of the 
time during Medvedev’s tenure as president. Pfeffer’s approach 
to the measurement of power would require us to focus on the 
few notable occasions when Putin and Medvedev seemed to 
disagree about major issues. During the war against Georgia 
in August 2008, observers noticed that Medvedev – who was 
formally commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces – 
was contradicted several times by Putin on operational and 
strategic questions.109 In June 2009, Putin suddenly announced 
that Russia would no longer seek entry into the World Treaty 
Organization (WTO) on its own and would instead seek to 
join as part of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan 
– a stance directly at odds with Medvedev’s oft-stated position 
that Russia should pursue membership on its own.110 In late 
December 2009, Putin unexpectedly announced that a new 
strategic arms reduction treaty with the United States would 
not be consummated unless the Obama administration agreed 
104 Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, p. 47.
105 Ibid., p. 50. 
106 Ibid., p. 45.
107 When Putin used this phrase in his remarks to the Valdai Club in Septem-
ber 2009, he described himself and Medvedev as people “of the same blood type 
and the same political views” (“odnoi krovi, odnikh politicheskikh vzglyadov”). See 
Aleksandr Minkin, Gruppa krovi, Moskovskii Komsomlets, 18 September 2009, p. 
3, as well as IF, My ‘odnoi krovi,’ Interfax, 21 September 2009, Wire Item n° 1447.
108 Dmitry Medvedev’s Interview to Steffen Kretz, Danish Broadcasting Corpo-
ration’s Senior International Editor and Anchor of TV News and Current Affairs Pro-
gramme, Moscow, 26 April 2010 (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/7559).
109 Anatoliy Dmitriyevich Tsyganok, Voina na Kavkaze, 2008: Russkii vzglyad 
– Gruzino-osetinskaya voina 8-13 avgusta 2008 goda, AIRO-XXI, Moskva 2010; 
Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future 
of the West, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010; Council of the European Union, 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Final 
Report, 3 vols., IIFFMCG, Brussels September 2009; and Stéphane Lefebvre and 
Roger McDermott, Intelligence Aspects of the Russia-Georgia Conflict, Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies, 22/1, January 2009, pp. 4-19.
110 Aleksei Shalovalov, Oleg Salozhkov, and Igor’ Sedykh, VTO poluchila opto- 
voe predlozhenie: Rossiya prekrashchaet odinochnye peregovory s organizatsiei, Kom-
mersant’, 19 June 2009, p. 1.
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to forgo deployments of missile defenses in Eastern Europe.111 
This announcement seemingly contradicted a joint statement 
Medvedev had signed with U.S. President Barack Obama in 
July 2009 that imposed no such requirement for a treaty. The 
most important divergence between Putin and Medvedev came 
in March 2011, when Putin spoke scornfully about a proposed 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution authorizing 
military action to protect civilians in Libya against the brutal 
crackdown by Muammar Gaddafi’s forces. After Putin argued 
that the resolution was “defective” and “deeply flawed” and was 
reminiscent of “medieval calls for crusades,” Medvedev publicly 
rebuked him for “unacceptable” comments that “could lead to a 
clash of civilizations.” At Medvedev’s behest, Russia abstained in 
the UNSC vote on the resolution, allowing it to pass.112 
At first glance, all of these would seem to be “instances in which 
[the two leaders’] preferences conflicted.” But in fact the situation 
in each case, with the probable exception of Libya, is too murky 
to know for sure one way or the other. During the August 2008 
war, most of the policies ended up being in line with what Putin 
said, giving the impression that he was still the de facto comman-
der-in-chief. In July 2012 the Russian military commanders who 
oversaw the war effort alleged in public that Medvedev had been 
irresponsibly diffident during the initial clashes with Georgia and 
that Putin had saved the day by taking charge.113 Even if these 
allegations are true (which is unclear), they do not necessarily 
mean that Putin and Medvedev were ever in disagreement about 
the war. Instead, what may have happened is that a fast-de-
veloping situation engendered uncertainty and abrupt changes 
of policy. On the basis of available evidence, we cannot truly say 
whether their preferences conflicted and, if so, whether each 
sought to get his way.
Much the same is true about the WTO issue. A few weeks 
after Putin made his announcement, the Russian government 
indicated that it would resume membership talks on its own with 
the organization.114 Although ambiguity about Russia’s position 
on WTO entry persisted into 2010 and 2011 (and was not fully 
dispelled until Russia finally entered the WTO in August 2012), 
the revival of negotiations on Russian membership without links 
to other Eurasian countries seemed to go against what Putin had 
declared in June 2009.115 But this does not necessarily mean that 
he and Medvedev were at odds or that either man backed down. 
On the contrary, most experts in Russia interpreted the whole 
episode as a bargaining tactic to gain better terms for Russia’s 
entry into the organization.116 Events in 2010 and 2011, when 
both Medvedev and Putin tried to elicit U.S. support for Russian 
membership in the WTO, lent further credence to this interpre-
tation. The crucial final push in joining the organization occurred 
after Putin announced in September 2011 that he would be 
returning as president. Even as he announced the formation of 
a so-called Eurasian Union in October 2011, he stepped up his 
111  Ekaterina Kuznetsova, Menyayushchiisya golos Moskvy v mire, Nezavisi- 
maya Gazeta, 29 December 2009, p. 3; and IZ, Rossiya budet razvivat’ nastupatel’nye 
sistemy, Izvestiya, 30 December 2009, p. 2. 
112 Vladimir Solov’ev, Maksim Ivanov, and Dmitrii Kozlov, V Rossii nazrela 
resolyutsiya: Prezident i prem’er razoshlis’ v otsenke situatsii v Livii, Kommersant’, 
22 March 2011, p. 1; and Aleksandr Gabuev and Vladimir Solov’ev, Gnet svoyu 
Liviyu, Kommersant’, 21 March 2011, p. 1.
113 These accusations were made in a 47-minute documentary film titled 
Poteryannyi den’ (Lost Day), which was widely posted on the Internet in July 2012, 
shortly before the fourth anniversary of the war. Studiya Al’fa, Poteryannyy den’. 
Vsya pravda o voyne 08.08.08 g., Tver 2012.
114 Petr Netreba and Dmitrii Butrin, Na troikh ne vkhoditsya: Rossiya vozvrash-
chaetsya k samostoyatel’nym peregovoram s VTO” Kommersant’, 11 July 2009, p. 2. 
115 On the continued uncertainty about Russia’s position, see NG,Gud-bai, VTO! 
Da zdravstvuet tamozhennyi soyuz, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 December 2009, p. 4; 
and Anders Åslund, Why Doesn’t Russia Join the WTO?, The Washington Quarterly, 
33/2, April 2010, pp. 49-63.
116 Igor’ Sedykh, Rossiya dast VTO memorandum: Tamozhennyi soyuz voidet v 
organizatsiyu otdel’nym dokumentom, Kommersant’, 7 December 2009, p. 3. 
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efforts to facilitate Russia’s admission into the WTO.117  Putin was 
the one who, in July 2012, signed the legislation formally ratifying 
Russia’s entry into the organization. All of this suggests that the 
June 2009 declaration was mostly a bargaining tactic rather than a 
genuine difference of views about the merits of joining the WTO.
Bargaining tactics also seem to be the most plausible 
explanation for the apparent divergences on strategic arms 
control. Medvedev himself in early 2010 doggedly sought a 
joint statement banning missile defenses in Europe, precisely 
as Putin had urged. When an arms treaty was finally completed 
in late March 2010 with some linkage to U.S. plans for missile 
defense – a direct link in the preamble and indirect link 
in Article 5 – the Russian government issued a declaration 
reserving the right to withdraw from the treaty if U.S. missile 
defenses posed a threat. Experts in Russia such as Dmitry 
Trenin surmised that Putin and Medvedev had actually 
been working in sync during the final phase of the negoti-
ations, hoping that “Obama could be put under pressure and 
concessions could be extracted from him” at the last minute.118 
Only on the question of Libya did some genuine differences 
of views seem apparent, at least for a while. But if a divergence 
existed initially, it rapidly disappeared when the Western 
countries that spearheaded the intervention (France, Great 
Britain, the United States) changed the de facto goal of the 
operation to the removal of Gaddafi, not just the protection 
of civilians. Russian political leaders were united in their 
opposition to this expanded mission, and memories of what 
happened in Libya after Russia declined to veto the UNSC 
resolution helped to harden Russia’s position on Syria from 
2011 onward.119 Having been “hoodwinked” once (as Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov put it), Russia was determined to block 
any UNSC resolution that might be “hijacked” to authorize the 
overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.120 Putin had warned in 
March 2011 that the UNSC resolution would “allow anything,” 
and in many ways he proved to be right. Medvedev’s decision 
not to veto the resolution seems to have been at variance with 
Putin’s wishes and may have been an important contributor 
to Putin’s decision later in the year to reclaim the presidency. 
A good deal of murkiness remains about Russian decision-
making vis-à-vis Libya, but the March 2011 episode seems to 
be the one time when Putin and Medevev did not see eye to eye. 
None of this is meant to imply that Putin and Medvedev were 
fully in accord on all other issues. The available evidence does 
not exclude the possibility that the two men’s preferences did in 
fact conflict in each case discussed here. Nor does it exclude the 
possibility that each leader’s staff sought to eclipse the other’s 
staff – a “rivalry of administrative apparatuses” (sopernichestvo 
apparatov) – even when the leaders themselves agreed.121 
Nonetheless, what these episodes illustrate is that any attempt to 
infer the distribution of political power by monitoring decision-
making and assessing policy outcomes is fraught with compli-
cations. Such indicators should be given significantly less weight 
than other metrics proposed here.
117 NR, Rossiya vstupila v VTO posle 18 let peregovorov, Newsru.ru, 22 July 
2012, Item 16; and Vladimir Putin, Gruppa dvadtsati i global’nye vyzovy ekonomiki, 
18 June 2012 (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15686).
118 Vladimir Solov’ev, Rossiya i Amerika udarili po raketam: Yadernye arsenaly 
sokratyat estestvennym obrazom, Kommersant’, 29 March 2010, pp. 1-2; and Peter 
Baker, Twists, Turns, and Anger on Way to Arms Pact with Russia, The New York 
Times, 27 March 2010, p. A4.
119 Mariya Khodinskaya-Golenishcheva, Pobeditelei ne sudyat? Vliyanie opera- 
tsii NATO v Livii na metody uregulirovaniya regional’nykh krizisov, Mezhdunarod-
naya Zhizn’, 7, July 2012, pp. 64-74. See also RBK, D. Medvedev: Rossiya skorrekti-
rovala podkhod k situatsii Sirii posle liviiskogo stsenarya, RBK, 30 July 2012, Item 4.
120 KP, Lavrov otkazal NATO v ‘appetite’ k ‘liviiskoi avantyure’ v Sirii, Komso-
mol’skaya Pravda, 28 June 2012, p. 3.
121 On this point, see Aleksandra Samarina, Medvedev sdelal strategicheskii 
khod, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 May 2010, p. 1.
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12. Conclusions
For both analytical and practical reasons, the task of evaluating 
political power is an important one, especially if we want to 
understand how the national political discourse is shaped. 
As Jeffrey Pfeffer has emphasized:
In the first place, the exercise and use of power is [sic] facilitated by 
an accurate diagnosis of the political situation confronted by the social 
actor. Strategies ranging from coalition formation to cooperation 
require an accurate diagnosis of the political landscape. Second, the 
measurement and assessment of power is [sic] important for those 
who would do research on this topic. If we are to assess whether 
or not power is correlated with other attributes, is stable over time, 
and [is consistent] across decision issues, then power will have to be 
measured. Third, […] one way of understanding what power is, is 
to consider how the concept can be examined and used. Thus, the 
assessment of power will help in the understanding of the concept.122 
Admittedly, as Peter Morriss and others have shown, 
attempts to quantify power have often been flawed, especially 
when scholars use indices and variables that do not actually 
measure what they purport to measure or measure nothing 
at all. Nonetheless, this essay has demonstrated that certain 
techniques and criteria, if used judiciously, can be helpful in 
understanding the distribution of political power in Russia over 
time and the capacity of various political figures to contribute 
to and shape the country’s political discourse.
Several points emerge from the discussion:
1. First, any attempt to evaluate political power presup- 
poses a definition of power that can be applied in different 
geographic and temporal settings. A review of the decades 
of cumulative scholarship on this subject indicates that the 
definition of political power used here – the capacity to 
exert political influence or to achieve political outcomes – 
is the most suitable from both a scholarly and a practical 
standpoint. The definition is simple, but it has far-reaching 
implications not only for the broad approach to take in 
evaluating power but also for the specific techniques to 
use. The importance of linking conceptual issues with the 
actual assessment of political power was stressed more than 
forty years ago by Roderick Bell, who argued that “we can 
never know that we have correctly assigned numbers to 
empirical phenomena until the results are useful to explain 
things... Measurement is not a process [that] takes place 
independently of theory.”123 More recently, this same point 
has been developed at greater length by Robert Adcock and 
David Collier, who contend that measurements of power 
should “never [be] examined in isolation; rather, they [must 
be] interpreted and given meaning in relation to the system-
atized concept [of it].”124
2. Second, the structure of the Russian polity is not all- 
determining, but it does have a crucial impact on the distri-
bution of political power. The basic structure in recent years 
has been one of a largely impotent parliament subordinated 
to a very strong executive. This pattern might change over 
the long term, but the existing arrangement means that the 
only elites with the capacity to shape the prevailing political 
discourse are those in the highest positions of executive 
authority (especially Putin), those in proximity to the highest 
executive, and those who have a realistic chance of one day 
attaining the highest office.
122 Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, p. 35.
123 Bell, Political Power: The Problem of Measurement, pp. 13, 26.
124 Adcock and Collier, Measurement Validity, p. 531. On a related point, see 
Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables, pp. 197-198.
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3. Third, reputational metrics are crucial to include in 
composite measures of political power, despite the pitfalls. 
The reputation-based techniques not only are important 
in their own right but can also be adapted to evaluate the 
power bases derived from social psychology. Because of the 
convincing experimental evidence supporting the expanded 
French-Raven typology, measurements of the various power 
bases through non-experimental means should prove to be a 
valuable addition to the more standard reputational metrics.
4. Fourth, the exercise of political power in Russia yields 
results that in some cases can shed valuable light on the relative 
standing of key political figures. For example, the ouster or 
demotion of a prominent official usually (though not always) 
clarifies the distribution of power at the top. In most instances, 
however, assessments of political power that rely solely on 
scrutiny of the exercise of power are likely to be deficient. 
Serious, and potentially fatal, methodological problems hinder 
this type of analysis. Even though meticulous appraisals of 
the exercise of political power can serve as an important 
cross-check on other techniques, they should be only as a 
supplement to – not a substitute for – these other methods.
5. Fifth, once we understand how political power is 
distributed, we can explore how the most powerful actors 
choose which ideas to latch onto. The relationship between 
leaders and thinkers is at times reciprocal and formal, but 
more often than not it is informal and involves no little or no 
direct contact. Neo-fascist thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin 
were of minimal political influence in Russia until recent 
years, but Dugin suddenly found his ideas being reflected in 
political discourse after the start of the Ukraine crisis. Putin’s 
speech on 18 March 2014 announcing the annexation of 
Crimea, for example, used phrasing in some places very 
similar to Dugin’s own phrasing. This is not because Putin 
directly consulted with Dugin (he never has, according to 
insider accounts) but because Dugin’s brand of Eurasianist 
philosophy became convenient for Putin in justifying his 
policies vis-à-vis Ukraine. Although Dugin himself has been 
critical of what he sees as Putin’s failure to go anywhere near 
far enough in Ukraine, Dugin’s ideas – with or without his 
blessing – have been empowered and incorporated into the 
prevailing political discourse because the most powerful 
figure in the country has chosen to embrace them.
6. Sixth, econometric models derived from game theory 
and bargaining theory are useful for thinking about 
some stylized aspects of the exercise of power and of the 
calculations that go into the use of power, but they do 
not give us any metrics that are useful for evaluating the 
political power of key political elites in Russia. By the same 
token, measurements of formal power are insufficient. The 
Russian case underscores that a metric of executive power 
that looks only at formal powers is apt to prove misleading.
7. Seventh, a review of different ways to evaluate political 
power has underscored both the strengths and the weaknesses 
of the contending approaches. To ensure maximum reliability 
of our overall evaluation, we must design a composite based 
on a convergence of various indicators. If the metrics discussed 
here are of any validity, we presumably should find a strong 
correlation between the power rankings we derive from them, 
suitably adjusted. If that proves to be the case, a composite 
metric that incorporates all of these indicators should yield a 
reasonably solid estimate of the distribution of political power.
To apply this composite metric to Russia, we must proceed 
in several steps.125 First, we need to calculate all the indicators 
relevant to Russia, adapting the scales as needed for the specific 
structure of the polity. Second, after tabulating the individual 
metrics, we need to calibrate the results to permit comparisons. 
Third, we must then test for correlations between the metrics. 
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Fourth, if one or more of the indicators do not show high 
correlations with the others, we need to figure out why. Is there 
something wrong with that metric, or is there a deeper flaw 
in the whole framework? Fifth, if we find that all the metrics 
are strongly correlated, or if we can resolve any anomalies that 
arise, we can then combine the different indicators to produce 
a vector. Finally, we need to weight the individual elements in 
the vector to take account of the country’s political structures. 
The specifications for this composite vector then need to be 
clearly laid out so that we can understand how the distribution 
of political power in Russia has evolved.
Finally, once we see how the distribution of political 
power has changed over time, we can more clearly link those 
changes to variations in Russia’s prevailing political discourse. 
At any given moment, many ideas and strands of thought are 
competing for influence in society. Ideas that become politically 
influential, even dominant, in Russia at any given moment attain 
that status not so much because they are self-evidently correct 
but because an extremely power political patron has decided to 
give them an official imprimatur.
Part I
The State’s Political Discourse and  
Ideological References in Contemporary Russia
125 The process specified here is similar to that outlined in Adcock and Collier, 
Measurement Validity, pp. 529-546. See also Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and 
Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Social Research, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994, pp. 25 ff.
Chapter I
The Discourse of Russian Bureaucracy 
and its Influence on the Political Discourse 
Alexey Barabashev, NRU-HSE
The general problem of bureaucratic over-influence in gover- 
nance is that sometimes – and perhaps too often – political goals 
and proposals announced by top authorities are “corrected” by 
the apparat. Indeed, the apparat finds ways to cleverly mask 
and ‘replace’ these political decisions with other conclusions 
that often appear far from the original ones announced by the 
political elite, even in their general goals and ideas. The issue 
of this bureaucratic ‘hidden influence’ on the political process 
is reflected not only in academic sources, but also in popular 
books1 and even in television series.2
1. The Theoretical Debate
 
With regards to administrative theories of bureaucracy, civil 
servants have often been viewed as a separate social group 
guided by their own interests, occupying a special role in gov-
ernance for their own personal benefit. Every administrative 
1 Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn, Yes, Minister: The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, 
3 volumes, BBC, London 1981-1983; Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn, Yes, Prime Min-
ister: The Diaries of the Right Hon. James Hacker, Salem House, Topsfield 1986-1988.
2 Antony Jay v Jonathan Lynn (creators), Yes, Minister, TV Serial for BBC 2, 
1980-1984; Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn (creators), Yes, Prime Minister, TV 
Serial for BBC 2, 1986-1988.
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paradigm has its own explanation for the enormous influ-
ence that the bureaucracy exerts on decision-making. Indeed, 
Weberian-style explanations of bureaucratic influence on deci-
sion-making appeal to meritocratic foundations of the apparat: 
civil servants, as far as being professionals of politics (along the 
ideal-type of bureaucracy and rational bureaucrat) try to embed 
the decisions into existing reality. It is the ‘organizational power’ 
of government bodies and the sequence of rational technique, 
embodied in specialized bureaucratic forms of organizational 
behavior 3 that follow the rules of the government.4 Thus, we see 
a ‘paradox of bureaucratic domination’ controlled by a relatively 
small political elite.5 More recently, the New Public Manage-
ment (NPM) paradigm of the mid-70s explained the attempts of 
bureaucrats to influence decision-making in order to maximize 
their resources, including functions and responsibility for their 
own public sector roles.6 
The influence of bureaucracy on decision-making manifests 
in multiple forms and components, such as the limitation of 
the access to operative administrative and social information 
for political authorities (culminating in direct disinformation), 
the drowning of problems in oceans of useless details during 
reporting, postponing of decision-making through time-wasting 
tricks, or, in contrast, fabricating the need for urgent decisions by 
simulating a necessity to act on a problem immediately despite 
a lack of information or other factors. Among the aforemen-
tioned forms and components, the most significant is the leading 
role of ‘bureaucratic discourse’ as an instrument of influence. 
The bureaucratic discourse can be understood as the significant 
influence exerted by the bureaucracy on the decision-making 
process. However, this task has an independent value and can be 
analyzed in terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity, of variants, of 
administrative procedures that formed the discourse, and more.
2. The ‘Procedural Discourse’ of Russian Bureaucracy
Russia has a strong and deep history of bureaucratic dominance 
and its influence in the spheres of policy making and every-
day life. In order to better understand the specificities of the 
Russian bureaucratic discourse, we must consider the real con-
straints that exist for political discourse and decision-making 
in the contemporary Russian Federation. Hence, we should 
accept the bureaucratic discourse as a ‘way of doing things’ 
consisting of three parts: vocabulary, meanings, and proce-
dures. My key hypothesis is that the specificities of the Russian 
bureaucratic discourse lay in the area of procedures. 
First, we must compare political discourse in Russia to 
bureaucratic discourse. Indeed, the procedures of public 
political discourse consist of a broad spectrum of oral and 
written entities. In terms of the schematic content of political 
discourse procedures – and the forms they manifest in – 
I believe that there used to exist no great difference between 
Russia and other (Western) countries. Over time, oral procedure 
– such as press-conferences, interviews, official round tables, 
presentations of politicians at socially significant events, 
screenings of official governmental proceedings, an array of 
3 Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. 
Bureaucracy, Oxford University Press, New York 1946, pp. 196-244.
4 Margaret Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, New York 1974, p. 33.
5 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. 
Bedminister Press, New York 1968, pp. iii, 953.
6 William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine 
Atherton, Chicago 1971; William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy: Servant or Master?, 
Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1973. The theoretical discussion within the 
NPM context can be revealed in Lee Sigelman, The Bureaucrat as Budget Maximizer: 
An Assumption Examined, Public Budgeting and Finance, 6/1, 1986, pp. 50-59. 
André Blais and Stéphane Dion, Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanen 
Model & Its Critics. Polity, 22/4, Summer 1990, pp. 655-674.
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populist politicians in TV channels, etc. – became a common 
occurrence in the everyday political discourse of Russia. 
Remarkably, the vocabulary of Russian oral political discourse 
in recent years (beginning in 2011 with the events of Bolotnaya 
ploshchad) has migrated toward increasingly ‘patriotic’ and 
anti-Western patterns. The repeated use of ‘sharp’ words – such 
as ‘sanctions and anti-sanctions,’ ‘national interests,’ ‘national 
idea,’ ‘import-replacement’ (importozameshcheniye), ‘social unity,’ 
‘foreign agents,’ ‘NATO pressure,’ ‘orange revolutions,’ ‘belt of 
instability’ around Russia etc. – is of particular significance. 
All of these ideologically tinged terms are transmitted daily 
through the mass media apparatus, especially by state TV 
channels. Some of them clearly reinforce the intensification 
of a sharp ‘anti-Westernization’ political discourse in internal 
and external political events such as Russian elections, negative 
economic trends, the war in Ukraine, the military exercises in 
the Baltic, etc. However, despite the sharpening of oral political 
discourse in recent years, the vocabulary of written political 
discourse presents a much ‘softer’ approach in its ideological 
contents. Press-reviews usually attempt to palliate speeches 
and acts of political discourse such as legislation, Presidential 
decrees, resolutions of the Russian government, and ministerial 
orders (excluding orders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
These acts appear more ‘balanced’ – sometimes by reaching 
entirely opposing meanings or using neutral terminology – 
and are certainly less ideologically refined. We can identify the 
reasons for this process in the ‘hidden influence’ of a Russian 
bureaucracy that acts according to ‘genre’ traditions.
Russian bureaucratic (non-public) procedures are the 
capstone to understanding these changes and replacements 
in both the vocabulary and policy-making of the government. 
This conclusion does not arise due to a Russian bureaucracy that 
stays separate from politics and attempts to correct politicians. 
Rather, this process is the result of some specific ‘rules of 
bureaucratic internal game’ that occur in every decision-
making process of Russian governmental bodies and have 
their roots in the Soviet and Russian past. Existing adminis-
trative paradigms, with their general explanations of bureau-
cratic influence on decision-making in terms of their attempts 
to maximize resources or in defense of their normative reality, 
fail to properly explain the practice of everyday administrative 
life in Russia. In Russia – most likely in other countries as well 
– the essence of bureaucratic influence and its purposes differs 
from the Weberian and NPM general explanations and instead 
follows the specificity of its discourse. 
I would like to note that the socio-cultural roots of Russian 
bureaucracy – as well as its tradition-oriented discourse and 
general manner of operation – heavily influence the political 
decision-making process. Hence, I would like to present 
some examples of substitution in the terminology/discourse 
of bureaucratic procedures from the preceding years, and in 
so doing demonstrate the radical discrepancy between the 
initial oral and written (in the drafts of documents) narrative 
and the final policy in documents produced by the Russian 
government, focusing on administrative and public service 
reforms (my professional field of research). My specific areas 
of research concern staff optimization, remuneration of civil 
servants, the resolution of conflicts of interest, support for and 
restrictions of NGO’s, the terminology of ‘open government’ 
compared with existing political terminology, and their role 
in bureaucratic influence on the political discourse and, 
ultimately, on policy-making.
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3. The ‘Hidden Influence’ of the Working Groups (WGs)
As previously mentioned, the essence of the influence of bureau- 
cratic procedures on the Russian political discourse – that pro-
vides the transition from the sharp ideological constructions 
toward some ‘softer’ final formulas – is the Russian tradition 
of bureaucratic decision-making. This process is determined 
through the co-operative efforts of government bodies – tradi-
tionally organized collectively – and can be traced back to the 
Soviet era, to the Russian Empire and perhaps even earlier to 
pre-Empire epoch and its Council of the Tsar with his Nobles.7 
This is the result of special administrative creations – the so-
called ‘working groups’ (WG) established within governmental 
bodies.8 The WG decision-making processes (prinyatiye resh-
eniy v rabochikh gruppakh) is based on a research of consensus 
and a sort of ‘informal veto’ of any governmental body. This 
condition is effective when the political intention does not 
completely prevail on other interests, defining an almost com-
mon situation since a condition of ‘last option’ is a quite rare 
event. In fact, this latest circumstance happens when there is 
not an internal struggle – for resources and for legislation 
purity – among different bodies and centers of decisions, and 
the quest for unity of state executive bodies succeeds. Thus, we 
can describe the mechanism of cooperative decision-making, 
concerning the Russian governmental WGs (mezhvedomst- 
vennye rabochiye gruppy) and the specific bureaucratic consen-
sus-procedures of the WGs’ activity (the so-called ‘Tables of 
disagreement’ – tablitsy raznoglasii) that are the heritage of the 
Imperial/Soviet past.9 
WGs are established under the initiatives of the top 
authorities and their apparats (such as the administration of 
President of Russian Federation or the Apparat of Government, 
etc.), are tasked with producing drafts of documents (such as 
decrees, resolutions, and orders) and simultaneously involve the 
specific areas of responsibility of various governmental bodies. 
Hence, following the practices, a joint committee of ‘interested’ 
(zainteresovannykh) bodies is temporarily created as long as a 
final version of the document is accepted. The numerous WGs 
are thus created in all areas of policy-making – from education 
to civil service reforms and to the state federal programs 
elaboration, etc. – becoming a remarkable force of Russian 
Government activity.
 Every ‘interested’ body, and some selected leading expert 
organizations – such as think-tanks and universities under the 
government of Russian Federation (NRU-HSE, RANEPA and 
the Finance University) and national universities (MSU and the 
SPbU) – are represented in the WGs by theirs top managers: 
the deputy ministers are directly nominated members while 
rectors, vice rectors, and directors of institutes are appointed by 
approbation (po soglasovaniuy). This is the highest managerial 
level represented in the WGs. 
The order of nominating the list of WG members is usually 
signed by the higher Russian authorities, such as the Prime 
Minister of Russian Federation, the head of the presidential 
administration, or (rarely) the President himself. Thus, the 
WGs are usually headed by a representative of the presidential 
administration (who is at the very least ranked as a ‘head of 
the management’) or a member of the government (who is at 
the very least ranked as a ‘deputy prime minister’ or a top 
Alexey Barabashev
7 In Russian, Soviet tsarya s boyarami. For example, we can mention the Sobornoye 
Ulozheniye a set of legal norms introduced by Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich in 1649, defin-
ing for the members of Duma (higher nobles) the right to make state decisions by them-
selves or with a final approval by Tsar, based on the consensus collective procedures. 
8 In Russian, rabochiye gruppy gosudarstvennykh organov.
9 When we read in historic documents formulations such as “Prikazy poso- 
vechshalis’ i reshili,” we can definitely make analogies with the contemporary 
Russian WGs.
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manager of the government apparat). In parallel with the WGs, 
Expert Groups (EGs) are also commonly – but not necessarily 
– created. The EG is guided by the secretary of the WG and is 
nominated by the same directive that appoints the head of the 
WG. Thus, the EG is aimed at preparing the documents for 
the WG sessions. Thus, the initial draft of the document (in the 
form of decree, order of government, etc.) then passes to the 
WG and is distributed among its members. In the next phase, 
the WG members formally request to their experts (from the 
government bodies or from the involved think-tanks) to prepare 
comments and even arguments against some positions on the 
initial draft. The secretary of the WG – possibly supported by 
the EG – collects those comments and combines them in a ‘table 
of disagreement.’
4. The ‘Table of Disagreement’
Hence, the ‘table of disagreement’ combines the different 
positions of the ‘interested’ government bodies and expert 
organizations, and is usually structured on (at minimum) three 
columns that report the name of the organization and its rep-
resentative (together with her /his position); the description 
of the draft’s part (including its number of paragraph) that is 
disagreed on; and the new formulation that proposed by the 
WG. After preparing the table of disagreement, the date of the 
meeting is decided. The activities of the WG are certainly kept 
private and out of media attention because of their potential 
danger: the leaks of alternate decisions variants – that heavily 
touch some actors’ interests – can lead to counteractions aimed 
at blocking unwanted results from those actions. In fact, the 
initial draft is just a working document and the positions of the 
different government bodies can be slightly dissimilar. Thus, a 
confidential approach – rather than revealing the lack of unity in 
the government – is preferable, announcing a unified (a priori) 
position of the government as a whole entity. Information is 
sometimes leaked to the media, but the texts of tables of dis- 
agreements almost never age. This ‘kitchen cabinet’ is the hid-
den procedural phase of the bureaucratic discourse in Russia. 
The specificity of the WG meetings remains in the (some- 
times relatively strong and harsh) tones of the discussions and 
disagreements on the tables. This process follows a scheme of 
progressive acceptance and rejection of local disagreements; 
every member of the WG potentially has an informal veto and 
is able to block the approval of the document. In fact, if some 
government body argued the impossibility of finding resources 
for a task – or declared that such assets could not be put 
toward implementation of their federal programs – it would 
be effectively impossible to accept the document in that very 
form. Thus, only in very rare circumstances can the top political 
authorities insist and push the WG to accept a draft without 
reserves. However, such a situation could seriously undermine 
the existing administrative consensus. 
Hence, this is usually a long process – implying many 
sessions of the WG and the resulting difficulties/delays in 
scheduling meetings that involve all the (usually busy) partic-
ipants in a unique event – that is led by consensus-oriented 
procedures which elaborate a final version of the document (in 
the forms of decrees, orders, etc.) that is slightly different from 
initial drafts. Another result of this type of procedural discourse 
is that sometimes government agencies are able to change their 
positions and reconsider positive responses (acceptance) toward 
certain formulas proposed by other bodies. Thus, it is clear why 
the WG process takes an extensive period of time and sometimes 
produces delayed final outputs. This is the result of a bulky and 
slow administrative machine. However, this is also the essence 
of a machine that analyzes issues and grasps onto them as a 
bulldog holds the throat of its prey. 
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In these consensus procedures, some government bodies 
have a key role inasmuch they have the ability to influence the 
consensus and contain any ‘sharp’ variants. This role is mostly 
assumed by the apparat of the government, the ministry of 
finances (more generally, even by the ministry of economic 
development and the central bank of Russia), and some of 
the security and law enforcement agencies of the Russian 
government. Certainly, this practice is the heritage of the Soviet 
past – with its Politburo consensus-decisions – and even of the 
older Russian Empire. 
Hence, we can observe how this mechanism works at the 
administrative and civil service reform levels in Russia. The 
differences between the initially proposed political ideas/
terminology 10 and the final formulation of the documents11 
transformed during the WG process can be seen in the 
following table.
From this example, we can see how every case is affected by 
the bureaucratic discourse procedures, leading toward some 
more balanced, ‘softer’ and more rational variants. This is the 
essence of the bureaucratic ‘hidden influence’ on the Russian 
political discourse aimed at strengthening the state executive 
power rather than encouraging possible challenges from the 
political elite. The destruction of the Russian bureaucracy in 
1917 and the replacement of its bureaucratic discourse – for 
example, nominating the exclusive responsibility of some single 
governmental body for the implementation of each decision – 
probably meant the destabilization of the governance rather 
than a simple replacement of the political elite (with its system 
of preferences) with another one. To follow this idea, we can 
to mark the challenges for the existent bureaucratic discourse 
in Russia. To improve the quality of Russian bureaucracy 
utilizing the public instruments of objective evaluation to 
measure its effectiveness and establishing personal responsi-
bility for managerial outcomes of professional activity could 
be crucial in transforming it from a ‘stabilizing’ force charged 
with eliminate politically risky movements. 
Alexey Barabashev
10 Concept of the Russian Federation Public Service System Reform, ap- 
proved by President of Russian Federation (15 August 2001), n° Pr-1496 (Kon- 
tseptsiya reformirovaniya sistemy gosudarstvennoy sluzhby Rossiyskoy Federatsii. 
Utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiyskoy Federatsii 15 avgusta 2001 g. Pr -1496).
11 Decree of the President of Russian Federation n° 1336 (19 November 2002) 
“About the Federal Program “Reforming the Public Service of Russian Federa-
tion (2003-2005)” – Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii n° 1336 ot 19 noyabrya 
2002 goda «O federal’noy programme «Reformirovaniye gosudarstvennoy sluzhby 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2003-2005 gody)»; The Federal Program “Reforming and 
Development of the System of Public Service of Russian Federation (2009-2013).” 
Approved by the Decree of the President of Russian Federation n° 261 (10 March 
2009) – Federal’naya programma «Reformirovaniye i razvitiye sistemy gosudarstvennoy 
sluzhby Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2009-2013 gody)». Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii 261 ot 10.03.2009.
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Russia needs a new bureaucracy that is a sufficient and 
productive social driver; a force able to provide more qualified 
decisions for the sake of its people, not just based on the balance 
of government interests. In continuing the above proposed ‘path 
of political and administrative discourse research,’ one can trace 
the historical dynamics of the Russian bureaucratic ‘hidden 
influence’ and its ‘mitigating’ effects on the Russian political 
discourse. Also, it is important to research the “hidden bureau-
cratic discourse” procedures from a theoretical perspective – as 
a part of the administrative paradigms of hierarchical subordi-
nation, of state services provisions, of government interactions 
with the community of experts and with civil society – and to 
realize the bureaucratic discourse from the administrative – 
everyday reality, involving into the research a new sort of adminis-
trative sources that are stored in the administrative bodies, in the 
administrative think-tanks and in the hands of WG experts.
Chapter II
Post-Crimean Political Discourse  
and Russian Foreign Policy Narratives
Anton Barbashin, Intersection
March of 2014 marked the most significant change in Russia’s 
post-Soviet foreign policy. Not only a Rubicon for Russia’s 
relations with the West, it also marked a profound shift in the 
structuring of Russia’s foreign policy discourse. The annexation 
of Crimea profoundly altered political, economic, social and 
historical realities for Russia, changes that ultimately required 
coherent explanations: paradigms and narratives that made 
these groundbreaking changes part of a consistent plan. 
In the search for these explanations, explanations that held the 
possibility of outlining the trajectory of future development 
in the country, the Russian political class – state-affiliated 
agents and foreign policy groups – have created symbiotic 
narratives that employ both traditional realist discourses and 
many features of revanchist discourses ultimately preventing 
an unbiased discussion that separates Russia’s national interest 
from foreign policy realities. In order to properly qualify and 
quantify the dominant foreign policy discourses in today’s 
Russia, we must first look at the political context in which these 
discourses have evolved and competed, shaping to some extent 
the worldviews of the decision makers in Russia. Naturally, 
we must look to the rule of President Putin, who made the 
decision to annex the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. This sixteen 
year period from 2000 to 2016 can be divided into three sub- 
periods, which I have outlined below.
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1. Russia As Part of The West (2000-2004)
The decade preceding Vladimir Putin’s rule was mostly defined 
by Russia’s determination to build a strong relationship with the 
West – a desire to integrate with Western political and economic 
institutions and find common ground for military cooperation. 
Still, the second half of the 1990s was a time of various dissat-
isfaction with the West that effectively destroyed any illusions 
that existed directly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, the potential to build lasting relationships was 
extremely high during this period and the sheer readiness to 
integrate was enough to make significant progress. 
When Putin became president in the year 2000, Russia 
was only beginning to recover from the 1998 economic 
crisis. Oil prices that would later change Russia’s economic 
and geopolitical realities were still relatively low at the time, 
and United States dominance as the sole global superpower 
was not threatened or questioned by any other state. With 
the legacy of president Yeltsin behind him, Vladimir Putin 
was eager to pacify Russia domestically, centralize the state, 
and bring Russia’s economy closer to the West all the while 
acquiring Russia a ‘say’ in global affairs. Both in domestic and 
foreign rhetoric, Russia was viewed as a part of European civi- 
lization and, more broadly, as part of the West. In 2000 Putin 
called to provide the Russians and the Germans with a new 
perspective, contribute to the well-being of our peoples, and 
the unity of Europe on the basis of common values of progress, 
democracy and freedom... Of course we accept common 
European values... Today basic European values are becoming 
an integral part of the Russian way of life.1 
In this address, Putin discussed not only the financial 
importance of Russian integration with the West, but also 
stressed a shared history and set of values – something that was 
never seen before and would never be repeated in the future. In 
the aftermath of 9/11, Putin had his chance to act and was the 
first foreign leader to call Washington and propose assistance 
and support. This marked a brief period of active partnership 
and even ’friendship’ between the United States of America and 
Russia. Given that the fight against terrorism was named as the 
primary goal of these joint efforts, both parties had a shared 
need to overlook their differences and prior disagreements 
in order to cooperate on mostly U.S. efforts to wage a war on 
terrorism.2 Moreover, it was relatively easy to sell this narrative 
to audiences in both Russian and the United States: Russia 
was waging war against terrorists in Chechnya and across the 
Northern Caucasus while the United States was fighting similar 
battles in Afghanistan and across in the Middle East. 
Russia’s leadership was confident that this partnership 
would bring the U.S. to appreciate their role, thus granting 
Russia a special status in the global order, with its interests 
and needs valued and respected. But as the war in Afghanistan 
progressed and the United States began to plan the Iraq 
campaign, Russia’s leadership shifted from its full support of 
American foreign policy plans to a closer relationship with 
France and Germany, opposing the U.S. campaign in Iraq3 
and deeming it dangerous and illegitimate. At that time, the 
Kremlin’s hope that the United States would allow Russia a 
leading role in global affairs had been dashed; ushering a short 
Moscow – Berlin – Paris axis served as a second chance to ‘join 
1 Vladimir Putin’s interview to the German newspaper, 11 June 2000 (http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24202). 
2 See Mark Galeotti, Russia’s War in Chechnya 1994-2009, Osprey Publishing, 
Oxford 2014. 
3 See the Joint declaration from Russia, Germany and France, 10 February 
2003 (http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/3662).
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the West.’ But as had happened with Washington, Moscow 
eventually became disappointed with this western pivot. 
In 2004, when the Orange Revolution took place in Ukraine, 
the governments of France and Germany supported the 
movement. Seen as a threat to Russia’s national interests, the 
Kremlin read the support of the Maidan by Paris and Berlin 
as an anti-Russian stance which rendered a further pivot to 
the West impossible. This entire period can be characterized 
by a two-sided misconception: Putin’s Russia believed that 
if it played by the Western rules it would be able to acquire 
a seat at the table alongside the world’s most powerful 
liberal democracies that would in turn afford Russia prefer-
ential conditions, particularly regarding the treatment of the 
post-Soviet space. In a similar manner, the West believed that 
Russia had accepted the dissolution of its empire and was ready 
to act as a ‘normal’ liberal democracy, respecting both former 
colonies and former parts of its empire as fully sovereign, 
independent states. Nevertheless, both positions were wrong.
2. Rivalry of ‘Partners’ and Hopes 
for the BRICS (2005-2012)
After the Ukrainian Maidan, Russia’s discontent with the West 
began to formalize. This is best illustrated in Putin’s Munich 
speech,4 which summarized the Kremlin’s assessment of the 
world in 2007. In the speech, Putin declared that Russia had 
been mistreated, her interests had been neglected while the 
United States – which had failed to deliver a unipolar world 
– was unilaterally breaking international laws and avoiding 
5 Yevgeny Primakov, Mir bez Sverhderzav, Rossiay v Globalnoi Politike, 3, 
2003 (http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_1560).
6 See Anton Barbashin, How Russia sees the multipolar world, Intersection, 30 
August 2016 (http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/how-russia-sees-
multipolar-world). Andrey Makarychev, Russia in a multipolar world: Role identi-
ties and “cognitive maps,” Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals, 96, December 
2011. Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia in Global Governance: Multipolarity or Multilat-
eralism? in Dries Lesage and Pierre Vercauteren (eds.), Contemporary Global Gov-
ernance: Multipolarity vs New Discourses on Global Governance, Peter Lang Pub-
lishing Group, Frankfurt-Brussels 2009, pp. 51-62.
4 Vladimir Putin participated in the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 
10 February 2007 (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034).
responsibility for its actions. Instead of seeking a role in the 
Western order, Russia moved to fashion a so-called multipolar 
world, which was described best by Yevgeny Primakov, the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-1998) and Prime 
Minister (1998-1999). According to Primakov, Russia – along 
with China, India and Japan – deserved a much larger voice in 
defining global governance and, due to their growing economic 
might, needed to have more political weight in the world order. 
Accordingly, as the unipolar world was now seen as incapable 
of bringing global peace (i.e. the military operation in Iraq in 
2003), only a multipolar world could guarantee a more just 
and inclusive order of which Russia had to be one of its pillars. 
However, this approach did not dictate Russia as the enemy of 
the West, but rather as a rival, a competitor.5 
Moscow has nevertheless continued to increase its economic 
interdependence with European nations, especially as growing 
oil prices have allowed the country to drastically increase imports 
of European goods. While Russia was building economic 
bridges with Europe and remaining in ‘partner’s rivalry’ mode 
with the United States, it was also attempting to find a formula 
of how BRICS could change the governing world order, 
despite the fact that no member of the BRICS was politically or 
economically stable.6  
This period was only briefly paused during the Georgian 
war when, for a relatively brief period of time, Russia – West 
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relations suffered a tremendous blow. Nevertheless, there was a 
conceptual decision among western nations to pacify the conflict 
and quickly reengage with Russia. The most vivid example of 
this was president Obama’s “reset” – a set of measures directed 
at de-escalation with Russia with the stated goal of beginning 
Russia-U.S. relations anew. In a sense, this appeasement policy 
postponed the Russia – West confrontation based on Russia’s 
interventionist foreign policy in its ‘near abroad’ until 2014. 
Medvedev’s presidency was a significant contrast to Vladimir 
Putin’s rule, although only in rhetoric. In practice, Medvedev, 
safeguarding the presidential seat, continued to look to the 
multipolar world, cautiously building up some reputational trust 
with the West that would be entirely lost only a few years later.
3. The Return to ‘Greatpowerness’ (2012-present)
Russia took a hard turn when president Putin came back to 
being president in 2012, after spending a required four years 
of intermission as the prime-minister of Russia. Highly dissat-
isfied with the events now known as the ‘Arab Spring,’ which 
the Kremlin blamed in some part on the West, Putin shifted 
towards revanchist rhetoric, pointing fingers at the West as the 
cause of most of the troubles the world was currently experi-
encing. A large part of his distrust with the West came from fears 
of political unrest inside Russia. The mass protests of 2011 and 
2012 came as a shock to Russia’s political elite; despite an initial 
push to liberalize political life in the country, Putin’s return to the 
office brought blunt measures that were directed at marginal- 
izing protest groups by significantly shortening the legal space 
of political protest. For two years, most of the developments 
were restricted to domestic affairs, restrictive laws, and a hard 
strike against NGOs promoting democracy and human rights. 
But by 2014, the Kremlin had tremendously altered the rules 
of the game. Once again in Russian history, anti-Americanism 
proved to be an effective justification of repressive measures. 
     In late February 2014, Russian troops entered the territory 
of Ukraine from a Russian military base in Sevastopol, seized 
control of several key government outposts, and by the middle 
of March secured the referendum that granted the Crimean 
Peninsula independence from Ukraine and subsequently 
ushered its annexation by Russia. The Crimean success – an 
almost bloodless annexation of a large segment of foreign 
territory – spawned the creation of the so-called Donetsk and 
Luhansk People’s Republics, separatist formations in the East of 
Ukraine that de-facto meant military conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine. This unprecedented episode, assessed by International 
Criminal Court as “international armed conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine, and an ongoing state of occupation of Ukraine’s 
territory”7 still determines Russia’s objective geopolitical realities. 
Western response – in the form of limited sanctions and partial 
isolation – determined the Kremlin’s attempt to pivot to the East, 
bringing Russia politically and economically closer to China, 
which has so far failed to prove successful.8 Russia is also now 
deeply engaged in the ongoing Syrian civil war, its first major 
military conflict outside of the post-Soviet sphere since the Soviet-
Afghan war (1979-1989). This entire period, currently ongoing, 
is characterized by ever-growing mutual accusations between 
the West and Russia; media disinformation campaigns and an 
ongoing debate regarding the resurgence of a Cold War ‘2.0.’9 
7 The ICC’s report on preliminary examination activities, 14 November 2016 
(https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf).
8 Alexander Gabuev, Russia and China: Little Brother or Big Sister?, Carnegie 
Moscow Center, 5 July 2016 (http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64006).
9 James Stavridis, Are We Entering a New Cold War?, Foreign Policy, 17 
February 2016 (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-
war-russia-europe).
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In looking at the evolution of Russia’s political regime, particularly 
in the realm of foreign policy, it would appear that one can draw a 
direct line from being a ‘friend of the West’ to be being an ‘enemy 
of the West,’ a gradual progression over the course of the last 
sixteen years. In fact, it is a bit more complicated than that.
4. Three Discourses of Russian Foreign Policy
In order to understand how the foreign policy discourse has 
changed since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, we must first 
outline three major narratives that have existed in one form or 
another throughout the entirety of Putin’s duration in power. 
The Liberal Discourse
The liberal discourse – also described as the pro-European, 
pro-Western, globalist approach to foreign policy – is a complex 
of political, historic-philosophical explanations for Russia’s 
positioning that highlights Russia’s desired status as a liberal 
democracy, a member of the Western institutions with high 
economic interdependence. Dating back in its current form to 
the late 1980s and anti-communist movements, it rejects Russia’s 
imperial legacy which calls for post-imperial development, and 
demands full recognition of sovereignty of former ‘colonies’ and 
dependent territories. It views the Soviet collapse as a highly 
positive moment that allowed Russia to develop as a liberal 
democracy, fully rejecting any revision of global framework 
formulated in 1991. This discourse views Russia as responsible 
for its flaws or successes, demanding economic and political 
modernization that would grant the country a satisfying place 
in the world order. This approach views foreign policy as a tool 
to advance economic development and guarantee a transparent 
environment that attracts foreign investment, thus stimulating 
broader engagement with the global community. 
The Realist Discourse
The derzavniy (state oriented) or realist approach is based 
on the so-called Russian national interests and is directed at 
advancing Russia’s economic might and political influence in 
the world using Russia’s strategic advantages as well as the 
other’s strategic disadvantages. In this capacity, the West is 
viewed as a possible partner when it benefits Russia, but should 
be contained if it threatens Russian interests. Values as such are 
not a priority for this line of thinking, as long as they do not 
threaten or strengthen particular aspects of national interest. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union is viewed as a given fact, while 
revisionism regarded this episode as harmful and claimed 
Russia’s authority to protect its interest in the post-Soviet 
space, seen as Moscow’s special sphere of influence. It also 
dictates Russia to prioritize regional integration projects over 
global economic involvement and views Russia as an economic 
and political bridge between Europe and Asia that dictates 
balances between the two.
The Revanchist Discourse 
The imperial approach views the loss of the empire as the 
biggest issue of the last quarter century: it is acknowledged as 
an unjust fact and Russia’s main goal is to reconstruct its empire 
in one way or another. The West is viewed as an ‘eternal’ enemy 
that is destructive on levels of policy, goals and values – thus 
destruction of the West is regarded as the primary goal, by all 
means possible. This approach is values-based and requires 
Russia to promote and be guided by so-called traditional values 
based either in Russian orthodoxy or an alternative symbiotic 
version like Eurasianism. According to this approach, foreign 
policy serves the goal of pursuing a historic mission and is 
accordingly not a subject of compromise of any kind.
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5. The Discourse Change in Post -2014
If we look back at the Russian foreign policy context it becomes 
quite obvious that there exists a certain correlation between 
specific periods and certain discourses. Indeed, the first period 
was a combination of liberal and realist discourses and allowed 
for a great freedom and competition between the two. Especially 
in regards to questions of economic development, much of 
the rhetoric voiced by higher officials on all levels was a direct 
product of the liberal discourse. 
Contrary to what many of today’s Russian liberals might claim, 
liberal narratives have existed in the state discourse all throughout 
the second period up until 2012. The presence of the discourse 
was most obvious during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. 
Generally speaking, the further Russian development grew the 
country away from ‘transitional democracy’ and moved towards 
authoritarianism, the more the liberal discourse grew limited 
and eventually became confined to the matters of economic 
developments, especially with regards to investment seeking and 
participation in international organizations such as the WTO. 
Still, until the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin, 
the revanchist discourse was considered marginal, with 
headliners such as Alexander Dugin or Alexander Prokhanov, 
and remained on the outskirts of the political debate. Their 
ideas although could be traced back to Slavophile discourses 
(in case of Prokhanov) or the original Eurasianism of 1920- 
30s. Its current shape and form and shape can be traced 
to the late 1980s. Its ideas were never present on the scale of 
academic debates nor were they considered part of the larger 
discourse of the foreign policy agenda since they were based 
on the belief that Russia must revise the post-1991 order. By 
2012, this narrative had become non-negotiable. Nevertheless, 
conservative ideas – characteristic to the revanchist discourse  – 
were first introduced as part of the domestic discourse of the 
so-called ‘conservative’ (traditional terms). Apparently, it’s very 
core was the contraposition of ‘Russian’ values of collectivism, 
solidarity, traditional Christian family and community values, 
and the love for the “homeland” in contrast to Western individ-
ualism, selfishness, secularism, moral decadence and cosmopoli- 
tanism, reaching new levels of anti-Americanism in no time at 
all. Broadly speaking, it was impossible to somehow separate 
domestic discourse from one related to foreign policy, since 
the link between the two is extraordinarily strong in Russia. 
So it occurred in 2014, when the Kremlin used the opportunity 
presented by the revolution in Ukraine to boost the president’s 
popularity to new heights, removing the possibility of debate 
on economic development.
The phenomenon of Crimea – the annexation of territory of 
another state – never existed as part of a liberal or pragmatist 
discourse; neither of those discourses were suited to explain it 
or respond to it. Thus, the events of March 2014 have created 
an unprecedented demand for new narratives to fill a vacuum 
in discourse, addressing issues of domestic development and 
international relations. Crimea has to some extent pushed 
Russia into the hands of previously marginalized revanchists 
who have viewed the annexation as the beginning of their time 
in power, misinterpreting the Kremlin’s actions. For a short 
period of time – from the annexation to the introduction of 
the concept of ‘Novorossiya’10 and a total oblivion to the 
Ukrainian affairs on Russian state television – the revanchists 
had free reign to penetrate public discussions and irreversibly 
change the dominant foreign policy discourse.
The realists’ discourse, the most dominant discourse of the 
last decade, was forced to acknowledge some of the narratives 
10 Putin at the press-conference referred to the so-called “Novorossiya” as the 
territories that were never part of the Ukrainian state (18 April 2014). See the video 
Putin pro Novorossiyu (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXr-oLbT8Qc).
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promoted by the revanchists in order to accommodate certain 
global political realities that occurred after 2014. First of all, it 
had to include anti-Americanism not just as a reaction to certain 
political events – as it was before – but as inherent trait, a 
logical explanation of Moscow’s positioning. Secondly, it had to 
justify the act of aggression against Ukraine, in light of interna-
tional law, and prove that Crimea, and the new confronta- 
tion with the West that it brought, was a part of a consistent 
foreign policy strategy as opposed to opportunism. Thirdly, it 
had to include value -based reasoning into its actions, justifying 
the need to domestically and globally endorse conservative 
values and to prove its superiority over Western liberal values, 
posing them as universal values. And finally it had to explain 
Russia’s pivot to the East away from the West as the sole 
winning strategy consistent with Russia’s foreign policy, going 
back to the mid to late 2000s search for multipolarity and the 
pivot away from the Western governed world to a more just 
and balanced global order.
In a sense, this development – a de facto state forced 
alteration to the discourse – ended a period of relatively free 
debate on Russia’s national interest and foreign policy objec- 
tives, ultimately leading to a form of national ideology related 
to international relations. Although it still allowed for fluidity of 
opinions, variations and interpretations, post-2014 the discourse 
became inherently hostile towards any liberal interpretations 
of the events, since they first attacked the legitimacy of the 
annexation of Crimea. To some extent, the liberal discourse 
switched places with the revanchist discourse, in turn becoming 
fully marginalized. 
This forced evolution created a new version of the realist 
discourse that now employs many of the narratives that 
formerly solely belonged to the revanchists. This symbiosis 
is neither coherent nor sound, but it desperately attempts to 
both justify and legitimize Russia’s actions of 2014 and beyond. 
11  Sergei N. Karaganov, Strategiya dlya Rossii. Rossiyskaya vneshnyaya politika: 
konets 2010-kh – nachalo 2020-kh godov, Sovet po Vneshney i Oboronnoy Politike, 
2016 (http://svop.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ы_23_sm.pdf).
12  Anton Barbashin, Expensive Dreams of Great Power Status, Intersection, 
1 June 2016 (http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/expensive-dreams- 
great-power-status).
It could be best illustrated by new foreign policy concepts 
and proposals emerging from traditionally realist think tanks 
such as SVOP.11 It builds upon recent Kremlin rhetoric rather 
than theoretical basis or rational analysis, neglecting issues of 
economic development or Russia’s economic decline for that 
matter. Certainly, this approach poses great risks for Russia’s 
foreign policy as well as for the future of honest discussion of 
foreign policy matters.12  The problem is that while remaining a 
subject of political will rather than theory or fact-based analysis, 
it loses its logical and discursive soundness, producing illogical 
recipes and practical recommendations. In this regard, this is a 




‘Experts’ and Pluralism of Political Ideas 
in Russia (2008-2016)
Olga Malinova, NRU-HSE1
The role of policy experts in Russia and their relations with 
authorities (and to a lesser extent, society) have been studied 
in various approaches and disciplines.2 Nevertheless, it is 
still possible to observe these dynamics from an unusual 
perspective. In fact, I consider policy experts as both partic-
ipants of a symbolic ‘struggle over meanings’ and active players 
in public discussions about the present conditions and further 
perspectives of Russian society. This aspect of their activity 
might be properly named ‘ideological.’3 Indeed, this ideological 
dimension is indispensable for experts’ activity as soon as 
it enters a public sphere. Essentially, any public statement 
of a policy expert has an ideological dimension in so far as it 
occurs in a structured realm of meanings where the struggle 
for power and domination takes place. It does not mean that 
the ideological aspect of the experts’ activity is a dominant one. 
However, under certain conditions policy experts might become 
noticeable players of the symbolic/ideological field. As we 
will see, this dynamic has effectively characterized the Russian 
political discourse since 2008.
Hence, we must analyze the public activity of some Moscow 
based experts’ organizations and the role of ‘experts’4 in 
setting the political agenda during the presidencies of Dmitry 
Medvedev (2008-2012) and Vladimir Putin (2012-2013). Thus, 
we will analyze media coverage and public reactions to series 
of reports produced by the leading think tanks in 2008-2016, 
in order to define the evolution of political communication in 
Russia. According to my hypothesis, since 2008 the leading 
experts’ centers pivoted and became significant articulators of 
competing approaches to urgent political problems. Thus, they 
intentionally – or unintentionally – contributed to a demarcation 
of the ideological spectrum. After Vladimir’s Putin re-election 
in 2012, the pool of experts’ organizations was enlarged, 
establishing new think-tanks with clearly evident ideological 
orientations and thus facilitating a further proliferation of the 
ideological functions of (some) ‘experts.’
1. Political ‘Experts’ and State Authorities  
during the ‘Tandem’ Period (2008-2011)
Since Putin’s first presidential term in 2000, his administration 
has tended to involve organizations5 and singular ‘experts’ – 1 The paper results from the research project of the Institute of Scientific 
Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, supported by the 
Russian Foundation for Humanities (grant n. 13-03-00553). The author is grateful 
to Valentina Efremova for her assistance in collecting the materials for this paper.
2 Nina Beliaeva (ed.), Analiticheskie soobschestva v publichnoi politike: global’nyi 
fenomen i rossiiskie praktiki, Rosspen, Moskva 2012; Aleksandr Yu. Sungurov, 
Nikolay P. Raspopov and Aleksandr Yu. Belyayev, Instituty-mediatory i ikh razvitie v 
sovremennoi Rossii, Polis, 4, 2012, pp. 99-116.
3 We accept ideologies as shared sets of beliefs about the social world that 
shape its competing visions.
4 This term is a common label for policy analysts and commentators in media 
discourse. I use it in commas to avoid a discussion about the criteria of expert status 
which are rather flexible in the Russian context.
5 Such kind of organizations (in Russian literature, they are referred as expert- 
analytical centers, think-tanks, or workshops of ideas) appeared in the early 1990s. 
See Alexander Sungurov, Nikolai Raspopov, and Alexander Beliaev Instituty-media-
tory i ikh razvitie v sovremennoi Rossii, Polis, 4, 2012, pp. 99-116. 
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mainly economists and sociologists but also political scientists, 
ethnologists and demographers – into the preliminary stages of 
decision making. This trend stimulated the supply in the market 
of analytics and consulting. Some of think-tanks that are still 
active – such as the Moscow Center for Strategic Research (CSR), 
the Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) and the 
Institute of Public Projecting (INoPP) – were created for specific 
projects ordered by the presidential administrations of Putin and 
Medvedev. Evidently, Putin’s administration considered these 
and other experts’ organizations not only as providers of analytic 
reports, but also as authoritative agents of public communication. 
From 2008 to 2011, when authority was personified by 
‘the tandem’ of two leaders – a term used to describe the 
relationship of President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin, 
who retained significant power after he handed down his 
former office to his chosen successor – additional stimulus for 
the public activity of experts’ organizations appeared. Despite 
a declared ‘permanent consensus’ between the two tandem 
leaders, their public statements proved the actual differences 
of political targets.6 This divergence could not be explicitly 
articulated by either of the two figures or by a United Russia 
in so far as the principle of ‘the ruling tandem’ presumed 
a ‘full consensus’ between the two leaders. Thus, the articu-
lation of the ‘modernization programs’ – the political course 
announced by Medvedev – was interpreted by several experts’ 
organizations that proposed differing policy programs in their 
reports. Hence, these organizations emerged as the major 
articulators of the competing alternatives, a situation the media 
referred to as ‘the war of reports and round tables.’
The reports produced by INSOR and INoPP – the former 
alleged to work under the Medvedev’s guidelines and the latter 
under Putin’s – as well as other think-tanks were willingly 
covered by the media as they gave some public articulation of 
such latent divergence. Indeed, journalists reduced ‘substantive’ 
aspects of the research and instead emphasized the ideological 
aspects of the proposed political programs and their values 
orientations, including dialogical contrapositions with the 
opinions of other speakers, their connections to the interests 
of specific political actors, etc. Thus, due to the mediation of 
journalists, these ‘experts’ – most likely unintentionally – became 
important ‘ideological’ actors. 
This result was facilitated by the political reforms of the 
2000s that enlarged the representation of the pro-Putin United 
Russia party in the State Duma and diminished the electoral 
opportunities of opposition parties, from liberal to nationalist 
segments of the political spectrum. Besides, since the early 
2000s, the most popular means of public communication – 
central TV channels – had been put under the state control, 
thereby excluding some oppositional discourses from the 
“core” of the media and endorsing the hegemony of the ruling 
elite’s eclectic discourse that combined contradicting meanings 
with different political narratives.7 Since the discourse of the 
pro-governmental faction of the political elite was deliberately 
vague and the leaders of the opposition had limited access 
to the main channels of mass communication, this situation 
‘crystallized’ the policy alternatives. Hence, the reports of 
experts’ organizations presented clearly competing visions of 
the announced political course aimed at ‘modernization’ and 
6 Elena Shestopal, Politicheskaia povestka dnia rossijskoi vlasti i ejo vosprijatie 
grazhdanami, Polis, 2, 2011, pp. 8-24; Olga Malinova, Escho odin ryvok? Obrazy 
kollektivnogo proshlogo, nastojaschego i buduschego v sovremennykh diskussijakh o 
modernizatscii, Politicheskaia Nauka, 2, 2012, pp. 49-72.
7 Olga Malinova and Philip Casula, Political and National Identity in Russian 
Political Discourse, in André Lecours and Luis Moreno (eds.), Nationalism and 
Democracy. Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions, Routledge, London-New 
York 2010, pp. 170-183.
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received a significant response. In a sense, they compensated 
for the lack of ideological activity from political parties 
performing as articulators of alternative political programs. 
A sign of this unexpected appropriation of party functions by 
‘the experts’ was a curious fact of the (unofficial) nomination 
of Dmitry Medvedev as a preferable candidate for the next 
presidential term: in fact, this was presented in a INSOR 
report published three weeks before the official nomination of 
Vladimir Putin at the congress of the United Russia.8 
2. The Role of ‘Experts’ in Setting New Public Agenda  
after the President Election (2011-2013)
The ‘expert’ discussions between 2008 and 2010 settled a pattern 
of ‘experts’ public activity that tended to continue beyond 
‘the tandem’ period. While public discussion of ‘the moderni-
zation’ in 2009-2010 was initiated by president Medvedev, in the 
context of the parliamentary (December 2011) and presidential 
(March 2012) elections and even later after Putin’s re-election, 
some experts’ organizations proposed their visions for the future 
political course without any such ‘invitation’ from the authorities. 
In March 2011, the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) 
published a report based on sociological research entitled 
Politicheskiy krizis v Rossii i vozmozhnyye mekhanizmy yego 
razvitiya (“The Political Crisis in Russia and Possible Mechanisms 
of Its Development”). The authors of the report pointed to 
‘unexpected shifts’ in the public consciousness, arguing that 
“the political crisis in Russia is taking place in a full course even 
if it is still latent.”9 This conclusion evidently contrasted the main 
idea published a few weeks prior in a report by the supposedly 
‘pro-Putin’ INoPP. The INoPP’s report disproved the thesis 
that ‘only immediate democratization will solve all problems of 
Russia’ and instead argued that mere discussion of this thesis was 
potentially harmful, because it shifted “the public agenda from 
actual problems to a false political choice.”10 
In December of 2011, when mass demonstrations against 
fraud in the State Duma election occurred in Moscow and 
other large cities throughout the country, the forecast of the 
CSR appeared to have proved true, drawing public interest to 
the field of policy reports. As a result, during the next months, 
a series of public presentations of analytic products related to 
several experts’ organizations were broadly covered by media. 
In various ways, the experts analyzed the changing political 
context and offered suggestions for the new political direction. 
Soon after Putin’s election, the list of Moscow experts’ centers 
expanded, adding a number of organizations with different 
political orientations. In April 2012, former minister of finance 
Alexey Kudrin – commonly reputed to be ‘a liberal’ – launched 
the new Komitet grazhdanskikh initsiativ (‘Committee of Civil 
Initiatives’-CCI). This experts’ organization was designed as 
an association of professionals whose cumulative authority had 
8 The ‘experts’ of INSOR argued that ‘it is only the leader who [...] has a po-
litical will for two different but mutually complementary things: resolute institu-
tional reforms and openness to the dialogue can ‘actually launch modernization.’ 
The document concluded: “as soon as we see such modernizing appeal in words 
and deeds of Dmitry Medvedev, INSOR considers the perspective and promises 
to nominate him for a second term” INSOR, 2011 god. Nulevoi tsikl’ sledujusche- 
go presidenta, insor-russia.ru, 4 September 2011 (http://www.insor-russia.ru/ru/
news/9610).
9 Sergei,Belanovsky and Mikhail Dmitriev, Politicheskiy krizis v Rossii i voz-
mozhnyye mekhanizmy yego razvitiya, CSR, 28 March 2011 (http://polit.ru/arti-
cle/2011/03/28/2011/).
10 V. Fadeev, M. Rogozhnikov, A. Mekhanik, Yu. Polunin and A. Smirnova, 
Oppozitsii nashego vremeni: Doklad Instituta obshchestvennogo proyektirovaniya o 
sostoyanii i perspektivakh politicheskoy sistemy Rossii, INoPP, January 2011 (http://
www.inop.ru/files/inop_doklad_2011.pdf).
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the ability to stimulate civic initiatives at any level of power. 
The CCI makes its own independent analyses of economic 
and political issues and even orders analytic reports on some 
other experts’ organizations. The organization might be said to 
represent ‘a liberal alternative’ to the official ‘experts’ narrative. 
Then, in June 2012, two new experts’ organizations – the 
Civil Society Development Foundation (CSDF, Fond razvitiya 
grazhdanskogo obschestva, led by Konstantin Kostin) and the 
Institute for Social, Economic and Political Research (ISEPR, 
Institut sotsial’no-economicheskikh i politicheskikh issledovanii, 
led by Dmitry Badovsky) – were created at the behest of the 
presidential administration. These organizations were designed 
for analytic support of decision-making and presented ‘a loyalist 
discourse’ that supported the official position. Furthermore, in 
September 2012, a new ‘rightist’ experts’ organization called the 
Izborsky Club – headed by the writer and journalist Aleksander 
Prokhanov, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Zavtra – was 
created with the aim of establishing an ‘intellectual alternative 
to the liberal project.’ Hence, the most important segments of 
the Russian political spectrum obtained their ‘representation’ 
in the form of ‘expert’ organizations. These new think-tanks 
immediately joined the public discourse regarding Putin’s 
new political direction for the country. Their efforts were 
often described in terms of an opposition between ‘a creative 
minority’ (this label was used for anti-Putin protestors in 2011 
and 2012) and a pro-Putin ‘patriotic majority.’11 The fact that 
these experts’ organizations ‘represented’ the different parts of 
the ideological spectrum turned them into important articu-
lators of the competing concepts of (proposed) state policy.
3. ‘Experts’ and Putin’s Political Course ‘after Crimea’
While the main contours of Putin’s new political course were 
molded in the first few months following his re-election, some 
illusions related to their further adjustment existed until 
early 2014. However, after the annexation of Crimea (based 
on the results of a referendum held on 16 March 2014) and 
subsequent international sanctions against Russia, both foreign 
and domestic policy assumed a certain direction. The struggle 
against the threat of international isolation became the central 
point of the foreign policy agenda. Even domestic politics 
became more strictly focused on the consolidation of resources 
in the context of mounting economic crises and the mobiliza- 
tion of mass support for Putin’s regime. This second trend 
combined positive (an enthusiastic reaction of the majority of 
Russian population to the annexation of Crimea) and negative 
(anti-Western propaganda)12 incentives that led to the absolute 
domination of the pro-Putin ‘patriotic majority’ in the public 
sphere, resulting in the marginalization of Putin’s critics as ‘the 
anti-national Fifth Column.’ This structure left little space for 
the expression of dissenting opinions.
These circumstances significantly changed the conditions 
for the public activity of think-tanks. Those groups whose 
ideas were in agreement with the new policy course seemed to 
receive new opportunities to exert influence on authorities and 
the public. Conversely, their opponents were forced to carefully 
avoid accusations of a supposed ‘lack of patriotism.’ The ‘social 
11 See also: Olga Malinova, Ekspertno-analiticheskie organizatsii i formirovanie 
obschestvennoi povestki dnia: Analiz ideologicheskikh praktik v sovremennoi Rossii, 
Politicheskaia nauka, 4, 2013, pp. 192-210.
12 After the protest campaign of 2011-2012, anti-Westernism was actively used 
for marginalizing political opponents. Probably the most remarkable manifestation 
of this trend was evident with the adoption of the so called ‘Foreign Agents Law’ 
(i.e. the amendment to the law regulating the activities of the NGOs, obliging those 
organizations that “participate in politics” and receive sponsorship from abroad 
to register as foreign agents and refer to this status in their publications, including 
Internet), on July 2012.
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conservators’ and ‘imperial nationalists’ of the Izborsky Club 
received their greatest opportunity inasmuch as their ideas 
finally fit with the official narrative as they never had before. 
Since 2013, the club has published on its website13 dozens of 
reports prepared by eminent nationalist intellectuals14 covering 
many aspects of domestic and foreign policy, with obvious focus 
on the mobilization of resources for opposition to the West. 
A report prepared by Sergei Glazyev entitled Predotvratit’ 
voinu – pobedit’ v voine (To prevent the war – to win the war)15 
might be the epigraph for the whole series. The members of the 
Izborsky Club discussed the perspectives of the new Cold War 
and of the Russian economic integration in Eurasia, reform of 
the Russian army, social and security issues as well as modern 
practices of waging wars (‘network wars’, ‘digital wars’, ‘psycho- 
historical wars’, ‘information wars’ etc.), perspectives of ‘empires’ 
(the EU as a ‘failed empire’ and Russia as ‘floating up empire’), 
etc. Claiming to be “a kind of a headquarters of the patriotic 
forces in Russia,”16 the Izborsky Club even focuses efforts on 
consolidating the slightly fragmented right wing of the Russian 
ideological spectrum. Its comprehensive analytic activity has 
been well covered by the media. According to the Integrum 
database, in the ‘post-Crimea’ period, publications mentioning 
the Izborsky Club in print and online media have doubled (see 
table) and its discourse of ‘patriotic forces’ has become more 
visible in public discussions.
Certainly, the ‘experts’ of the Izborsky Club attempt to 
affect not only public opinion but also the individual authorities 
whose political views were never so close to the ideals of the 
‘patriots.’ One of its key ‘experts,’ Sergei Glazyev has emblem-
atically served as a Putin adviser since 2012. This suggests that 
while the Kremlin does not ‘buy’ their ideas wholesale, it is eager 
to keep the Izborsky Club around as a part of its ideological 
‘stock supply.’ 
The new political circumstances gave ‘patriotic’ and anti- 
Westernist forces broader opportunities in the struggle against 
their political opponents, who could now finally be accused 
of ‘anti-patriotism.’ Indeed, some ‘expert’ organizations did not 
hesitate to use this weapon against their competitors. In Febru- 
ary 2014, the Russian Institute for Strategic Research (RISR) 
13 Official website of the Izborsky Club (www.izborsk-club.ru).
14 Nationalist intellectual such as such as Sergei Glazyev, Mikhail Delyagin, 
Vitaly Aver’yanov, Aleksandr Dugin, Sergey Chernyakhovskiy, Andrei Fursov etc.
15 Analyzing the long cycles, the report argues that regional military conflicts in 
which the U.S. and their satellites will challenge Russia are most probable in 2015-
2018 and suggest a program to face this challenge. Sergei Glazyev, Predotvratit’ 
voinu – pobedit’ v voine, Izborsky Club, 30 September 2014 (www.izborsk-club.ru/
content/articles/3962/).
16 Vitaly V. Aver’yanov (compiler), Po tu storonu “krasnykh” i “belykh,” 15 April 
2013 (http://www.izborsk-club.ru/content/articles/1164/.)
17 This table has been realized with data elaborated from Integrum database. 
See (http://www.integrumworld.com/).
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together with the Center of the Actual Policy (CAP) published 
a report18 assessing the activity of eight think-tanks. These 
included the Moscow Carnegie Center, the Russian Political 
Science Association, the Russian Association of International 
Studies, the sociological research organization ‘Levada-Center’, 
the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
the Russian School of Economy, and more. According to the 
RISR/CAP report, the activity of the aforementioned academic 
and research organizations were ‘political’ inasmuch as they 
criticized the government and argued that the recently adopted 
‘Foreign Agents Law’19 must be extended to organizations 
involved in political research. 
Hence, this ‘war of reports’ has shifted into the sphere 
of academia in a slightly unexpected way. Some observers 
properly considered the report of the RISR/CAP as a mere 
‘accusation’, causing a wave of outcries from experts who 
not only argued against the main intent of the report but also 
demonstrated the report’s inaccuracy regarding some facts. 
Thus, after several weeks the document disappeared from 
the RISR website and became available on the website of 
the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. However, in 
May 2014 the State Duma adopted new amendments that 
allowed the Ministry of Justice to register NGOs as ‘foreign 
agents’ without their consent. These measures also effectively 
sanctioned the stigmatization of independent research centers 
– whose work did not correspond with the official ‘patriotic 
platform’ narrative – as ‘foreign agents.’
Since 2012, the official policy had veered toward a more 
‘ideological’ format. In his annual address to the Federal 
Assembly in December 2012, Putin pointed to “the shortage 
of spiritual bonds”20 that should be addressed as soon as 
possible. Thus, the president supposed the elaboration of a 
kind of official ideology – that from the very beginning was 
labelled ‘conservative’ – requesting the ‘experts’ to explore 
the perspectives of conservatism in contemporary Russia. This 
task was assigned to the Institute for Social, Economic, and 
Political Research (ISEPR). For the first time, an analytic task 
in the field of ideology was formally outsourced to an experts’ 
organization. Then, the ISEPR received a grant for organizing 
the experts’ conferences, Berdyavskie chteniya (“Berdyaev’s 
proceedings”),21 and the publication of the journal Tetradi po 
konservatizmu (“Notebooks on conservatism”). Nevertheless, 
the activity of ISEPR was not confined to the field of 
‘conservatism.’ The Institute operated grants of the President 
of the Russian Federation for social and political research and 
conducted its own studies on elections and electoral systems, 
local governments, political parties, and more, monitoring 
public activity at the federal level and producing ratings of 
the most relevant political and public leaders. Its activity has 
been well covered by the media; according to the Integrum 
database, it is the most referenced experts’ organization in the 
country (see table).
18 The report is entitled ‘The Methods and Technologies od Activity of the 
Foreign and Russian Research Centers, Consulting Structures and Universities 
Getting Funds from the Foreign Sources.’ See RISI-TsAP, Metody i tekhnologii 
deiatel’nosti zarubezhnykh I rossijskihk issledovatel’skihk tsentrov, a takzhe issledo- 
vatel’skikh structur I buzov, poluchaiuschikh finansirovanie iz zarubezhnykh 
istochnikov, February 2014 (https://www.oprf.ru/files/2014dok/doklad_ordzho- 
nikidze24042014.pdf).
19 The Federal Law n. 121-FZ of 20 July 2012 “On Amendments to Legislative 
Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non- 
profit Organizations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent” (http://publica-
tion.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201207230003).
20 The message of the President Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly, 
12 December 2012 (http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118).
21 In 2013-2015 there were four expert conferences – in Moscow region, Yalta 
(with the second part in Moscow), Kaliningrad and Vladivostok.
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Another experts’ organization created in 2012 by the 
initiative of the presidential administration is the Civil Society 
Development Foundation (CSDF): Its activity has also concen-
trated on analyzing of the social and political basis of Putin’s 
regime, focusing on the regional branches. In particular, the 
CSDF monitors political leaders throughout regions of Russia 
and publishes an ‘Index of the Governors’ Effectiveness’ which 
attracts a significant amount of media interest (see the table). 
In May 2016, it presented the results of the study of ‘Putin’s 
majority’ that analyzed the social structure of the groups who 
support the president and predicted their further rise.
The most difficult situation regards the ‘liberal’ experts’ 
organizations. They were forced to carefully select analytical 
topics in order to not provoke persecution. However, despite 
the risks of stigmatizing ‘liberals’ as ‘Westernizers’ and ‘traitors 
of the nation,’ they were able to raise their voices in the ‘experts’ 
format. In this regard, the role of Alexey Kudrin’s ‘Committee 
of Civil Initiatives’ (CCI) was relevant in publishing reports 
that were either produced by its own experts or prepared by its 
order. Topics of the CCI analytical reports included reforms of 
the judiciary system and law-enforcement agencies, the potential 
for civic participation, Russia’s new prospects in the global 
economy, perspectives for reforms after 2018, the social attitudes 
in the ‘post-Crimea’ scenario as well as regional and parlia-
mentary elections. Basing its reports on official data published 
in the websites of state departments and agencies, the CCI 
monitored the arrangement of public spending with a project 
named GosZatraty (“State Costs”). Through these efforts, the 
CCI was also able to get effective media coverage (see the table).
Some ‘older’ ‘liberal’ experts’ organizations also refused 
to surrender. In July 2014, the Fond Liberal’naya Missiya 
(“Liberal Mission Foundation”) published a paper reporting 
the main trends of Russia’s political development from 2012 
to 2013 with a focus on “the crisis and transformation of 
the Russian authoritarianism.”22 Its activity is also regularly 
mentioned in the media, although its coverage is far more 
modest in comparison with the CCI (see table).
All of the aforementioned experts’ organizations devoted 
their activity to analyzing the new domestic and interna-
tional landscape that appeared ‘post-Crimea’ and to searching 
for answers to these newly emerged challenges. They did 
so in accordance with their ideological orientations: while 
the Izborsky Club welcomed a confrontation with the West 
and emphasized the alleged advantages of isolation for future 
development, the liberal ‘expert’ organization remained unable 
to explicitly criticize Putin’s course and focused instead on 
monitoring the current situation and accumulating ideas for 
future reforms. Then, the ‘loyalist’ think-tanks did their best to 
present the current situation as ‘normal’ and provided analytic 
reports demonstrating ‘democratic’ development inside the 
contemporary authoritarian path.
4. Experts and “Ideology”
In many countries, think-tanks are formally – or more often 
informally – affiliated with specific political groups (such 
as parties) and are ide ntified by their ‘rightist’ or ‘leftist’ 
orientation. Generally speaking, they always have some 
ideological dimension and might be understood in relation 
to the viewpoints of other speakers – in terms of support or 
opposition to certain public ideas – and could be measured 
by a right- left scale. The most explicit ideological effects of 
the experts’ discourses resulted from their representation of 
22 Kirill Rogov (ed.), Osnovnye tendentsii politicheskogo razvitija Rossii v 2011-
2013 gg.: Krizis i transformatsia rossijskogo avtoritarizmea, liberal.ru, 2 July 2014 
(http://www.liberal.ru/articles/6537).
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competing approaches to public issues under particular value 
orientations (hence, they can be arranged against one another 
on this grounds); from a lower argumentation in retelling the 
results of research to mass audiences of non-specialists; from 
their explicit or implicit connections to particular political 
agents (such as parties or leaders). Thus, we could argue that 
the more policy issues are a matter of public debate, the more 
salient are the ideological functions of experts’ discourse. 
Nevertheless, some aspects are still specific to the Russian case. 
First, the public activity of experts’ organizations in Russia 
is awarded special influence because the political parties are 
not strong participants in the market of political ideas. This 
conclusion might be partly explained by actual inability of 
parties’ to influence the political course – that is determined 
by the president who acts above the party politics – and partly 
by informal control of the presidential administration over 
the party structure. Second, in such circumstances the experts’ 
activity becomes a kind of ‘substitution’ of purely political forms 
in ‘a struggle over meanings,’ compensating for a lack of party 
‘representation’ in some segments of ideological spectrum. Of 
course, ‘the experts’ could not perform as political parties, in so 
far as realization of their proposals depended entirely on those 
who were vested with power or struggled for power. So, they 
were simply articulators of ideas they had no chance to fulfil. 
Finally, despite an ideological component related to any 
public discourse concerning political issues, its explicit demon- 
stration undermines the symbolic capital of the expert experts’ 
community as its authority is based on objectivity of scientific 
knowledge. So, an overgrowth of ideological components is not 
advisable for expert experts’ community whose legitimacy is 
based on objective knowledge.
Moscow’s attitudes towards foreign policy can be understood 
through the neo-conservative concept of Russia as Katechon 
– the ‘restrainer,’a protective agent against the forces of 
chaos in the world. Many of the neo-conservative doctrines 
and ideas popular today, including the messianic Katechon 
concept, originated in the early 1990s from relatively marginal, 
radical right-wing groups. Today, these views have begun to 
influence the official policies of the Kremlin. In contemporary 
scholarship, this process is commonly referred to as Russia’s 
(or Putin’s) “conservative turn.” The phenomenon of neo- 
conservatism and the rise of political theology in contemporary 
Russia have drawn the attention of scholars from various 
disciplines,1 but the concept of Katechon has not yet been fully 
studied. This essay will discuss the concept of Katechon within 
the emerging discursive field of new Russian conservatism, 
while demonstrating a historical analysis of the traditions of 
‘state-messianism’ in Russian culture and the Western roots of 
the contemporary Russian conservative doctrine. In so doing, 
1 Sergei Prozorov, Russian Conservatism in the Putin Presidency: The Disper-
sion of a Hegemonic Discourse, DIIS Working Paper, 20, 2004; Marlene Laruelle, 
Conservatism as the Kremlin’s New Toolkit: An Ideology at the Lowest Cost, Russian 
Analytical Digest, 138, 8 November 2013; Andrei Makarychev and Alexandra 
Yatsyk, A New Russian Conservatism: Domestic Roots and Repercussions for Europe, 
Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 93, June 2014.
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I hope to demonstrate that the actualization of the messianic 
Katechon ideologeme and the extensive use of collective 
cultural memory in contemporary Russian political discourse 
is one of the dominant factors accounting for the popularity 
of Putin’s politics of ‘ideological sovereignty’ in foreign policy 
and national security, both among the elites and ordinary 
Russian citizens.
1. Foreign Policy and the Neo-Conservative Ideology
The third revision of the foreign policy doctrine of the Russian 
Federation, signed by Putin in February 2013, marked a 
critical shift in Russia’s history of foreign relations. The concept 
criticized the attempts of “some countries” to ignore the 
decisions of the UN Security Council, military interventions 
in sovereign states, and even the “re-ideologization of foreign 
relations.” The doctrine declared that in today’s unstable and 
dangerous world, Russia had a “unique role, formed centuries 
ago, of a balancing factor in international affairs and the 
development of the world civilization.”2  This document closely 
paralleled the key points of Putin’s pre-election essay dedicated 
to foreign policy, “Russia and the Changing World,” published 
on 27 February 2012. One of the main theses in Putin’s piece 
is that rising global instability is due to Western – primarily the 
efforts of NATO and the U.S. – attempts to interfere with the 
internal affairs of other countries. Specifically, Putin ascribed 
the cause of these military interventions to economic interests, 
in contradiction of UN statutes. According to Putin, these 
2  The Foreign Policy concept of the Russian Federation – Kontseptsiya vnesh-
ney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii – adopted on 12 February 2013 (http://www.mid.
ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/
id/122186).
3 Vladimir Putin, Rossiya i menyayushchiysya mir, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 27 
February 2012.
4 The conservative ideologists have since long ago maintained that the ban on 
ideology in Russia and Putin’s orientation toward the concept of realism is extremely 
harmful for Russia’s interests, which after the collapse of the USSR and the rejection 
of Marxism can oppose nothing to the liberal model of internal and foreign policy.
appeals to human rights and the advancement of democratic 
liberties under the guise of ‘humanitarian interventions’ are 
nothing more than pure demagogy. In his words:
They often say that human rights are more important than the state 
sovereignty. Undoubtfully, crimes against humanity should be pun- 
ished in the international courts. However, when this clause is used to 
violate the sovereignty of the state, when human rights are protected 
from the outside and selectively and for “protecting” these rights, 
[other] rights of many people are violated, including the most basic 
and sacral one, the right of life, then we are not facing a noble cause but 
a pure demagogy.3 
Certain internal political processes of the last several years 
must be understood in the light of this new foreign policy 
direction. “The Russian approach to human rights” and a 
demonstrative propaganda campaign of “traditional values” – 
including the new legal initiatives of 2013 and 2014, the hunt 
for “agents of influence,” actions against NGOs, the passage 
of the “anti-gay law,” the new state cultural policy, and more 
– all testify to a re-ideologization of Russian foreign policy. 
This re-ideologization is also in full alignment with the neo- 
conservative doctrine, which maintains that a state without 
ideology cannot be considered truly sovereign.4 According to 
the text of this new foreign policy doctrine, Russia views itself 
as an important military and economic power and a unique 
‘restraining’ force in an increasingly chaotic world. It also 
considers itself one of the global ‘ideological poles,’ a unique 
civilization whose values should be disseminated throughout the 
world through ‘soft power.’ This view of Russia as an alternative 
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model and a restraining factor in the chaos of international 
relations is in fact a ‘bureaucratic,’ secular version of the 
messianic concept of Katechon. Thus, as the influence of this 
conservative ideology on foreign policy is particularly noticeable, 
we must examine this concept in further detail.
Proponents view contemporary Russian messianism as an 
alternative to the doctrine of ‘American exceptionalism’ and 
a potent ideological tool for openly challenging Western 
hegemony and creating a new polycentric world order. They 
also argue that the true cause of the current ‘ideological 
Cold War’ between Russia and the United States is a clash 
between two messianic projects with shared roots in Christian 
eschatology and European political thought.
2. Russia, the Restrainer as a National Idea
The eschatological doctrine of Rome as the last Kingdom of God, 
protecting the world from the Antichrist, is central to all Christian 
cultures. Christian interpretations of katechon (ό Κατέχων), ‘the 
withholding,’ are based on the eschatological moment of the 
Second Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians:
Let no one in any way deceive you, for it will not come unless the 
apostasy comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son 
of destruction, who opposes and exalts himself above every so-called 
God or object of worship, so that he takes his seat in the temple of 
God, displaying himself as being God. Do you not remember that 
while I was still with you, I was telling you these things? And you 
know what restrains him now, so that in his time he will be revealed. 
For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only he who now 
restrains will do so until he is taken out of the way. 5
St. John Chrysostom interprets Paul’s words as a reference 
to the Emperor and his power that ‘withholds’ and protects the 
world from the advent of the Antichrist. In this teaching, the 
Roman Empire is an antithesis of Anomia and will exist until 
the Second Advent, restraining the chaos. This empire has no 
constant temporal or spatial characteristics and can present 
itself in many different states (translatio imperii romani).
In the Russian tradition, this historiosophic concept is 
presented in the well-known concept of Moscow as the ‘third 
Rome,’ dating back to the 16th century. It was authored by the 
elder monk Philotheus of the Belozersk monastery between 
1523-1524 and was officially recorded in the 1589 Founding 
Deed of the Council of Moscow, which established the Moscow 
Patriarchate.6  The postulates that the Russian people are the 
chosen nation and that their colossal burden is to fight against 
the Antichrist led to the formation of a specific governing style 
in the Tsardom of Muscovy, which can be defined as both 
sinister and successful. It had already been specified during 
the reign of Ivan the Terrible that the two enemies of the 
Katechon (Moscow) were the external Antichrist – i.e., all the 
lands beyond Moscovy – and the internal Antichrist, no less 
dangerous than the external. Internal resistance to the state, 
particularly during unstable periods, is now interpreted as an 
indulgence to the powers of Anomia and Chaos. This eschato-
logical view has become a constant in Russian history and in 
the Russian understanding of power.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the Christian idea of katechon 
was reformulated in the secular context of Russian foreign 
policy, while still maintaining some providential elements of 
Maria Engström
5 Scriptural quotations are from the NRSV, New Revised Standard Version of the 
Bible, 1989, 2 Thess. 2:3-7 (http://bible.oremus.org/?ql=351660442).
6 See the monograph by Sinitsyna who follows the history of transformations of 
the Katechon ideologeme (theories of the world monarchies, theories of translatio imerii, 
and the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome). Nina Vasilevna Sinitsyna, Tretii Rim. 
Istoki i evolutsiia russkoi srednevekovoi kontseptsii (XV-XVI vv), Indrik, Moskva 1998. 
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Russia as the protector of the world and the military “shield” of 
Europe.7 For example, the interpretation of Russia as a “shield” 
can be found in Pushkin’s letter to Chaadayev (19 October 1836):
What concerns your ideas, you know that I do not agree with you 
on many points. Without doubt, the Schism separated us from the 
rest of Europe, and we did not participate in all the great events 
that shattered it, but we did have a special destiny. It was Russia 
and its limitless territory that absorbed the Mongolian invasion. The 
Tatars did not risk going to the Western borders, leaving us in their 
rear. They went back to their deserts and the Christian civilization 
was saved […] our martyrdom saved the energetic development of 
Europe all the trouble.8
Fyodor Tyutchev also uses this ideologeme, demonstrated 
in his 1848 poem “Russian Geography”:
Moscow and Peter’s town, the city of Constantine,
These are the cherished capitals of the Russian monarchy. […]
This is the Russian empire and it will never pass away,
Just as the Spirit foretold and Daniel prophesied.9
During the ‘Silver Age’, the view of katechon as a ‘shield’ 
against the forces of evil was once again reformulated, this time 
in the apocalyptic and decadent Eurasian context. Russia is 
under the Dionysian intoxication and no longer prevents the 
Antichrist from entering the world, but in contrast, permits 
7 The Eschatological medieval concept of Philotheus considerably changes 
in the 18th and 19th centuries, acquiring the features of a ‘political doctrine’ closely 
related to the “Eastern question.” See Andrei Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla: Litera- 
tura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII – pervoi treti XIX 
stoletiia, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moskva 2004.
8 Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin, P. Ia. Chaadaevu. 19 oktiabria 1836. Iz 
Peterburga v Moskvu, in Alexander Pushkin, Sobranie sochinenii v 10 tomakh, t.10, 
GIKhL, Moskva 1962, p. 307. This passage gained much popularity in the Soviet 
times due to Andrei Tarkovsky’s film The Mirror (1975) in which the protagonist 
reads this letter off screen.
9 Fedor Tyutchev, Russian Geography, in Andrew Baruch Wachtel and Ilya 
Vinitsky (eds), Russian Literature, Polity, London 2009, p. 97.
him the fallen world because there no longer exists any hope 
of salvation. In this version, Russia lays down the shield and 
refuses to prevent the “pan-Mongolic” movement, most vividly 
depicted in Alexander Blok’s Scythians (1918):
You’ve had whole centuries. We – a single hour.
Like serfs obedient to their feudal lord,
We’ve held the shield between two hostile powers-
Old Europe and the barbarous Mongol horde.
[…]
But we ourselves, henceforth, we shall not serve
As henchmen holding up the trusty shield.
We’ll keep our distance and, slit-eyed, observe
The deadly conflict raging on the field.
We shall not stir, even though the frenzied Huns
Plunder the corpses of the slain in battle, drive
Their cattle into shrines, burn cities down,
And roast their white-skinned fellow men alive.10
Full study of the Soviet version of katechonic messianism 
is an important topic which is beyond the scope of this essay. 
I will only mention that during the early post-Soviet period, 
Russian right-wing intellectuals began to interpret the Soviet 
– primarily Stalinist – period of Russian history as exclusively 
katechonic. The Soviet idea of protecting the working class 
from capital – and later during the World War II, the belief 
in protection of humankind from the evil of Nazism – is today 
interpreted by neoconservatives as a version of secular State 
messianism and Orthodox universalism.
Thus, the Greek-and-Roman idea of ‘internal structure’ 
– an inner order of the inhabited world – transformed the 
Russian soil into the idea of ‘defense from the external enemy.’ 
Russia is understood not so much as an empire – which holds 
the power of chaos beyond the borders of the world through 
10 Aleksandr Blok, The Scythians, 1918 (https://allpoetry.com/The-Scythians).
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its inner order – but rather as a military force that resists a 
metaphysical enemy, sent by the Antichrist (historically the Tatars, 
the Turks, freemasons, Napoleon, Hitler, and today liberals, 
American foreign agents, and the LGBT movement). One of 
the most prominent contemporary conservative thinkers, Yegor 
Kholmogorov, expressed the katechonic essence of Russia’s 
mission in the following way: “Russians always “defend,” even 
when it seems that they attack.”11
It should be emphasized that the post-Soviet neocon-
servative discourse of katechon originates not only in the East 
Christian and Russian historiosophic tradition but also in the 
political theology of Carl Schmitt, who writes about Katechon in 
his book Nomos of the Earth (1950) in a chapter entitled “The 
Christian Empire as a Restrainer (Katechon) of the Antichrist.”12 
For Schmitt, Katechon is identical with the State, understanding 
it as a force that restrains the chaos.13 On 19 December 1947, 
Schmitt wrote in his Diary: “I believe in the [k]hatechon; he is 
the only possibility for me to understand history and find its 
meaning as a Christian.”14
11 Yegor Kholmogorov, Russkii proekt. Restavratsiia budushchego, Algoritm, 
Moskva 2005, p. 280.
12 The post-Soviet concept of katechonic messianism was developed with ref-
erence to American neo-conservatism and the political philosophy of Schmitt’s dis-
ciple Leo Strauss who criticized Schmitt’s critique of liberalism in his “Comments on 
Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.” See Carl Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth in 
the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, Telos Press Publishing, New York 
2003; Leo Strauss, Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Archiv 
für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 67/6, August-September 1932, pp. 732-749.
13 See Julia Hell, Katechon: Carl Schmitt’s Imperial Theology and the Ruins of 
the Future, The Germanic Review, 84/4, 2009, pp. 283-326. 
14 Carl Schmitt and Eberhard Freiherr von Medem (ed.), Glossarium: Aufzeich-
nungen der Jahre 1947-1951, Dunkler and Humblot, Berlin 1991, p. 63, quoted in: 
Wolfgang Palaver, Carl Schmitt’s “Apocalyptic” Resistance against Global Civil War, in 
Robert Hamerton-Kelly (ed.), Politics and  Apocalypse,  Michigan State University Press, 
East Lansing 2007, pp. 69-94.
15 Carl Schmitt was first translated into Russian in 1992, when Alexander 
Filippov, the translator and popularizer of Schmitt’s legacy, published a translation 
of “The Concept of the Political.” See Karl Shmitt, Poniatie politicheskogo, Voprosy 
sociologii, 1, 1992, pp. 35-67.
16 Alexander Dugin, Katekhon i Revolyutsiya, Arctogeia, Moskva 1997.
17 Sergei Kurginyan, New Year Eve address to the followers of the movement 
Sut’ Vremeni, Sovetskii Khabarovsk, 31 December 2013.
The first Russian translations of Schmitt appeared in the 
1990s.15 In radical neoconservative circles, Alexander Dugin 
popularized his thought. In the 1997 article “Revolution and 
Katechon” Dugin introduced Schmitt’s conceptualization, 
which had not previously been used in texts belonging to the 
Russian tradition of State messianism.16 The term quickly 
became very popular in neoconservative circles, and more 
recently has been increasingly used in the media, reaching wider 
and wider audiences. For example, in 2013 Sergei Kurginyan 
used the term in his New Year’s Eve address to the followers 
of his movement Sut’ Vremeni (“The Essence of Time”). In his 
own words:
Many things are clouding around Russia; the evil is approaching from 
all directions; from the Middle East, from the Far East; it is clouding 
around Europe and the whole world. We know that the circle of evil 
is tightening around us. We remember that Russia is Katechon, that is, 
the withholder of peace.17
On 16 November 2015, following the terror attack in Paris, 
the very popular pro-Kremlin writer and journalist Sergei 
Minayev published on his Facebook page a post that charac-
terized Russia as Katechon, almost entirely alone in fighting 
against the global evil of ISIS. Interestingly, Minayev employed 
the main neoconservative metaphors of Katechon, which are 
‘North’ and ‘cold’:
And something tells me that, as it usually happens, the rescue will 
come from the unsmiling people of the North; that is, us. At an 
unhuman cost, by sacrificing a ravaged generation Russia once 
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again will have to save the world. The rescued world will applaud us 
vigorously for a couple of years after the victory. The applause will be 
sincere, boisterous and grateful. But by the fourth year they will again 
pronounce us an empire and start shunning us.
This might be the intended purpose of our territory. To save, without 
any profit, dividend, or gratitude. Winter is not simply coming. We 
are the winter.18 
Yegor Kholmogorov also described the apocalyptic mood 
of the present moment and discussed the readiness of Russians 
to “remove the lid.” In his words:
To be the third is a calling and an undisputable place of Russians in 
history. The meaning of this place is not to allow for “the fourth one” 
to come; we have to stand on a post, keeping off all the contenders 
for the Roman scepter by kicks, clubs, and nuclear missiles […] any 
non-Russian, “fourth” idea will be the incarnation of evil and will 
result in a painful end of the whole world. This is how the Bysantine 
idea of Katechon is refracted in our imperial consciousness, the idea 
of withholding the world. That which stands on the bridge between 
the Antichrist and the world and which does not let the Antichrist 
into the world. Nowadays it is not a bridge but rather a manhole, the 
lid of which is removed from time to time, and some vampires, or 
werewolves or murderers come out of this hole. The Russian tarpaulin 
boot stamps on that lid, and restores the silence for some time. The 
crawling beast knows that if it shows itself too much, the Russian will 
not hesitate to blast it together with the whole world. Because “there 
shall not be the fourth one,” and if before us there was the Flood, 
after us there is only the Apocalypse.19
3. The ‘Atomic Orthodoxy’: Russia’s Double Shield
According to contemporary Russian neoconservatives, in 
order to fulfill the mission of katechon, Russia must first unite 
‘the Reds’ and ‘the Whites.’ It is important to take both the 
nuclear shield from the modernist technocratic red tradition 
and orthodox messianism from the white one. Orthodoxy 
thus becomes a political force, akin to the military-industrial 
complex, functioning both as a shield and a guarantor of 
sovereignty. That is why, according to the neoconservative 
doctrine, all attempts to diminish the role of the Orthodox 
Church must be persecuted because they represent not only an 
attack against Russian religious and cultural identity but also a 
sign of the coming doomsday. This concept of the ‘two shields 
of Russia’ is known in neoconservative circles as the ideology 
of ‘atomic orthodoxy.’ During the 2007 press-conference, 
Putin was asked by a journalist from Sarov – the city where 
the first Soviet atomic bomb was created – about the future 
of orthodoxy and the nuclear strategy of Russia. Putin replied:
Both topics are related because both the traditional faith of the Russian 
Federation and the nuclear shield of Russia are the components that 
strengthen the Russian State and create necessary conditions for 
internal and external security of the country. This clearly means how 
the state has to treat both of them today and in the future.20
Thus, Yegor Kholmogorov further developed Putin’s unifi- 
cation of orthodoxy with the nuclear shield as a doctrine of the 
atomic orthodoxy. Here are several points of this ideology:
[…First:] the religious and historical mission of Russia is to secure for the 
Russian and orthodox people the best possible conditions, in the words 
of St Seraphim of Sarov, to acquire the Holy Spirit, to approach God. 
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18 Sergei Minayev’s Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/minaevsergei? 
fref=ts).
19 Yegor Kholmogorov, Russkii proekt. Restavratsiia budushchego, Algoritm, 
Moskva 2005, pp. 18-19.
20 Vladimir Putin, Press conference on 1 February 2007 (http://lenta.ru/articles 
/2007/02/01/putin/.
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[…Second:] in order to fulfill this mission successfully, Russia cannot be 
an orthodox state only; it should be a powerful state so that nobody and 
no weapon could silence our testimony of Christ. […Third:] to develop 
most perfect military, organizational, and other means to protect our 
sovereignty is not only a military-political but also a spiritual goal, in 
which the secular and the sacral are going hand in hand.21
The term “atomic orthodoxy” originates from the title of 
Russian contemporary artist Alexey Beliaev-Gintovt’s painting 
from the cycle “Novonovosibirsk” (1999-2001), which depicts 
a deeply frozen Russia and a missile submarine with a rudder 
resembling a cross.22 Hence, Kholmogorov is not alone in his 
Orthodox-technocratic utopia. His main thesis is close to 
Alexander Prokhanov’s concept, which emerged in “The Fifth 
Empire,” that the Soviet civilization is a logical extension of 
Russian Orthodox civilization and that the modern State 
must use both resources to its advantage.23 This katechtonic 
ideology has also been developed by the Center for Dynamic 
Conservatism. Thus, the ‘Russian doctrine’ project, introduced 
in 2005 by Vitaliy Aver’yanov, Maksim Kalashnikov and 
Andrey Kobyakov, also presupposes a marriage of advanced 
technological society with conservative Orthodox ideology. 
Aver’yanov defines the ‘Russian doctrine’ as follows:
The goal of the proposed ideology of reformation is to create the 
centaur of Orthodoxy and innovation-based economics, of high spiri- 
tuality and high technology. This centaur will present the 21st-century 
face of Russia. It will be carried out by a new attacking class, imperial 
and authoritarian, not liberal and democratic.24 
For Yegor Kholmogorov, Alexander Dugin, Alexander 
Prokhanov and many other neoconservative ideologists, the 
development and strengthening of the military shield of Russia 
is a question of ‘agyopolitics,’ i.e. a question of spiritual nature. 
That is why the fact that the a-bomb was created on the territory 
of the Sarov monastery (following Stalin’s orders) has been inter- 
preted as God’s providence, and the clarification of St Seraphim’s 
image has been compared with the flash from a nuclear 
explosion.25 The doctrine of atomic orthodoxy is fully devoid of 
subjects such as suffering or death, which were dominant in the 
perestroika period after the Chernobyl catastrophe.
4. Conclusion
Contemporary Russian neo-conservatism treats orthodoxy as 
a political religion, emphasizing the connection of the Russian 
Church with war and the discourse of “resistance to evil by 
force.” There is an increased interest for warrior princes – such 
as Alexander Nevsky and Dmitry Donskoy – and for figures 
like Iosif Volotsky, known for his fight against ‘Jewish heresy.’ 
Political orthodoxy manifests itself most explicitly in the 
attempt to canonize the royal builders of the Russian empire, 
Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Stalin, and also military 
warriors such as marshal Zhukov, the seamen from the perished 
Kursk submarine, and the martyr fighter Yevgeny Rodionov.
Both the West and the liberal opposition within Russia 
heavily criticize the Russian state and the Orthodox Church for 
repressive measures against modern art, against NGOs, for the 
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21 Yegor Kholmogorov, Atomnoe pravoslavie. Sarovskaia lektsiia, Specnaz, 7, 
July 2007 (http://www.specnaz.ru/article/?1118).
22 See: Andrei Molodkin and Alexey Beliaev-Gintovt, Atomnoe Pravoslaviye, 
Novonovosibirsk, 2001 (http://www.doctrine.ru/delo/novonovosibirsk/?i=4).
23 Aleksandr Prokhanov, Pyataya imperia, Eksmo, Moskva 2007. 
24 Vitaliy Aver’yanov, Nuzhny drugie liudi, Zavtra, 14 July 2010.
25 See the image at the webpage: S Bogom, Beseda prepodobnogo Serafima 
Sarovskogo s N.A. Motovilovym (http://sbogom.kiev.ua/beseda-prepodobnogo-ser-
afima-sarovskogo-s-n-a-motovilovym/).
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Pussy Riot trial, for the Dima Yakovlev law, and for the passage 
of anti-gay laws, where Russia has been compared with Nazi 
Germany. Modern katechonic conservatism views this critique 
solely as an attack against the actions of a Kremlin that attempts 
to strengthen its ‘orthodox shield.’ Conservative analysts are 
certain that in the nearest future we will witness the clash of 
two ideologies because Russian foreign policy focuses precisely 
on the expansion and propaganda of their understanding 
of human rights based on the orthodox tradition. Yegor 
Kholmogorov argues that in the situation of nuclear parity, it is 
especially important to strengthen the ‘conceptual shield’:
As long as the atomic clinch remains […] the war is being conducted 
primarily by conceptual [ ] means. That is why, together with a 
traditional military defense, the Russian State has to protect the nation 
by conceptual means, to protect it from mental threats.26 
Although many of the most radical neoconservative ideas 
and projects are not yet supported by the Kremlin, the fact that 
many of them are discussed in popular culture and the mass 
media – as opposed to marginal right-wing circles as was the 
case in the 1990s and 2000s – signifies that the political climate 
in the country has changed and that we are at the beginning of a 
new epoch in Russian history. Sanctions, an ‘information war,’ 
and diplomatic isolation as punishment for Russia’s actions 
in the Ukraine have been interpreted by both a large part of 
Russian ruling elite and many ordinary Russians as confir-
mation of progressing Anomia in the West, and justification 
for the katechonic argument. The ideologization of domestic, 
foreign and security policy can be understood as Putin’s 
attempt to legitimize his own power, and his popular support 
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26 Yegor Kholmogorov, Atomnoe pravoslavie, Russkii obozrevatel, 31 August 
2008 (http://www.rus-obr.ru/idea/594).
can be analyzed as the result of propaganda. However, such 
explanations ignore the important factor of collective memory 
and identity, the deep roots of the katechonic discourse in 
Russian culture, pre-revolutionary, Soviet and contemporary.
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Chapter V
Neo-Conservatism as National Idea for Russia?
Andrei Melville, NRU-HSE
The dominant political discourse in contemporary Russia is 
a reflection of both crucially important policy choices of the 
ruling regime as well as deep changes in attitudes, perceptions 
and self-perceptions among the ruling elites and other segments 
of the population. It appears that Russia’s unsuccessful, quarter-
century long search for a post-Soviet national ethos and identity 
has reached an important milestone – a near consensus based 
on a particular worldview version of self-styled identity and a 
set of approved values.1
1. The ‘Fortress Russia’
This newly established version of the national idea heralds 
Russia ascension to its legitimate status as a great power in 
a chaotic world of adversaries. In order to withstand external 
enemies, Russia must mobilize internally through a set of revived 
conservative values. This new discourse evokes one experience 
from my personal research. About a decade ago, I was involved 
in a research project aimed at forecasting a series of alternative 
1 This paper develops some ideas explored in: Andrei Melville, Russian Political 
Ideology – New Conservatism Ascendant, in Irvin Studin (ed), Russia: Strategy, 
Policy and Administration, Palgrave, London (forthcoming 2017).
scenarios for Russia in 2020. We developed four variants and 
tested them in focus groups that involved various audiences 
from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. These scenarios were:
1. Kremlin’s Gambit: When oil prices persistently remain 
high, domestic political and economic competition is sacrificed 
for strategic goals of rapid modernization and the expansion of 
Russia’s international influence 
2.Russian Mosaic: As globalization successfully progresses, 
Russia becomes more decentralized, embodying a ‘mosaic.’ 
The international community at large and the most prosperous 
and active regions and social actors in particular reap the 
rewards of this new pluralism 
3. New Russian Dream: After a new generation of elites 
comes to power, Russia pursues a coherent strategy of political 
and economic liberalization resulting in integration with the 
global world order 
4. The Fortress Russia, a ‘Horror Story’ and a highly unde- 
sirable scenario that can be briefly described as follows:
The world of 2020 is unstable and prone to severe crisis. International 
law and international institutions are dramatically undermined, to the 
point of being replaced by force and military power. A rapid arms race 
is accompanied by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear ones. Russia finds itself in a hostile international 
environment. Numerous local armed conflicts menace the borders of 
the country, especially in Central Asia. The U.S. and the EU come 
to the conclusion that they have ‘lost Russia.’ They fail to influence 
Russian politics and return to deterrence, which in fact means the 
Cold War. […] Elements of the U.S. National Missile Defense 
system are deployed near Russian borders. All the major powers try 
to increase their influence in Eurasia, including the regional ones – 
China, Iran, Turkey, etc. Hence, Russia is forced into all-around 
defense while the rivalry between ‘old powers’ – including the US and 
its European allies – with the new competitors – such as China, India, 
Iran and others – tends to become more and more intensive. Besides 
that, new areas of conflict and instability emerge or get wider in 
Latin America, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Balkans, etc. Russia does not 
interfere in these conflicts. It does not join any coalitions, while trying 
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to utilize the contradictions between world leaders. The new Cold 
War has provoked the outflow of foreign capital and investments from 
Russia. Russian defense expenditure has radically increased. Russians 
have to bear the slump of incomes and growth of taxes. Volatile oil 
prices and a hostile international environment significantly undermine 
prospects of modernization. The country has to mobilize resources by 
all possible means to counteract the external threats and challenges 
for the sake of sovereignty and integrity of the country. The represen-
tatives of the security forces predominate in the government and 
manage the ‘rules of the game.’ Political opposition does not exist. 
[…] Russia needs to be united and mobilized to respond successfully 
to external threats, even if this limits economic competition, political 
rights and freedoms. Russia is a ‘fortress,’ towering over a dangerous 
ocean of chaos.2 
During discussions with our focus groups, nearly all of the 
participants we surveyed considered this scenario as extremely 
undesirable and highly improbable. However, today this 
scenario appears to represent the core of a new, near universal 
conservative ideology, almost a ‘symphony’ between the ‘power 
state,’ the elites and the population. How did this occur? Is this 
unity solid and durable? What is its social base? What policy 
recommendations does it entail? Do political and ideological 
alternatives exist for the Russian future? 
As postulated in the ‘Fortress Russia’ scenario, the world 
today is, indeed, unstable and prone to severe crises. The contem-
porary world also appears dramatically different in comparison 
with the period immediately following the Cold War. Now, most 
of the original optimism and goals of global cooperation and 
integration no longer exist, while reality appears much harsher: 
new axes and spheres of global and regional confrontation, 
2 Andrei Melville and Ivan Timofeev, Rossiya 2020: Al’ternativnyye Stsenarii 
i Obshchestvennyye Predpochteniya, Polis, 4, 2008, pp. 66-85. See also: Andrei 
Melville and Ivan Timofeev, Russia in 2020: Alternative Scenarios of the Near Future, 
in K. Almqvest and A. Linalater, On Russia, Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson 
Foundation, Stockholm 2010, pp. 127-148.
shifting balances of power, the spread of new forms of terrorism, 
violent conflicts, instability, territorial disputes, changing 
borders, religious wars and even a new bipolar world that 
divides the globe into twin opposing forces of ‘West’ and ‘Anti- 
West.’ Following decades of the dominance of the narrative of 
a global world order that resulted in the erosion of ‘classical’ 
state sovereignty and national borders, it appears that we are 
now witnessing a revival of national sovereignties – a ‘neo- 
Westphalian world’ based on ‘traditional’ geopolitics where 
irreconcilable conflicts, permanent rivalry between states and 
groups of states, focus on spheres of influence, buffer zones, 
appear more and more likely.3 Major international institutions 
seem to be in jeopardy and the power of international law is 
in decline. Apparently, it appears that the three decades of the 
post-Cold War order have been spent in vain, and the “Cold 
War 2.0” has already begun or is in the process of beginning. 
The historical opportunities that appeared during 
Gorbachev’s Perestroika and following the demise of the Soviet 
Union and Communism are lacking today, with little apparent 
path of return. The essential divide between Russia and the 
West has reemerged, although it has presented itself in new 
forms. Both sides are preoccupied with mutual disillusionments 
and disappointments, sharing responsibility for missed oppor- 
tunities. Attitudes towards Russia as a ‘collapsed empire’ and 
not as a ‘new democracy,’ the self-styled Western position of 
‘teacher’ and not as a ‘therapist,’ the crises in Yugoslavia and 
Kosovo, NATO’s enlargement, and more are intrinsic to the 
U.S. and West European side. Conversely, the implicit and 
unspoken assumptions regarding ‘privileged interests’ in the 
‘Near Abroad’, post-imperial frustrations, ‘phantom pains,’ and 
resentments can be attributed to the Russian side. 
3 See Walter Russel Mead, The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of the Revi-
sionist Powers, Foreign Affairs, 93/3, 2014.
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Nevertheless, today’s Russia appears vastly different from 
its post-Soviet stage and the majority of Russians perceive 
their country as finally ‘rising from its knees’ and restoring its 
legitimate status as a great power. However, a minority in Russia 
and a majority in the West refer to Russia as a ‘revisionist’ entity, 
returning to its historical authoritarian patterns. Regardless, the 
prevailing mood among Russian population (and a very large part 
of the elites) is resentment, while a remarkable ideological consensus 
– with the exception of marginal fringes of ‘liberals’ – has emerged 
in Russia and is evident in the rise of neo-conservatism to the 
position of Russia’s long-awaited new national idea. 
It is fair to say that this newly emerged consensus is far from 
monolithic and that there exist various flanks and coalitions 
among its proponents, including some respectable pro-Kremlin 
think tanks (groups that are close to the President’s adminis-
tration, like ISEPR4 and the famous Valdai Club 5) and some 
radical – but relatively marginal – extremes (such as the emblem- 
atic Izborsky Club6). However, there are some shared, core 
ideological components of neo-conservatism. These include 
the concept that Russia is a unique civilization-state with a 
special mission in an adversarial world; the necessity to defend 
traditional conservative values under assault by the depraved 
forces of Western moral decay; and the supremacy of political 
status quo threatened by subversive external intrusions and by 
the internal ‘fifth column.’
4 The Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPR) produces 




2. New Geopolitics and New Ideological Warfare
Primarily, this neo-conservative version of the Russian national 
idea purports to resurrect a centuries-old concept of Russia as 
a unique civilization-state distinct from ‘regular’ nation-states 
and with a special ‘mission’ in the world.7 This view claims 
Russia as a ‘floating Empire’8 or a “continental empire, and 
not a nation-state.”9 Some advocates of neo-conservatism trace 
its roots back to the concept of the ‘Third Rome’ expressed 
in the 15th and 16th centuries, while others seek its legitimiza- 
tion in the so called ‘Eurasian tradition’ of the 1920-30s. 
Nonetheless, the dominant strains of neoconservative justifi-
cation all relate to revived geopolitical arguments. Indeed, 
one of the favorite arguments of this ideology is that the era of 
globalization is over and that geopolitics is back. Globalization 
and interdependence are said to be “factors of vulnera-
bility”10 for Russia in the unfair world of singular super-power 
dominance. To overcome this unjust and unfavorable position, 
Russia must restore its legitimate great power status in the ‘real’ 
world of permanent conflicts and confrontation, relying not 
on previous illusions of ‘common goals’ and interdependence 
but exclusively on its national interests and effectively resisting 
the American and Western monopoly. Nevertheless, these 
7 Tsygankov points that the current discourse of a “distinct civilization” is the 
product of the international pressures and domestic vulnerabilities. See, Andrei 
Tsygankov, Crafting the State-Civilization. Vladimir Putin’s Turn to Distinct Values, 
Problems of Post-Communism, 63/3, 2016. 
8 Vitaly Aver’yanov, Vsplyvayushchaya Imperiya, Izborsky Club, 8 April 2015 
(http://izborsk-club.ru/content/articles/5201).
9 A “Manifesto of Enlightened Conservatism” has been presented in: Nikita 
Mikhalkov, Pravo i Pravda. Manifest Prosveshchennogo konservatizma, Polit.ru, 26 
October 2010 (http://polit.ru/article/2010/10/26/manifest).
10 Sergei N. Karaganov, Strategiya dlya Rossii. Rossiyskaya vneshnyaya politika: 
konets 2010-kh – nachalo 2020-kh godov, Sovet po Vneshney i Oboronnoy Politike, 
2016 (http://svop.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/тезисы_23мая_sm.pdf).
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proclaimed national interests are vaguely defined and based on 
a concept of ‘national sovereignty’ that is primarily understood 
as noninterference from the external forces in Russia’s do- 
mestic affairs and recognition of Russia’s privileged ‘spheres of 
influence’ in the ‘Near Abroad.’ 
According to traditional geopolitical logic, neo-conservatism 
understands the world arena as a bellum omnium contra omnes 
whereby major international players cannot agree on basic rules 
of interactions and are trapped in a “Hobbesian moment.”11 
In this simplified ‘black and white’ picture of world politics,12 
especially in its extreme versions, a ‘fight to the death’ is the only 
logic13 between two major geopolitical rivals – the “West” and 
“rising non-Western states” – two diametrically opposed and 
irreconcilable systems of values that pit ‘freedom’ (the core value 
claimed by the current Western global system) and ‘justice’ (the 
contending principle identified by the ‘anti-West’).
Indeed, the thesis of ‘geopolitical revival’ in neoconservative 
mentality closely parallels the thesis of ‘ideological revival’ and 
the promotion of traditional conservative values. Common 
principles are hardly possible to be found as these values are in 
direct opposition to one another, recalling an almost forgotten 
‘ideological struggle’14 and substantially repudiating perestroika 
11 Fyodor Lukyanov and Ivan Krastev (eds.), New Rules or No Rules? XI 
Annual Valdai Discussion Club Meeting Participant’s Report, Valdai Club, 13 March 
2015 (http://valdaiclub.com/publications/reports/new_rules_or_no_rules_xi_annu-
al_valdai_discussion_club_meeting_participants_report/).
12 Some important critical arguments against the neoconservative “geopo-
litical revival” are presented in: Andrei Kortunov, The Splendours and Miseries of 
Geopolitics, Russian International Affairs Council, 14 January 2015 (http://russian-
council.ru/en/inner/?id_4=5074#top-content).
13 Aleksandr Nagornyy, Rossiya i zapadniki, Izborsky Club, 1 December 2015 
(http://izborsk-club.ru/content/articles/7867).
14 Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club, War 
and Peace in the 21st Century. International Stability and Balance of theNew Type, Russia 
in Global Affairs, 10 February 2016 (http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/War-and-Peace-
in-the-21st-Century-International-Stability-and-Balance-of-the-New-Type-17972).
and Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ as though it never occurred. This 
‘struggle’ is supposed to have both international and domestic 
dimensions, with an argument concerning the “re-ideologization 
of international relations” recalling Soviet overtones where “we 
are on the ‘right side’ and our ideological opponents on the 
defensive.” However, this time “our” ideology is not Marxism-
Leninism but Russian neo-conservatism. Remarkably, the West 
is to be blamed for this re-ideologization since it remains the 
center of the “new international ideocracy.”15 Hence, on a 
global level this struggle opposes the “emerging ideology of 
neo-conservatism” and “defensive democratic messianism.”16 
Neo-conservatism is supposed to have both domestic and 
international appeal. It represents the aspirations of ‘rising’ 
nations that challenge the existing unjust world order and seek 
to restore the viable fundamentals of traditional (‘pre-modern’) 
values in order to protect from current ‘European decay.’ 
These values mainly consist of religious fundamentalism (re- 
sisting decadent permissiveness), collectivism (as opposed to a 
disruptive individualism), a unique version of patriotism based 
on the mythology of ‘spiritual bonds,’17 the primacy of the State 
(‘statism’), and neopatrimonialism.18 Some of these ideological 
components evoke past Soviet rhetoric.19  
15 See Alexander Lukin, Novaya Mezhdunarodnaya Ideokratiya i Rossiya, Srav-
nitel’naya Politika, 1/22, 2016.
16 Sergei N. Karaganov, Strategiya dlya Rossii. 
17 See Olga Malinova, “Spiritual Bonds” as State Ideology, Russia in Global 
Affairs 4/6, 2014. 
18 See Stephen Hanson, On the Novelty of Patrimonialism in Putin’s Russia, in 
Riccardo Mario Cucciolla (ed.), The Power State Is Back? The Evolution of Russian Political 
Thought After 1991, Reset, Rome 2016. During the Reset DOC conference held in Venice 
on 17-18 June 2016, Hanson also coined a noteworthy expression of “neopatrimonialism 
by default” as recurrent ideological, political and social pattern of contemporary Russia. 
19 On this regard, Timofeev has a perceptive vision and states: “In effect, Russia 
is resurrecting a Soviet version of its identity. This new identity is missing the socialist/ 
collectivist component, but, nevertheless, retains the equally important patriotic 
element. The next stage in this search is finding a universal idea.” Ivan Timofeev, From 
a Greater Europe to a Greater Eurasia, Russia Direct, 4/6, 2016.
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However, the truly universal appeal of Marxism-Leninism 
is still missing in this neoconservative version of a new Russian 
national concept and identity, most likely not accidentally. 
By some standards, this ideology is ‘weak’, specifically designed 
for domestic purposes and domestic consumption, consonant 
only with the marginal ideas of the European ‘New Right’ and 
with some ambitions of the ‘rising’ adversaries of the post-Cold 
War world order. Hence, despite its pretentions for universal 
appeal, Russian neo-conservatism is fundamentally parochial and 
only partly resonates with some ideas of the new populist and 
nationalist movements in Europe and most recently in the U.S.
3. Primacy of the Status Quo and Sources 
of the Domestic Support
Undoubtedly, the main domestic aims of this form of neo-con-
servatism are stability, propagation of the regime, and preser-
vation of the status quo. Hence, the proponents of this new 
version of Russian national idea actively endorse the aforemen-
tioned view of a ‘besieged fortress,’ surrounded by an extremely 
adversarial environment and effectively propagating an ‘image 
of the enemy.’ Rejection of globalization as a major destabilizing 
factors corresponds with the rejection of external interference 
in the sovereign affairs of Russian domestic politics.20  Following 
this logic, stability and order are more important than the law 
20 Russia’s neo-conservative ideology based on “restoration of the moral and 
political unity of the authorities and the people – boils down to the following ideas: 
‘stability’ – unchangeability of the authorities – overcoming ‘chaos’ caused by Yeltsin’s 
reforms; ‘traditionalism’; a special role of Orthodoxy and its importance in the matter of 
society’s ‘moral upbringing’; fighting Western influence – civil society organizations as 
well as constitutional state and human rights movements are appointed ‘agents’ thereof 
by the Kremlin political engineers.” Lev Gudkov, The ‘Great Power’ Ideology as a Condi-
tion of Putin’s Regime Legitimacy, in Riccardo Mario Cucciolla (ed.), The Power State Is 
Back? The Evolution of Russian Political Thought After 1991, Reset, Rome 2016. 
and the rights of the individual. In the words of one of the 
advocates of this neo-conservative vision: “for a conservative, 
tradition and morality are above the law.”21
Indeed, stability and maintenance of the status quo are 
distinguishing features of conservatism in general – in all cases 
throughout history. Nevertheless, attempts to legitimize the 
current conditions derive not just from appeals to conserve the 
present, but even from a reactionary desire to restore the past – 
including its symbols, identities and myths. Therefore, Russia’s 
neo-conservative ideology lacks some very critical elements like 
a vision of the future, long-term goals, and a positive agenda of 
how to attain them. Despite widespread claims of “conservatism 
for development”22 – relying on Russia’s indigenous resources 
and capabilities and its pivot towards the ‘East’ – Russia’s 
“sovereign modernization” would not be viable without relying 
on Western technologies and investments.
However, despite all of these discussed conceptual weak- 
nesses and practical vulnerabilities, the neoconservative version 
of Russia’s national idea persists as a nearly-universally sup- 
ported ideology. What are the sources of neo-conservatism’s 
domestic support and how secure is it in Russia? First, the 
greatest impetus for the movement comes from the central 
authorities and powerful elite groupings whose main priority is 
preservation of the status quo. The static dominance of leaders 
and elites, with positions to guarantee personal gain, is the 
key factor and the principal cause of this current demand for 
conservative ideology. 
Another important segment of the social base supporting 
neo-conservatism is the constantly expanding bureaucratic 
21 Boris Makarenko (ed.), Konservatizm i razvitiye: Osnovy obshchestvennogo 
soglasiya, Alpina, Moskva 2015, p. 275.
22 Rather sophisticated versions of these claims are documented in the above- 
mentioned volume: Boris Makarenko (ed.), Konservatizm i razvitiye.
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estate in today’s Russia. Bureaucracy – at any rank and geo- 
graphic level – is a natural bearer of a conservative attitude and 
stance. The bureaucracy’s natural conservative inclination is 
reinforced by various benefits from the status of individual officials 
and their ever growing salaries. This ideological inclination is 
also widespread among other social groups whose existence and 
wellbeing depends on the government – employees of govern-
ment-financed organizations, military, pensioners, etc.
 Conservative attitudes and values are also characteristic 
among a large group of the middle class that emerged as a result 
of the redistribution of rents during the oil boom in the early 
2000s. In contrast to the famous ‘Lipset hypothesis’ – which 
stated that economic growth and the expansion of the middle 
class would produce democratic and liberal expectations and 
demands – large segments of Russia’s contemporary middle 
class seem to support conservative values and the status quo. A 
possible explanation of this ‘paradox’ is related to the massive, 
widespread level of dependence on the state. Economically 
and administratively, the middle class is largely ‘servile’ – their 
very existence depends on bureaucratic decisions rather than 
independent economic (and other) activities.23 This situation is 
also evident in some other non-Western countries.24   
Finally, regarding sources of domestic support, one should 
note that the neo-conservative version of Russia’s national 
idea falls largely in line with widespread, pre-existing public 
attitudes. On the one hand, this process is the result of an 
effective TV propaganda campaign that became the crucial 
instrument of ideological legitimization. On the other hand, 
it also embodies various effects of popular syndromes and 
23 See Evgeny Gontmakher and Cameron Ross, The Middle Class and Democ-
ratization in Russia, Europe-Asia Studies 67/2, 2015.
24 China may be another specific example refuting the causality nexus between 
economic growth and the wellbeing of the emerging middle class, on the one hand, 
and support of democratic values – on the other.
25 Data extrapolated from the Levada Center’s surveys published on 13 October 
2015, 2 November 2015, 2 and 30 June 2016 on the website www.levada.ru. 
complexes, nostalgia, resentment and frustrations. As with 
the phenomena of “moral majority” during Reaganism, these 
popular attitudes function as both a specific stimulus and a 
source of massive support for neoconservative ideology. 
The dominant motivations for these neo-conservative 
sentiments in today’s Russia consist of a mélange of emotional 
issues, such as the desire for a return to ‘great power’ status, 
the belief in a ‘special Russian way,’ the ‘image of the enemy,’ 
and the priority of ‘order and stability.’ All of these attitudes 
strongly resonate with the major premises of neo-conservatism. 
In June 2016, 67% of respondents said they believed that 
Russia was a great power: 48% believed so due to its military 
power (the same figure was 30% in 1999) and 39% for its 
economic potential (64% in 1999). Interestingly, while 82% of 
those polled stated they were proud to live in Russia (this figure 
remained the same over the last ten years), only 68% of them 
said they were proud of contemporary Russia, while 44% were 
proud of Russian history, and 21% of respondents said they 
were proud of Russian territory. This patriotic élan is reinforced 
by an “image of the enemy” spread by massive propaganda 
campaigns: from the fall of 2015 to the spring of 2016, the 
large majority of the population (80%) felt the presence of the 
external enemies – such as ‘the West’ (75%), the U.S. (70%) 
and Ukraine (48%) – and only slightly perceived the presence 
of a few allies such as Belarus (50%), Kazakhstan (39%), China 
(34%), India and Armenia (13%).25 
Public opinion polls reveal that neoconservative assump- 
tions regarding Russia’s ‘special way’ are deeply rooted in 
popular attitudes. In spring of 2015, 55% of respondents felt 
that ‘Russia’s own way’ was unique and fundamentally different 
from all other nations in the world. However, the majority 
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(69%) were not able to clearly articulate the nature and the 
peculiarities of this Russia’s ‘special way.’ Many respondents 
believed that that democracy did exist in Russia. It is important 
to note that the percentage of these respondents has dramat-
ically increased following the events of Crimea, from 37% in 
2006 to 62% at the end of 2015. Incidentally, this trend may be 
a remarkable manifestation of both the impact of propagan-
distic mobilization ‘around the flag’ and a profound confusion 
in the people’s mentality. Lastly, when asked what type of 
democracy Russia necessitated, 46% of respondents affirmed 
“a completely special kind that is appropriate to Russia’s 
national traditions and unique characteristics,” 19% chose a 
type “that existed in the Soviet Union,” and only 16% chose 
a version “that exists in the developed countries such as the 
Europe ones and the United States.” In the aftermath of the 
annexation of Crimea, the powerful urge towards stability and 
status quo are well evident, with 61% of respondents preferring 
‘order,’ even at expense of individual rights and freedoms.26 
The picture seems to take shape: public moods in today’s 
Russia appear chaotic and certainly in line with major postulates 
of neo-conservative ideology, which leads to a traditional 
‘chicken and egg’ issue: do neo-conservative ideologists develop 
their version of Russian national identity reflecting popular 
attitudes drawn from widespread frustrations and syndromes? 
Or do they simply enforce their view on the people through 
powerful propaganda in order to inculcate these preferences? 
Most likely, both of these arguments are true and reflect 
important components of a complex Russian society. A more 
important question deals with the resilience of these beliefs in 
public opinion and, accordingly, in determining the popular 
support for neo-conservatism in Russia.
4. Prospects
We must acknowledge the actual – and sometimes embryonic – 
complexity of the current state of the popular mood in Russia. 
On the one hand, there exists clear, widespread support for 
the neo-conservative status quo, although it has many distinct 
causes. On the other hand, there are signs of doubts about 
the permanence of this new social contract that could lead to 
a replacement of ‘TV in the place of the refrigerator’ with a 
‘refrigerator in the place of political involvement.’27 We must 
closely monitor signs of shifting trends in public opinion 
that may eventually threaten the neo-conservative consensus. 
In particular, there currently exist signs of potential fatigue with 
the massive propagandistic brainwashing apparatus and the 
emergence of concerns related to the daily lives of ‘rank-and- 
life’ Russians. For example, in February 2016, during the current 
economic crisis, survey respondents began to characterize their 
anxieties in a different way. Instead of rating “enemies outside” 
as their primary fear, a greater number of the respondents 
expressed their concern for other issues, like the “growth of 
prices” and the “impoverishment of population” (54%); the 
economic crisis (49%); the potential for Russia to be drawn 
into conflicts outside its borders (33%); unemployment (26%); 
increase in tensions with Western countries (22%), etc.28 In other 
words, the popular foundations of this new ideological 
consensus in Russia may very well become vulnerable in the 
future. Clearly, it is difficult to accurately predict the paths and 
outcomes of these fluctuations: nevertheless, in the future they 
26 Data extrapolated from the Levada Center’s surveys published on 28 October 
2014, 21 April 2015 and 20 January 2016 on the website www.levada.ru.
27 See Andrei Kolesnikov, Russian Ideology After Crimea, The Carnegie Moscow 
Center, Moscow 2015 (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Kolesnikov_Ideolo-
gy2015_web_Eng.pdf). In this context, TV means ‘patriotic propaganda’, while the 
refrigerator still represents the wellbeing of the population.
28 Data extrapolated from a Levada Center’s survey published on 26 February 
2016 on the website www.levada.ru.
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may significantly challenge the solidity and the durability of 
the seemingly strong neo-conservative ideological consensus in 
today’s Russia. 
Apart from the obvious volatility in public attitudes, there 
may exist other factors which could eventually undermine 
the seemingly immutable status quo and the near-universal 
acceptance of neo-conservative ideology in today’s Russia. In 
continuing with the previous argument, it is difficult to predict 
exactly how long the social base and the ideological appeal 
of neo-conservatism will endure. It has proven resilient in 
the case of contemporary Russia. However, as demonstrated 
above, there may be various exogenous and endogenous events 
that hold the potential to disrupt and undermine the current 
popular support for the status quo. An additional long-term 
possibility is the emergence of a new generation of elites with 
no connection to the previous regime and a new search for 
Russia’s post–industrial modernization. 
Generational elite change may become – as in other devel- 
oping countries – a powerful instrument for political and social 
transformation. Currently, regime stability and ideological 
consensus are sheer facts of the Russian state, as demonstrated 
by the power of the ruler, the interests of the elites, specific 
middle class motivations, and popular support. However, the 
beauty of political history is in its unpredictability. There may 
exist many other latent factors at work, whose impact we will 
only become aware of in the future.
Part II
The Demise of Liberalism in Russia: 
Testing the Waters on the Subject
Chapter VI
Cultural Contradictions of  
Post-Communist Russian (Il)Liberalism 
Nina Khrushcheva, The New School
Things that I admire elsewhere, I hate [in Russia]... 
I find them too dearly paid for; order, patience, 
calmness, elegance, respectfulness, the natural and moral 
relations that ought to exist between those who think 
and those who do, in short all that gives worth and 
charm to well-organized societies, all that gives meaning 
and purpose to political institutions, is lost... here.1
We wanted for the better, but it turned out as usual.2
A few simple definitions of Liberalism should provide useful 
in the following discussion of the cultural contradictions of the 
(il)liberal developments in the post-communist Russia. Defined 
in economic terms, liberalism is the concept that a government 
should not intervene in an attempt to control prices, rents, 
and/or wages but rather let open competition and the forces of 
supply and demand create an equilibrium that benefits the vast 
majority of citizens. It differs from the doctrine of laissez faire 
in its acceptance of government intervention in certain circum-
stances, such as to control the creation and spread of monopolies 
and in the distribution of public good. In general, economic 
liberalism favors the redistribution of income through taxes and 
1 Astolphe de Custine, Empire of the Czar: A Journey Through Eternal Russia, 
Doubleday, New York 1989, p. 233.
2 Aleksandr P. Gamov, Khoteli kak lushche... Devyatnadtsat vecherov s Viktorom 
Chernomyrdinym ili Kak rozhdalis krylatye slova epokhi, Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshe- 
niya-CheRo, Moskva 2008, p. 239.
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welfare payments. A political definition of liberalism outlines a 
concept wherein the preservation of individual liberty and the 
maximization of freedom of choice should be the primary aims 
of a representative government. It stresses that all individuals 
stand equal before law (without class privileges) and have only 
a voluntary contractual relationship with their government. 
It defends freedom of speech and press, freedom of artistic and 
intellectual expression, freedom of religion, the right to private 
property, and the use of state resources for the welfare of the 
individual. The political systems of North America and Western 
Europe can be described by applying the following two 
notions: they are liberal because they seek to guarantee rights of 
individuals, and they are democratic because their institutions 
seek to translate popular views into public policy.
However, in recent decades, as ordinary citizens’ living 
standards have stagnated and threats to security and stability have 
multiplied around the world, these two principles of Western 
politics have come into conflict. As a result, ‘liberal democracy’ has 
been diverging, giving rise to two (not inherently) contradictory 
regime forms: ‘illiberal democracy’ (democracy without rights, 
or in other words, ‘democratic authoritarianism’) and ‘undemo-
cratic liberalism’ (rights without democracy). An example of the 
‘illiberal democracy’ is when vast sections of policy are guarded 
from democratic participation. Macroeconomic decisions are 
made by independent central banks. Social conflicts are settled 
by constitutional courts. This has been an increasing reality in the 
nearly two decades of Putin’s Russia, where this type of leadership 
is defined as ‘managed’ or ‘sovereign’ democracy as opposed to 
other Western liberal models. While the Kremlin argues that this 
special system is necessary in order to protect Russia from its many 
enemies, both domestic and foreign, this mode of governance has 
become a trend in more and more countries within the European 
Union – like Hungary and Poland – and others elsewhere such as 
India, Turkey, or China.
At the same time, the development of ‘undemocratic 
liberalism’ can be seen in the rise of Donald Trump, the real 
estate mogul and reality TV star who defied all predictions to 
emerge as the victorious candidate in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
elections. In the 1990s, this trend was already being represented 
by Boris Yeltsin’s post-communist de-institutionalized era of 
hyper-liberal capitalism.
1. The Impact of ‘Cultural Legacy’ 
on the Russian Undemocratic Liberalism
One specific goal of the Yeltsin era economic reforms was to 
establish a new class of businessmen and private property owners: 
a body of people who could form the foundation of a new model 
post-Soviet citizen. However, the experience of this post-com-
munist liberal economic ‘revolution’ turned out to be very 
different from the original expectations. For just as people became 
disillusioned with Communism due to its broken promises, after 
1991 the words ‘democracy’ and ‘reform’ quickly became equally 
as unbearable to large sectors of the Russian public. 
Only a few years after the reform process had begun, disap- 
pointed analysts were posing stark questions: “Why has 
Western style liberalism, embraced almost everywhere in theory, 
proved difficult even to approximate in practice? Why has 
freedom not yet been established, even though the totalitarian 
state has been torn down?”3 Indeed, many analysts judged the 
results of the first post-communist decade as a near complete 
failure and blamed either internal corruption or Western 
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. 
3 Stephen Holmes, Cultural Legacies or State Collapse?, in Michael Mandelbaum 
(ed.), Post-Communism: Four Perspectives, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 
New York 1996, p. 25.
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The blame attached to these international bodies was, of 
course, far too simplistic, as the Bretton Woods Institutions had 
existed for over sixty years and many of their projects have proven 
successful. Additionally, corruption is part of every political 
economy and exists to varying degrees in every country. What 
is significant is the consensus that Russia’s political economy has 
been corrupt on every level. According to numerous sources, 
Russia was ranked among the ten most corrupt nations in the 
world during each year of Yeltsin’s decade in power – while 
Putin’s Russia has performed only marginally better.4 Under 
Yeltsin, international investors regularly complained about 
corruption. The financial crisis of 1998 only further worsened 
this, inciting discussion as to whether Russia’s developing 
economy was, in fact, a form of developing capitalism, or simply 
‘oligarchism,’ a system where a narrow elite have “stolen the 
state, and everything else.”5
This question drew global attention. Public and political 
speculations of ‘Who lost Russia?’ triggered debates within 
the IMF and the World Bank, resulting in a restructuring 
process of both institutions in the late 1990s. Boris Yeltsin 
was forced to resign and in 2000, the new President Vladimir 
Putin declared a “dictatorship of law and order” in order to 
combat what was perceived as Russia’s lawlessness.6 However, 
4 The Corruption Perceptions Index 1999 – published by Transparency 
International – ranked Russia 76 out of 85 countries. Denmark was ranked the least 
corrupt country, and the United States shared 17th place with Austria. On a 10-point 
scale, with Denmark being a 10, Russia scored 2.4. The U.S. and Austria both had 
7.5, while Cameroon earned only 1.4, the lowest score. For comparison, in 2015 Russia 
scored 29, and holds 119th place out of 168 countries. Respectively, America scored 76 
and ranks 16th (https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_1999/0/).
5 Kenneth Murphy and Marek Hassel, Stealing the State and Everything Else: 
A Survey on Corruption in the Post-Communist World, Project Syndicate, Prague, 
Winter 1999.
6 Jonas Bernstein, Party Lines: Dictated by Law, or Nods, The Moscow Times, 
4 March 2000.
Putin has been unable to root out corruption throughout his 
seventeen years in power – first serving two terms as president, 
then prime minister, and now president yet again – although 
there have been almost annual promises to curtail favoritism.7 
The issue of corruption certainly highlights Russia’s complicated 
transition, but the country’s general problem with liberalism 
and capitalism extend far beyond politics and into history and 
culture. According to Stephen Holmes, corruption is not a cause 
but rather a consequence of what he calls ‘cultural legacies,’ 
“habits acquired in the past which are difficult to shake and 
which purportedly obstruct the successful creation and function 
of democratic and market institutions. Habits die hard and 
mentalities change slow.”8
Several aspects within the Russian ‘national character’ and 
‘cultural legacy’ help to explain the failings of liberal policies 
in Russia since 1991. Among these are the influence of Asian 
culture and values that remain from the previous system of 
government, both of which reinforce the special role of family 
and friend relationships – a form of that prizes the commune 
as opposed to the value of an individual. The influence of 
these factors leaves little hope for the existence of a ‘faceless 
bureaucracy,’ able to apply the law equally to all, without 
regard to personal preferences and sympathies. The mixed 
results of the reform process, varying assessments by Russian 
actors and outside participants and analysts,9 and the now 
largely anti-liberal regime of Vladimir Putin, all suggest that 
the root of these problems extend far deeper than only issues 
of bad policies, inefficient implementation, or the supposedly 
corrupt nature of the Russian state. In Holmes’ words:
7 Ivan Krastev and Vladislav Inozemtsev, Putin’s Self-Destruction: Russia’s New 
Anti-Corruption Campaign Will Sink the Regime, Transit Online, 2013 (http://www.
iwm.at/transit/transit-online/putins-self-destruction/).
8 Stephen Holmes, Cultural Legacies, p. 26.
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9 Today only a handful of reformists insist that the road to capitalism, which they 
chose by way of “shock therapy,” had proven successful. In his book “Russian style 
privatization”, Chubais argues that the way reforms were implemented was defined by 
the necessity to neutralize the Soviet-style bureaucracy, because the command system 
never wanted to admit that a “Soviet man like every other man was nothing more 
than ‘homo economicus,’ fully engrossed in the economic interests: interest in mon-
ey, interest in property and profit.” Anatoly Borisovich Chubais (ed.), Privatizatsiya 
po-rossiiski, Vagrius, Moskva 1999, p. 29.
10 Stephen Holmes, Cultural Legacies, p. 26.
11 See, for example, Edward Kennan, Muscovite Political Folkways, The Russian 
Review, 45/2, April 1986, pp. 115-182.
What deserves careful thought is the reform-hampering role of 
inherited attitudes and patterns of behavior. People do more easily 
what they are used to doing than what they have never done... Habits 
and expectations, which perversely constrict freedom of choice, 
can be handed down from generation to generation and survive for 
centuries by sheer inertia.10  
The two epigrams by de Custine and Chernomyrdin 
at the beginning of this essay suggest a simple but powerful 
conclusion: Russia’s culture has a deep impact on any reform 
effort, meaning that regardless of those efforts, the country has 
had difficulty embracing change. Why is it that the late Tsarist 
system, late Communism, and post-Communism all failed to 
generate viable alternatives and only produced changes that 
appeared flawed and destructive? Why is it that replacing the 
old regime always resulted in a crippled successor regime? 
One possible answer to these questions is a great paradox of 
‘tyranny,’ in which a ‘weak state’ provides too much govern- 
ment, depriving people of the basic liberties needed to make 
their own decisions.11 Such a state is left impotent, unable to 
solve the fundamental problems that face it, remaining effective 
only through weakening and discrediting alternatives. This 
pattern certainly defines Vladimir Putin’s governing style – 
seen most clearly in his top-down command structure known as 
the “vertical of power”12 – but it also held true following 1991, 
when reform efforts led by Western-style liberals such as Yegor 
Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais refused to tolerate any alternative 
to themselves.13
This point brings to the fore another paradox: having endured 
some of the worst despots in the history of the world, the Russian 
people have developed an almost apocalyptic fear of change, 
especially regime change. The end of a regime engenders not hope 
but a fear of catastrophe. Thus, power in Russia, far more than 
in other cultures, is subject to inertia, which creates a favorable 
environment for autocratic rule. The person wielding power 
embodies power and is followed by the population regardless of, 
and often even in spite of, the types of policies he implements. 
This attitude marked people’s devotion to Iosif Stalin and helps to 
explain the re-election of Boris Yeltsin in 1996 when, despite poll 
numbers that showed his popularity was at its lowest point in his 
entire presidency, the Russian people voted to re-elect him, most 
likely reasoning ‘better the devil we know.’ The phenomenon of 
Putin’s popularity, steadily hovering over 80% in recent years, is 
of a similar nature – if not Putin, who else?14 In fact, this attitude 
is often held subconsciously rather than consciously and is 
12 Ivan Sukhov, The Power Vertical and the Nation’s Self-Consciousness, Russia 
in Global Affairs, 15 June 2008 (http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10931).
13 Anatoly Chubais insists: “Of course our privatization was not without 
‘minuses,’ however if we followed the slow A-B-C process suggested by the ‘soft’ 
reformers, we would have had much more negative outcom... Criminalization would 
have been absolute.” Anatoly Borisovich Chubais (ed.), Privatizatsiya po-rossiiski, 
p. 32. However, already in the 1990s there was enough evidence that reforms could 
have taken a less radical turn if the reformers and their Western advisors would have 
been less rigid in understanding the reforms. Traditional structures would not have 
been destroyed, appropriate new structures would have been built, and Russian cul-
tural values – such as a preference of a commune versus the individual – would have 
been considered. See, for example: Giulietto Chiesa, Proshchai, Rossiya, Geya, Mosk-
va 1997, pp. 35-60; Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), The Destruction 
of the Soviet Economic System, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk 1998.
14 RT, Putin continues to ride high in popularity polls, latest research shows, RT, 5 
May 2016 (https://www.rt.com/politics/341922-putin-continues-to-ride-high/).
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part of a centuries old tradition, which only time and different 
(positive) experiences have the ability to change.
In his seminal work Culture and Explosion,15 Russian cul- 
tural historian Yuri Lotman offers the perspective that unlike 
Western culture, Russian culture embodies an underlying binary 
logic of opposition. Without necessarily being aware of these 
patterns, individuals and groups conceptualize social lives in 
terms of absolute alternatives that admit no compromise. There 
is no neutral ground. When a path is chosen, it must be seen as 
absolutely victorious. Therefore, Russian leaders always believe 
in the righteousness of their policies. Regarding the binary logic 
in terms of human values, Lotman offers the following sets of 
stark oppositions: charity in Russia vs. justice in the West; love 
vs. the law; personal morality (ethics) vs. state law; holiness vs. 
politics, and so on. In contrast to the Western institutions that 
operate on standard protocols, Russia often operates according 
to ‘personalized rituals.’ According to Lotman, a fateful result 
of this binary thinking is that after defeating an opponent, the 
victor must always seek to rewrite the past. The past is seen not 
as the foundation for organic growth, but rather as a source of 
flaws to be destroyed before it is able to infect the new regime. 
Creation is preceded by total destruction, thus occurring in 
a void. Means and ends are divorced, as the longed-for new 
world can only be constructed on the ruins of the old.
In the 1990s, Yeltsin, Gaidar, Chubais and their colleagues 
appeared to be acting in line with this classical script of Russian 
history, repeating that binary logic of opposition. Reformers 
fashioned a monolithic, mythological West, understood pri- 
marily in terms of its opposition to the Soviet Union. And 
despite their liberalism, these reformers reverted to the usual 
absolutist, and rather destructive, formula of ‘we know best’ in 
their attempts to transform the old Soviet society. Communism 
15 Yuri Mikhailovich Lotman, Kultura i Vzryv, Gnozis, Moskva 1992.
failed because it was a bankrupt ideology. They reasoned that 
the Russian society and economy would begin to work only 
by quickly adopting a viable ideology: the free market model. 
Never mind that such change could only be imposed by the 
autocratic techniques of ‘the ends justifying the means,’ and 
lacking the necessary institutions to see the ensure its viability. 
What Isaiah Berlin called “the mixture of utopian faith and 
brutal disregard for civilized morality,”16 in reference to the 
Bolshevik policies, could also be applied to the Russian liberal 
reform process, which ruled more often by presidential decree 
rather than through transparency and democratic consent.17
However, the essence of democracy is to secure public 
support for government policies, something Yeltsin consistently 
failed to do. We cannot auction, privatize, or even redistribute 
the assets of a huge country among the people without wide 
citizen involvement, particularly when the people are well- 
aware of the high (and often bloody) price paid to develop those 
assets. In order to be supported by the public, economic liberties 
would only be viable when the public and authorities have 
agreed on a defined set of goals, procedures, regulations, and 
codes. Although the Russian and Soviet systems never had such 
a written code, they had a strict tradition of rituals and ‘informal 
formalities’ that were followed by the elite and the people alike. 
When the traditionally accepted systems were formally destroyed 
in 1991, rituals were no longer functional neither within the 
power elite nor between the people and the government. 
The formerly unwritten set of rules were replaced by the 
‘undemocratic liberalism’ – ‘bespredel’ (limitless lawlessness)  
– as Yeltsin’s government overlooked the need to replace old 
16 Isaiah Berlin, Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century in Four Essays on 
Liberty, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 1969, p. 17.
17 See Janine Wedel, Rigging the U.S.-Russian Relationship: Harvard, Chubais, 
and the Transidentity Game, Democratizatsiya, 7/4, Fall 1999.
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autocratic rituals with the new modern regulations of societal 
protocol and new, functioning institutions of democracy. Thus, 
the separation between the state and society suppressed anything 
that Russia has ever known before. Deprived of the familiar 
patterns and structures, and lacking any formal replacement, 
the people have become greatly confused about the formal 
functions and responsibilities of citizens, government officials 
and businessmen in the Russia’s new capitalist environment.
Reforming without democratic consent, rather than making 
reforms comprehensible to the wider public, doomed the entire 
liberal program from the start and empowered illiberal forces 
within the country. From 1991 onwards, policies imposed from 
the top clashed with expectations from the bottom, mainly 
because the average Russian clung to the long-established idea 
that the interests of the commune, of the state, far surpassed 
the interests of any individual. They are deemed more valuable 
than any concept of democracy or capitalism. Incidentally this 
helps explains the resilience of the Communist Party in Russia, 
which even Vladimir Putin supports, despite his affiliation 
with the competing United Russia party.
2. The Illiberal Democracy of the Putin State
This Russian belief system as described above was better suited 
to the ‘illiberal democracy’ Putin’s Kremlin rather than the 
‘undemocratic liberalism’ of the Yeltsin regime. Most analyses 
of Putin’s government, with its ruling philosophy of ‘sovereign’ 
or ‘managed democracy’, emphasize his KGB past and portray 
him as a destroyer of liberty and democratic freedoms, yet 
this strong-man act fits into a centuries-old Russian tradition 
of so-called ‘liberal conservatism,’ a hybrid model of reform 
and oppression exercised by many leaders before Putin. It is a 
longstanding belief that Russia, with its enormous territory and 
a population prone to communal attitudes, necessitates a strong 
not in the place of liberal reforms, but rather in order for reforms 
to become coherent and successful. For instance, in 2000 Putin’s 
first order of business as the new President was to combine 
Russia’s 89 federal subjects into just several federal districts ruled 
by ‘super-governors’ handpicked by the Kremlin. Just recently 
in 2016, through a similar effort of centralization the Kremlin 
implemented an ‘anti-terror’ law – or the ‘Big Brother’ law, as 
it was immediately dubbed – which ordered Russia’s phone 
companies to keep logs of users’ calls and internet histories for 
six months. The results of these ‘strong-hand’ reforms are often 
unsatisfactory and appear undemocratic and illiberal if assessed 
from the point of view of Western democracy, as their stated 
goals of protecting the country against disorder or terrorism 
often manifest in cracking down on any possibility of disobe-
dience or dissent. Yet, as Putin sees it, he has simply brought 
unified compliance to the federal governance.
In fact, in the first decade of Putin’s rule this fusion of 
‘reform and conservatism’ did provide some stability to the 
Russian governing system, in stark contrast to the chaos of the 
Yeltsin era. For example, in his early Kremlin years Putin made 
serious efforts to consolidate property rights and to liberalize 
and normalize the economy. He employed a series of liberal-
minded finance ministers, like Alexey Kudrin, who achieved 
reasonable results in regulating businesses. Big oil and other 
natural resource conglomerates – such as Gazprom, Rosneft 
and others – were seen as national treasures and were thus 
brought under state control. Other businesses that resented 
Kremlin oversight were destroyed, like the now-defunct oil 
company Yukos, whose owner Khodorkovsky spent fourteen 
years in prison for supporting the opposition politics despite 
Putin’s objections. Although undemocratic from the point of 
view of liberal democracy, from the perspective of ‘liberal- 
conservatives’ these acts were essential in order to eradicate 
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the influence of the Yeltsin-era ‘oligarchism’ and place the 
Kremlin at the center of economic progress. And real progress 
did occur in some areas, as in 2011 when Russia’s trade and 
finances became stable enough for the country to be admitted 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Putin has often argued that instilling a network of restrictive 
laws is necessary to strengthen order.18  In this, his Russia squarely 
fits the ‘liberal-conservative’ model, especially preceding his 
2012 reelection for president when further consolidation of 
power drove the Kremlin’s ‘law and order’ agenda away from 
the murky idea of fostering stability to forcing control. A century 
ago, this very model was employed by Prime Minister Pyotr 
Stolypin, a man Putin holds in high regard. Stolypin attempted 
to reform Russia in the midst of the 1905 revolution and used 
extreme violence to suppress the uprising, yet he pursued some 
liberal social and economic reforms, most famously giving the 
peasants land ownership.
As a philosophical model for the ‘liberal-conservatism,’ both 
Stolypin and Putin have followed the teachings of the 19th 
century jurist Boris Chicherin. Chicherin was the first author 
to express concern about the tendency of liberalism to veer 
towards the inclusion of too many rights, particularly in the case 
of Russia. Long before Lotman outlined Russia’s binary logic of 
opposition, in which differing perspectives allow for no middle 
ground or compromise, Chicherin espoused a similar view in 
discussing liberalism. Chicheren writes that the Russian liberal 
18 Thomas Grove, Russia’s Putin Signs New Law Against ‘Undesirable’ NGOs, 
WSJ, 25 May 2015 (http://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-putin-signs-new-law-against-
undesirable-ngos-1432567550). See also, Tania Lemondzhava, In Russia, the Doors 
are Closing, Foreign Policy, 29 April 2016 (http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/29/in-
russia-the-doors-are-closing-tourism-putin-human-rights/); and Fred Lucas, Back to 
the Soviet Era: Putin’s New Law Could Lead to Religious Crackdown, Daily Signal, 
20 July 2016 (http://dailysignal.com/2016/07/20/back-to-the-soviet-era-putins-new-
law-could-lead-to-religious-crackdown/).
travels on a few high-sounding words: freedom, openness, public 
opinion […] which he interprets as having no limits. […] Hence he 
regards as products of outrageous despotism the most elementary 
concepts such as obedience to law or the need for a police and 
bureaucracy. […] The extreme development of liberty, inherent in 
democracy, inevitably leads to the breakdown of the state organism. 
To counter this, it is necessary to have strong authority.19
Other philosophers who followed, from Vladimir Solovyov 
to post-Bolshevik revolution exiles Nikolai Berdyaev and Ivan 
Ilyin, shared the same view of ‘liberal-conservatism.’ Similarly, 
Putin’s ‘dictatorship of law’ stands in opposition to what the 
Russian president saw as Yeltsin’s bespredel: liberalism run 
amok. Putin has shown himself faithfully devoted to these 
philosophical views as he regularly returns to Ilyin’s notion of 
‘legal consciousness,’ which he prefers over Western liberal 
democracy. In the philosopher’s words, “at the head of the 
state there must be a single will,” and a “united and strong state 
power, dictatorial in scope,”20 though with legal limits. Hence, 
the ruler must have popular support, organs of the state must 
be responsible and accountable, and the principle of legality 
must be preserved and all persons must be equal under the law. 
Putin certainly relies on popular support, often taking the 
public’s pulse by looking at poll numbers, collecting questions 
for his frequent and lengthy TV-broadcast town-halls with 
the country’s citizens, and visiting remote locations in Russia, 
although that has become more of a rarity compared to his earlier 
Kremlin years. The last principle, too, has become increasingly 
challenging for the Kremlin. In fact, since Putin began his third 
term in 2012 a series of laws have been passed criminalizing 
19 Cited in Gary M. Hamburg, Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism, 
1828-1866, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1992.
20 Cited in Marc Bennetts, I’m Going to Ruin Their Lives: Inside Putin’s War on 
Russia’s Opposition, Oneworld Publications, London 2016.
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repeated street protests. The aim of such laws is to boost the 
Russian government’s ability to control public discourse and 
the free exchange of information. This flies in the face of Ilyin’s 
notion that the top down autocratic state would respect civil 
rights and promote civil society irrespective of the challenges it 
posed to the state. 
As the experience of Putinism has confirmed, the state 
invariably feels threatened by those challenges. Even though 
the Putin administration has been formally more consistent 
regarding civil society institutions – in 2004 it created a 
series of ‘public councils’ on a variety of issues, from art and 
education to finances and administration – than the Yeltsin 
regime, these councils have remained ‘Russian-specific.’ That 
is, their job has been mostly to conform to the agenda of the 
state. After all, by liberal conservative standards, civil society 
should serve to cooperate with the state in order to better the 
country, not to create a disarray of opposition. The view of a 
limited, law-based, and accountable dictatorship espoused by 
Chicherin, Ilyn, and other philosophers is a noteworthy concept 
for those who are attempting to understand the Russian state. 
Yet, there has been no real evidence that it able to work in a 
society long term. Stolypin, after all, was only Russia’s minister 
for five years. Who knows what further restrictive measures he 
may have instituted for the sake of a strong state. The perils 
of ‘illiberal democracy’ as demonstrated by Putin’s increasingly 
controlling presidential third term, from curtailing the freedom 
to protest to the ‘Big Brother’ law and many other restrictions 
in between, the ‘illiberal’ takes over and ‘democracy’ fades.
Leaders and countries who take cues from Putin – like 
the Hungarian and Indian Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and 
Narendra Modi, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or 
Poland’s former Prime Minister and Chairman of the right-wing 
‘Law and Justice’ (PiS) party, Jarosław Kaczyński – who hope 
that flexing muscle and curtailing opposition will protect their 
countries from internal turmoil and external threats, should be 
wary of Russia’s example.21 While these ‘illiberal’ democrats’ 
promise to shelter their countries from a variety of problems 
may be appealing to voters, there is little evidence that they do. 
After all, in Russia under Putin terrorist acts continue to 
permeate public spaces and opinions, the issue of corruption has 
not changed, and extrajudicial killings show no sign of slowing 
down and are increasing instead.22
21 See Nina Khrushcheva, The Lilli-Putin’s of the EU, Project Syndicate, 28 
March 2016 (https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/leaders-building-il-
liberal-regimes-in-hungary-and-poland-by-nina-l--khrushcheva-2016-03?barri-
er=true) and Nina Khrushcheva, The Strongman’s Power Trap, Project Syndicate, 19 
July 2016 (https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/putin-xi-erdogan-pow-
er-trap-by-nina-l--khrushcheva-2016-07).
22 Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015 Global Terrorism Index, IEP, November 
2015, p. 90 (http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-Glob-
al-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf); Levada Center, Russian Public Opinion 2012-2013, 
Annual Report, Levada Analytical Center, Moscow 2013, p. 164-165 (http://www.leva- 
da.ru/sites/default/files/2012_eng.pdf) and RT, Russia to launch own corruption index, to 
replace ‘biased’ Transparency Intl, RT, 20 April 2015 (http://on.rt.com/xh3vei). See also, 
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On August 22nd 2016, Russia celebrated its National Flag 
Day and the 25th anniversary of the Russian state’s victory 
over putschists. During the dramatic days of August 1991, an 
enthusiastic crowd resisted the coup arranged by the GKChP, 
a faction of officials in power who detained Soviet president 
Gorbachev in Crimea in an attempt to create a new government 
and end the democratization process in the USSR. Those three 
days gave a fresh start to Russian – and global – history and 
opened a new chapter in the development of Russian media 
and journalism.1 It is not an exaggeration to say that new 
Russian journalism was born and established its contemporary 
framework and principles during those three days. Nevertheless, 
many problems and dramas of today’s Russian media 
development can also trace their roots and origins to those days. 
   Perestroika, August 1991, the Soviet collapse and the 
new order in Russia clearly transformed the nation at all 
levels, political, economic and ideological, introduced ‘rev- 
olutions’ of concepts and practices, and at the same time 
1 Alfred B. Evans, The failure of democratization in Russia: A comparative 
perspective, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2/1, January 2011, pp. 40-51; Stephen F. 
Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev’s 
Reformers, Norton, New York 1989; Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper and Gregory 
Freidin (eds.), Russia at the barricades: eyewitness accounts of the August 1991 coup, 
M.E. Sharpe, Armonk 1994.
created an impressive ‘life experiment.’ Participation in 
this ambitious transformation of the Russian society and 
the establishment of new rules were lifelong goals for many 
people of all different ages, a realization of the old dreams and 
desires of the previous generations of Russian intellectuals. 
     The liberal dream was a long term ‘love affair’ of Russian 
intellectuals and the foundation of many ideological concepts 
and clandestine movements in the country. The liberal concept 
was more than simply an idea, it was a very deep and emotional 
part of Russian identity: great Russian literature, which 
had battled against censorship for almost three centuries, 
elaborated a great mythology of freedom, and naturally liberal 
ideas were a part of it.2 
2 The great dream of freedom was core stone of ‘golden age’ of Russian 
literature and way of thinking, and transformed and developed its character dur-
ing all recent history. Alexander Griboyedov, Petr Chaadayev, Alexander Pushkin 
and Mikhail Lermontov created brilliant lines and images presenting this dream. 
Freedom was part of romanticism, accompanied in Russia by the dream of civil 
liberation, inspired by French revolution and the Decembrists revolt in 1825. The 
idea of liberation of peasant people from slavery gave power to the next generations 
of writers and journalists. The magazine Sovremennik, Otechestvenniye Zapiski and 
other publications developed intellectual debate using ‘aesopian language’ under 
struck censorship. Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Lev Tolstoy payed serious attention 
to the consequences of fighting for freedom and its moral and existential aspects. 
In late 19th century, the dream of freedom and first liberal reforms gave fresh start to 
led journalist and writer’s movement for democratization. In the 20th century, freedom 
was also romanticized by Alexander Blok, Maxim Gorky, and many others. During 
Stalin’s terror, the dream of freedom was best presented in Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s 
Gulag Archipelago, in Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Stories, in Vasily Grossman’s Life 
and Fate; in Khrushchev and Brezhnev time it was presented by Sinyavsky and Daniel 
samizdat and dissident literature. See Victor Terras (ed.), Handbook of Russian 
literature, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 1985; Nina Barkovskaya and 
Mark Lipovetsky (eds.), Russkaya literatura XX-XXI vekov: Napravleniya i techeniya, 
Ural State Pedagogical University Press, Ekaterinburg 2011.
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1. A Heavy Legacy
It is not an exaggeration to say that in practice, the liberal 
experience in Russia was too short-lived and rigid. Liberals 
were primarily preoccupied with the theoretical aspects of their 
ideas and had little awareness about their implementation. The 
cost of this idealistic approach was effectively high. I would 
never forget the experience of my friends and colleagues in 
August 1991: we were ready to sacrifice for press, information 
and all the other civil freedoms when we stayed around the 
Russian White House in August 1991. However, we could not 
predict that in the new Russia – free from communism and 
censorship – journalists would be regularly murdered while 
their killers and masterminds would live with impunity and 
attacks and threats would become an everyday occurrence.3 
    It is remarkable that for the 25th anniversary of the failed 
coup, the event was not been presented as it had been in years 
past, as the heroic and romantic effort of a people united in 
demanding innovation and democratization of their country. 
Rather, in the summer of 2016 many national TV programs 
described the events of August 1991 as a big mistake, a betrayal, 
a sort of ‘color revolution’ masterminded from abroad. 
Additionally, some analysts wrote that people had been 
deceived by small groups of liberals.4 We are clearly witnessing 
a transformation and new divisions within the Russian society 
today, and it is time to carefully study the country’s recent past 
3 Yelena Vartanova, Postsovetskiye transformatsii rossiyskikh SMI i zhurnalistiki, 
MediaMir, Moskva 2014. See also The Russian Media Guide to the troubled world of 
independent journalism, The Calvert Journal, 2017 (http://calvertjournal.com/features/
show/2228/russian-media-guide-to-the-troubled-world-of-independent-journalism).
4 For example, the popular political talk show Vecher s Vladimirom Solovyo-
vym where his guests used to blame liberals and ‘democrats’ of 1991 and point at 
them for tragedy of Donbass people and all tragedies of Russia in general.
in order to understand the main trends and problems of the 
period. What happened to our country? Why did it happen? 
These traditional questions appear in everyday discussions in 
Russia, and remind me of the period of late Soviet stagnation, 
when people spent their evenings debating the nation’s past 
history and future potential. 
Could the concepts of liberalism and freedom of the press 
have any future in Russia? Many experts and many writers 
and businessmen have given a negative response, writing 
long and short texts regarding the subject.5 Nevertheless, we 
can be optimistic and we must learn lessons from Russian 
history in order to build an effective new concept and practice 
based on that experience. First, we must understand what 
liberalism meant for the younger generations of Russians living 
under perestroika – as I was – and for our older colleagues 
and teachers. This concept was essentially associated with 
rule of law, civil freedoms, human rights, free media, and a 
market economy. The latter element, the market economy, 
was considered in our dreams as the ideal ‘paradise’ while, 
in contrast, the socialist system was seen as the ‘hell.’ We can 
remember how the Soviet era TV reports narrating the South 
Bronx were, with the ‘spring/autumn attacks’ of workers in 
New York and other ‘shocking’ stories were replaced by reports 
from the 5th Avenue showing its glossy glass windows and lights. 
This change in narration regarding the United States and its 
basic values symbolized a total conceptual transformation 
of the official position towards the “beloved enemy.” For 
5 Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is true and everything is possible: the surreal heart 
of the new Russia, Public Affairs, New York 2014; Mikhail Zygar, All The Kremlin’s 
Men: Inside The Court of Vladimir Putin, Public Affairs, New York 2016, Nadezhda 
Azhgikhina, It’s Not Too Late for an Honest Russian-American Dialogue, The Nation, 
17 January 2017 (https://www.thenation.com/article/its-not-too-late-for-an-honest-
russian-american-dialogue/.
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Russians, this model became the only possible alternative that 
apparently welcomed the ideal of building a new capital order 
in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, no one – including the brave 
‘architects of perestroika’ and the new Russian leaders – had 
had a lived experience of capitalism. What could and should 
have been implemented in the new Russia was no more than 
a very general and vague notion, rather than tangible policies.
This phenomenon had deep roots in the surrealistic per- 
ception of the external world that the totally closed societies 
had, the Soviet society among them. I remember that time 
very well: I was a young journalist for Ogonek, a national 
weekly magazine that became a frontline of the ‘liberalization’ 
of information. Its publications offered the audience new 
pages of Russian and international history, publishing diaries 
and testimonies from the Gulags, the truth about Stalin’s 
repressions, and the prohibited texts of exiles and dissident 
writers and artists. Together with two other weeklies – 
Literaturnaya Gazeta and Moskovskiye Novosti – the magazine 
created the basis for a new ideology and a new cultural 
canon in Russia during years of perestroika. In 1988 Ogonek 
published Bukharin’s last will, his manifesto of ‘communism 
with a human face.’ Following its publication, thousands of 
letters came to the magazine and many people wrote that 
they have been waiting for this moment all of their life.6 1989 
was a very important year: the Berlin wall collapsed, the iron 
curtain disappeared, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR – and 
its Congress of People’s deputies of USSR – had been (more 
or less) independently elected, and Article 6 in the Soviet 
Constitution had been removed, eradicating the monopoly 
of the ruling role of Communist Party. In effect, 1989 was the 
6 Some of these letters are collected in the volume: Christopher Cerf, Marina 
Albee, Lev N. Gushchin, and Lynn Visson (eds.), Small Fires: Letters from the Soviet 
People to Ogonyok Magazine, 1987-1990, Summit Books, New York 1990.
end of the dominance of Soviet ideology. Beginning in 1988, 
the young legal experts Mikhail Fedotov, Yuri Baturin and 
Vladimir Entin drafted the first ‘law on press and other mass 
media,’ effectively establishing freedom of information, while 
other enthusiastic intellectuals began studying legal drafts to 
fully implement glasnost. We all understood freedom as a gift, 
a golden rain, and lived those emotional moments of hope. 
Nevertheless, we did not struggle for that freedom as other 
journalists in many old democracies had for decades; we did 
not understand that achieving freedom required an everyday 
effort. We perceived it as a bright wedding celebration and this 
was the most dramatic mistake that we made.
The aforementioned ‘law on press and other mass media’ was 
based on the best European legal practices and was approved in 
the perfect framework for a detective story (published twenty 
years later by its authors). The draft reached the parliament 
through a publication in the Estonian language sports newspaper 
Spordileht and later in Molodezh Estonii, as it needed to be 
officially published before the first hearing in the parliament and 
in Estonia the press had slightly more freedom. This mechanism 
fostered a clandestine transportation of copies with translation 
through to parliament building. Finally, the law was approved 
by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 12 June 1990. The law 
gave the basis for future media laws in Russia and all other former 
Soviet states. For the first time in Russian history, after more 
than 300 years of total state control and censorship in the media 
(with a short exception in the spring of 1917), censorship was 
declared illegal and every citizen had the right to establish private 
media. In addition, journalists received the right to refuse to write 
anything against their principles.
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2. Hopes and Disillusions in Post-Soviet Russia
Today, the law on press and other mass media is still active in 
Russia and is generally considered as one of the best media laws 
in Europe. Nevertheless, its implementation was problematic 
from the very beginning as it was to an extent the development 
of a market economy. I would never forget our discussions 
at Ogonek, when we started the first judicial case for our 
independence from the dominant Pravda Publishing House. 
Being a part of Ogonek, the most popular weekly in the country, 
was a great responsibility. We truly believed that gaining 
independence from the official party-oriented publisher was 
an opportunity to automatically become incredibly wealthy, 
and began planning higher salaries for journalists and even 
bought a sort of historical palace in the center of Moscow for 
our office space. Many colleagues far more experienced and 
older than I were certain that such transformation had to 
occur. We won the court case in 1991, the market economy 
followed, and we remained without money and facilities while 
the property of the magazine passed on to the new owners –
former Soviet directors – and we could not manage to work 
without extra sponsorship. In 1992, the first registration service 
formalized more than 400 names of newly established media in 
one year. Essentially, more than one media channel had been 
registered every day. Everyone wanted to establish their own 
media station, nobody wanted to cooperate, nobody wanted 
to establish an association of owners or workers, and the idea 
of trade unionism was tossed into garbage bin of history as an 
abandoned Soviet relic.
Newcomers – with no understanding of professional and 
ethical standards – arrived at the media field in a new framework 
free from any regulations. In parallel, almost all existing 
publications eliminated their proofreading and checking sections 
because of budgetary concerns and as a result the quality of 
information became a significant issue. In this moment, a new form 
of censorship came to complete this dramatic picture. Surprisingly, 
many enthusiasts were eager to support this new censorship. 
In fact, in the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup, new 
Russian authorities banned the communist media, giving their 
first demonstration that evidently the old practices were coming 
back. Only the new NGO Glasnost Defense Foundation called 
for equal justice for all political movements and media outlets, 
but its voice was a weak minority and remained basically unheard. 
A real challenge for press freedom and a nascent democracy as a 
whole occurred during the Russian constitutional crisis and the 
storming of the White House in October 1993. At that time, most 
of liberal publications (and Moscow intellectuals) supported that 
shelling. The famous dissidents Andrei Sinyavsky and Vladimir 
Maksimov overcame their previous disagreements with each other 
and together wrote an open letter stating that democracy could 
not been built with non-democratic tools. None of the liberal 
publications wanted to publish this letter. Finally, this sensitive 
appeal was printed in the communist newspaper Pravda, while a 
kind of neo-bolshevism – a way of thinking that was influencing 
the political, civic and media practices – came to complete the 
picture of post-Soviet Russia.
3. Oligarchs, Media and Politicization of Journalists
Another trend evidenced in the failure of Russian liberalism is 
related to the use of media by their new owners, the ‘oligarchs,’ 
who used mass communication as one of the most effective tools 
for consolidating political and financial interests. In fact, most of 
the newly established media organizations failed in the mid-90s 
and the sector was quickly polarized into oligopolies. Indeed, 
the media marked was divided between just a few giants and 
journalists began to ‘serve’ them. Some professionals truly 
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believed that private owners would encourage press freedom 
because of their personal interest in the issue, counting on 
‘good oligarchs’ as possible saviors of the liberal dream. 
In this framework of competition and privately owned 
communication, the ‘media wars’ between the Gusinsky and 
Berezovsky media empires on national television and the 
participation of journalists in the guise of public relations 
officers for the elections while working at the same time for 
the media – some even promoting two opponents at the same 
time – played a dramatic role in negative public attitudes 
toward journalism and media. In effect, journalists lost any 
trusted credibility. At the same time, income inequality grew 
dramatically, with the salaries of ordinary media workers in 
peripheral regions at times more than 100 times lower than 
those of correspondents and editors in Moscow. Furthermore, 
those (fortunate) operating television stations began to have 
their rights limited and could potentially be destroyed at any 
moment. Professional solidarity disappeared, seen clearly when 
the ‘good oligarchs’ sold the NTV channel and changed its 
policy and the Russian Union of Journalists called to protect it. 
Nevertheless, people from the regions did not support this call. 
In close parallel, violence against journalists – including 
beating and even murdering – became a regular practice, and most 
of these cases ended in the impunity of the culprits. According 
to the Glasnost Defense Foundation and the Russian Union 
of Journalists, since 1993 more than 350 journalists and media 
managers have been assassinated, have disappeared or have died 
in unclear circumstances.7 The database “Conflicts in the Media” 
8 See Ann Cooper, The death of glasnost: How Russia’s attempt at openness 
failed, Committee to Protect Journalists, 27 April 2015 (https://cpj.org/2015/04/
attacks-on-the-press-death-of-glasnost-russia-attempt-at-openness-failed.php); 
Alyssa Rosenberg, How censorship works in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, The Washing-
ton Post, 9 February 2016 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/.../how-censorship-
works-in-vladimir-putins-russia/); Nadezhda Azgikhina, 10 years Without Anna 
Politkovskaya, Rights in Russia, 21 October 2016 (http://www.rightsinrussia.info/
advisory-council/advisory-committee/azhgikhina-3).
7 See Glasnost Defense Foundation, Digest n° 785, 16 January 2017 (http://
www.gdf.ru/digest/item/1/1445#z1); Luke Harding, To be a journalist in Russia 
is suicide, The Guardian, 24 November 2008 (https://www.theguardian.com/me-
dia/2008/nov/24/anna-politkovskaya-russia-press-freedom) and the list of journal-
ists killed in Russia prepared by John Crowford and Boris Timoshenko (https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_journalists_killed_in_Russia).
has registered dozens of cases of violence of journalists rights all 
over Russia, including threats, attacks, firing and various forms of 
censorship.8 Especially in the 2000s, control of the media came 
from financial groups – very closely associated with established 
power structures – and (although officially illegal) censorship 
flourished and became more and more sophisticated. 
In addition, self-censorship became an everyday practice, 
while independent voices were marginalized from the main- 
stream media to the internet or other small publications. 
Since 1991 – and especially after 9/11 when governments 
across the world, including Russia’s, implemented measures 
to prevent terrorism including restrictions for media freedom 
– many amendments to the media law have been omitted 
while a great number of diverse restrictions of media freedom 
have been introduced. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
Russian independent media and civil society were those who 
suffered the most from international sanctions in so far as 
each new sanction was accompanied by further restrictions 
for independent media and NGOs operating in the country. 
Apparently, we could demand ourselves if these sanctions were 
by origin conceived against the independent voices in Russia. 
Indeed, the politicians and oligarchs targeted by sanctions 
have been reimbursed by the state budget and have remained 
free from any criticism and internal investigations, instead 
becoming sort of self-styled patriotic martyrs.
Nevertheless, the media framework that exists in Russia 
is still rather diverse and presents a number of extraordinary 
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examples of strong professionalism and innovative management: 
some national political newspapers such as Novaya Gazeta, the 
radio station Ekho Moskvy, the television channel Dozhd, and 
many others are good examples of professional journalism, 
appreciated even internationally. Similarly, some Russian regions 
also present examples of strong independent media such as 
the TV channel (also now online) Tomsk 2, the local networks 
Yakutsk Vecherny, Gorodskiye Vesti in Sverdlovsk region, 
Prima Media and Arsenyevskiye Vesti in Vladivostok, Deloboy 
Peterburg and Fontanka in Saint Petersburg, the publishing 
house Altapress in Altay, and dozens of private newspapers 
in the Urals, Northern and Southern Russia. Many of them 
started their businesses in the 1990s, some of them with 
Western support. Additionally, the association of independent 
regional publishers has more than 50 active members with 
discrete commercial success. 
Almost all of these smaller media networks faced multiple 
problems and challenges. However, they created a basis for 
future development: they are trusted by their audience, they 
elaborated new strategies to combat pressure from above, and 
they developed their agenda autonomously. These new online 
media platforms also demonstrate new communication trends 
and, most importantly, show the many young journalists who 
came to the field and did not give up, believing in their victory 
in this battle for the ‘free word’ and in the mission of journalism.
4. A Postponed Liberal Agenda
Hence, we could say that since perestroika and the first victory 
of the liberal model in 1991, the liberal concept in the media 
(and about the media) has been transformed several times. 
However, these long years of liberal economy and liberal 
declarations in politics did not bring the Russian media to a 
sustainable market model nor did it introduce instruments to 
protect democracy, media freedoms, and the role of journalists’ 
in society. In the 2000s, the liberal concept slowly began to 
lose its dominant position. Not many voices today recall the 
famous First Russian Civic Forum in 2000, when then-newly 
elected president Putin was co-chairing the event together 
with Lyudmila Alexeyeva, an icon of the dissident movement 
Moscow Helsinki Group.9 In his speech, the president talked 
about a liberal path for the country, promising to lead Russia to 
a full and deep democracy with the triumph of freedoms and 
active cooperation at international level. 
At that time, a fifth of Russian citizens – almost 30 million 
people – were receiving free aid from Russian NGOs every 
year in the form of training, consultations, courses, etc. Hence, 
NGOs became an important part of Russia’s society and 
economy, creating some 2,000 working positions and helping 
people survive during the difficult ‘shock therapy’ era that 
transformed the Russian socio-economic system. Nevertheless, 
in a short period of time liberal trends were replaced by other 
ones associated with a ‘strong state’ and ‘vertical power.’ 
These included anti-Western or so-called ‘patriotic’ voices that 
referred to a ‘unique Russian way,’ the emergence of religious 
activists participating in the fields of media and politics, and 
the Orthodox Church playing the role of exclusive ‘moral 
jury,’ claiming to replace the former Soviet ideological 
department in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. 
Fundamentalism was not blamed but was rather promoted 
in TV shows and the mainstream media. The new legislative 
framework created strong challenges for NGOs. 
Hundreds of small civil organizations ended their ac- 
tivities, partly as a result of these restrictions and more 
9 See Alexander Nikitin and Jane Buchanan, The Kremlin’s Civic Forum: Coop- 
eration or Co-optation for Civil Society in Russia?, Demokratizatsiya, 10/2, March 2002.
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generally as a result of increasing state control of the media. 
Today – especially in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis and 
anti-Russian sanctions – mainstream political discussion and 
media debates are a far cry from those of the early 2000s and 
the hopes expressed in the Civicс Forum. Indeed, anti-Western 
trends and anti-Americanism have become mainstream while 
propaganda has completely replaced journalism on the 
national television. Unfortunately, the Western response to that 
attitude has worked as a mirror, demonizing Russia as a new 
‘empire of evil’ and the Russian media landscape as a desert. 
As we have demonstrated, this is not entirely true. Nevertheless, 
a consistent practice of journalists based on liberal and 
independent media principles is difficult to realize. 
The recent legal restrictions and misuse of legislation are 
effectively challenging many independent voices. “Since its 
adoption, the “Law on Counteracting Extremist Activities” 
has been used to suppress freedom of expression, dissenting 
any critical voices in the Russian press and blogosphere in 
cases where the subject of criticism is not a particular person 
but rather a broader group of people or a system itself” said 
Galina Arapova, director of the Mass Media Defense Center 
and board member of Article 19. Evidently, the definition itself 
of “extremism” is very broad and unclear. The number of court 
cases brought under this law has grown fast. Recently, Article 
282 of the criminal code (hate speech) has been also used against 
media for critical publications. In some cases, the incitement to 
hate towards the so-called ‘social groups’ had been evidenced 
by experts of linguistics. Among those ‘social groups’ were the 
employees of the regional administration, policemen, cossacks, 
judges, etc. It means that any critical publication, for example, 
digging corruption in local police could become a target. 
Media legal experts also referred to many cases of misuse 
of the law, for example, a newspaper that could be taken to 
court for incitement of hatred by publishing old photos from 
the Second World War with a Nazi flag as illustration of 
historical material. The criminal liability for defamation was 
introduced again some months after it was decriminalized in 
2012. The new provision provides harsh financial penalties 
even in comparison with the previous legislation and includes 
a special section “on libels against judges, jurors, prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials.”10 Engaging in an investigation 
on corruption, among others, is now even more problematic 
considering that the new version of law protects personal 
data. Recent examples of court cases where top managers and 
state officials sued independent media organizations after they 
reported on their luxury expenses clearly supports this. 
Regardless, complaints against the media and journalists 
for defamation and damage to dignity and business reputation 
– which made up the majority of all cases against journalists 
some years ago – are no longer so prevalent in Russia. In 
the 1990s and 2000s, rich and powerful individuals used to 
bring journalists and media to the court. Today, more often 
the controlling institutions initiate cases against the media 
for violations of different laws and regulations (including 
things related to the internet), while the anti-extremist and 
anti-hatred legislations are functional to this task. Recently, 
the media legal experts counted more than 20 new initiatives 
and regulations related to the media, and most of them were 
to many extents restrictive and were not discussed with the 
professional community or the public at all. Article 144 of the 
criminal code – a supposed protection for journalists from 
harassment – and the establishment of criminal liability for the 
“obstruction of the lawful professional activities of journalists” 
is used very rarely. 
10 RiR, Galina Arapova on a New Database on Media Law, Rights in Russia 
(http://www.rightsinrussia.info/archive/interviews-1/arapova); Galina Arapova (ed.), 
Tsena Slova: Novyye Grani Diffamatsii, Tsentr Zashchity Prav Smi, Voronezh 2013.
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Further, media owners also face new restrictions, including 
limitations on foreign investment and new regulations for 
advertisement. Several printed media organizations – mostly 
funded through joint and private investment – have been 
closed or have stopped producing printed versions and been 
relegated to working online. Indeed, new internet regulations 
created various restrictions as well: the so called ‘bloggers law’ 
required any web site with more than 3,000 visitors per day 
to be considered as a media outlet and be legally responsible 
for all published information. Bloggers could no longer be 
anonymous on online platforms and this type of media could 
also be banned without warning. The recent initiative for the 
implementation of the ‘Yarovaya law’ – a law that demands 
total control of all internet activities in Russia – is incredibly 
expensive, far from practically realized, and has prepared 
the Russian public for a great discussion. Unfortunately, the 
majority of Russians are not aware that freedom of the media, 
journalists’ rights, or end of impunity are their own business 
and have no interest in those issues. This fact – as well as the 
absence of professional solidarity and cooperation between 
media actors – contributes significantly to the current situation 
in the Russian media field. Recalling the traditional Russian 
questions “What is to be done?” we may think about the 
simple and well known points of the general liberal agenda. 
Nothing new. This contains open discussion, education and 
awareness including media literacy for everybody, development 
of self-regulation in the media, transparency in the market etc. 
Nevertheless, above all, enforcing an active citizenship – through 
daily, hard and qualified work of journalists that strengthen free 
institutions – is crucial for implementing free press and realizing 
a sustainable democratic regime.
Chapter VIII
Unsuccess’ of Russian Liberalism: 
Contemporary Reflections
Vladislav Zubok, LSE
From the time Peter the Great ‘brought Russia to Europe,’ 
Russian elites have imported and emulated the values of 
freedom and liberty engendered by the religious, intellectual, 
and political developments of western Europe.1 Driven by the 
needs of modernization and the desire to be members of the 
‘civilized club’ of developed nations, these elites attempted to 
periodically apply these principles to Russian state-building 
efforts and socio-economic reforms. These attempts began with 
Catherine the Great and her grandson Alexander I, concurrent 
with the first massive influx of liberal ideas and values from 
Europe. These attempts resumed during the period of Great 
Reforms, then again during the first Russian revolution and 
the ‘Duma Monarchy,’ and most remarkably during the brief 
interregnum of February-October 1917. These efforts resulted 
in complete social anarchy and economic destruction that 
eventually paved the way for the dictatorship of Lenin, Trotsky, 
and the Bolsheviks.
1 On the history of Russian liberalism see Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian 
Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York 
1966; Gary M. Hamburg, Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism, 1828-1866, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford 1992; Julia Berest, The Emergence of Russian 
Liberalism. Alexander Kunitsyn in Context, 1783-1840, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York 2011; Anton A. Fedyashin, Liberals under Autocracy: Modernization and Civil 
Society in Russia, 1866-1904, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 2012.
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1. The Roots of Liberal ‘Unsuccess’ in Russia
From an intellectual-cultural perspective, the Soviet communist 
period can be viewed as a ‘substitute’ for liberalism. Instead of 
appropriating European liberalism for state-building, the radical 
segment of the Russian intelligentsia embraced a different 
European concept: Marxist socialism. Similarly, instead of 
serving as a European apprentice and staying in the civilised 
club, Lenin and his disciples envisioned themselves as makers of 
a new world. While a descendent of the ideals of the European 
Enlightenment, the communist utopia was in fact a radical 
negation of the European liberal tradition. Instead of liberty, it 
offered social justice. The movement had remarkable success 
in Russia. Of course, the Bolshevik government used unbridled 
terror in order to impose its millenarian vision on Russians and 
other peoples of the former Tsarist empire. At the same time, it 
is difficult to deny the fact that at socialism, in stark contrast to 
liberalism, found great receptivity in Russian society. 
 After World War II, European liberalism was seen as dead 
and discredited, yet the global intervention of the United States 
gave liberal ideas newfound vitality. These ideas became the 
ideological foundation of a highly successful Western project 
that, in the 1970s, appeared to be the winning global project. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had failed to ‘liberalize’ 
the Stalinist version of socialism deeply embedded in the 
bureaucratic and fiscal/economic structures of the state. In 
the new global model, the Soviet Union appeared to be falling 
to the role of global pariah. The Soviet-Russian elites, who 
were once seen as the vanguard of the global left in the 1960s, 
were now frustrated and disenchanted. Younger intellectuals 
had lost faith in the kingdom of social justice and become 
‘westernizers.’ They returned to the ideas of a once-reviled 
liberalism and began to admire its achievements and culture in 
Western countries.2
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Gorbachev’s perestroika was not a liberal project, but its 
evolution reflected the triumph of a ‘new’ global liberalism 
and the dissolution of the socialist project. Mikhail Gorbachev 
launched his reforms in an attempt to rejuvenate Soviet 
socialism by dismantling Stalinist ‘aberration,’ yet only five years 
later, he redirected his reforms entirely towards the principles 
of global liberalism. During his final year in office – while still 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party – Gorbachev 
claimed the country had evolved to a social democracy, but did 
so at the time when European social democracy had already lost 
its distinct identity and become diluted in the US-led global 
liberal consensus.3 Above all, it was Gorbachev’s reluctant and 
haphazard liberalization of the Soviet Union that undermined 
the state and its economy, ending in the complete disintegration 
of the Soviet project along nationalist and geographic lines.
In 1991, in a new, smaller Russia, Boris Yeltsin became 
the first elected president. As a result, he was bestowed with 
enormous political legitimacy. He was also the first national 
leader who attempted to implement an impressive array of 
liberal doctrines onto Russia’s state -building efforts, particularly 
regarding economic and social reforms. Like Gorbachev, 
Yeltsin was hardly personally identified as a liberal, yet he 
staunchly believed that liberalism – as a set of economic and 
political principles – was the only way for Russia to become an 
advanced and prosperous society. Over the next twenty-five 
2 Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s children: the last Russian intelligentsia, Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2009; Alexey Yurchak, Everything 
Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 2006.
3 On Gorbachev’s evolution to ‘new thinking’ and Social Democracy see 
Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West. Gorbachev, Intellectuals,and the 
Idea of the Cold War, Columbia University Press, New York 2000; Archie Brown, 
Did Gorbachev as the General Secretary Become a Social Democrat?, Europe-Asia 
Studies, 65/2, 2013.
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years, Russia transformed itself beyond belief. However, from 
the viewpoint of its architects and ardent advocates, the liberal 
project in Russia went disastrously wrong. The Russian state did 
not collapse as it had in 1917, and the Russian economy even 
recovered under these reforms. Yet the state and the society 
under Vladimir Putin resembled more a corrupt Third World 
authoritarianism than a developed liberal democracy.
The repeated failures of reforms in Russia, especially in the 
1990s, created a sense of ‘unsuccess,’ a fatal path dependency. 
Today in Russia, anything referred to as ‘liberal’ seems a doomed 
enterprise. The word itself appears to be cursed. In a final irony, 
Western liberalism has entered another stage of its crisis, and 
the debates about the causes of this crisis have only begun. 
At this juncture, both the Russian leadership and the Russian 
public lack any radical substitute for liberalism. Instead, they 
have turned to conservative values. In 2013, Putin even went so 
far as to declare that Russia stood as the defender of European 
conservatism, the representative of ‘true European values’ in 
the face of the cosmopolitan, postmodern, ‘decadent’ liberal 
practices of the West. 
There are several obvious explanations for the ‘unsuccess’ 
of liberalism in Russia. Above all, that the Russian elites 
imposed too many changes too quickly on a society that was 
not yet ready to adapt to liberal norms and rules of behaviour. 
What appeared ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ for American liberals 
was not at all inherent to or natural for Russian society. History 
had not provided Russia with opportunities for the gradual 
development of a liberal ‘cultural code.’ Instead, liberalism was 
injected into the nation much like last-minute medicine into a 
dying patient. In 1917, this injection led to a lethal outcome. 
In 1991 a similar injection, while nonfatal, left Russia a deeply 
traumatized, divided, and chaotic country. 
At the same time, there are less clear explanations related 
to the specificities of Russian liberalism as it historically 
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developed on Russia’s political ‘soil.’ Russian liberalism, of 
course, underwent remarkable changes over the last century. 
Late Soviet and post-Soviet liberalism hold almost nothing in 
common with Russian pre-revolutionary liberalism: the latter 
lacked any populism (“love for people”) and focused instead 
on pursuit of individual civic freedoms, on individual cases of 
political prisoners, and on “being free in the unfree society.”4 
Yet there are recurring features that are often unnoticed by 
observers. It seems that with each new ‘incarnation,’ Russian 
liberalism has had to learn some basic lessons anew. It resists 
learning from its past failures and mistakes. Above all, Russian 
liberals refuse to acquiesce to basic structural limitations for 
their experiments, such as the country’s standing in the world, 
Russia’s political and economic history, and Russian culture. 
While this essay is not the place for a full treatment of such 
complex concepts, I will map out several issues that may be 
useful to consider in order to better understand the ‘unsuccess’ 
of Russian liberalism in the past and the challenges that face 
Russian liberals in the future.
2. Liberalism, Representative Politics,  
and Governability
Following the end of state-sponsored terror in the late Soviet 
period, it became possible to discuss political ideas in one’s 
private environment among trusted friends. In their discussions 
at home and later in the Samizdat publications, some Moscow 
intellectuals acknowledged the lack of liberal culture in Russia. 
4 Robert Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation 
and Radical Nationalism in Russia, Routledge, London-New York 2005; Lyudmila 
Alekseyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post- 
Stalin Era, Little, Brown, Boston 1990.
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They also began to argue that the Soviet state and bureaucracy 
was archaic, corrupt, and inefficient. It stood in the way of 
basic civic freedoms, and impeded the progress of the country’s 
economic and social modernization. The best way to improve 
the state, produce effective governability, and promote modern-
ization was to observe the constitutional principles of ‘checks 
and balances’ and to import Western liberal principles of mass 
political representation, free press, and government transparency. 
Liberal legalism in dissident circles of the mid-1960s gave an 
impetus to the movement of human rights defenders.5  
These claims – so familiar to critics of the current Russian 
regime – are difficult to question in and of themselves. At the 
same time, as Russian history has repeatedly shown, they pose 
two contradictory problems in terms of state governability 
and management of mass politics. Constitutional reforms and 
freedom of the press by themselves do not create propitious 
conditions for state governability. In fact, under certain 
unfavourable conditions, particularly during severe economic 
and financial crises, these reforms may contribute to destabi- 
lization and anarchy. 
During the late 18th and 19th centuries, Russian liberals were 
both members of the governing estates and staffed the Russian 
bureaucracy. This changed significantly when Russian liberalism 
became a broader social phenomenon, expanding to involve the 
middle classes. Liberals of the early 20th century, who formed the 
Constitutional Democratic Party, waged political wars against 
Russian bureaucrats. Carried away by their political agenda, 
many Russian liberals of that generation failed to realize that 
they had much in common with the state bureaucrats. The gap 
between ‘systemic’ (bureaucratic) liberalism and ‘unsystemic’ 
liberalism in Russia resurfaced in the late 1990s, after the 
5 Benjamin Nathans, The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol’Pin and the Idea 
of Rights under “Developed Socialism,” Slavic Review, 66/4, Winter 2007, pp. 630-663.
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initial idealistic expectations of Russia’s reforms disappeared. 
Revulsion of the state is a recurring phenomenon of Russian 
liberalism. Oftentimes, one hears complaint that ‘there are 
not enough good liberals’ in the Russian bureaucracy. These 
complaints echo the old idealistic chant that ‘there are not 
enough good communists’ in the Communist Party.
Another recurring problem was the difficulty that Russian 
liberals had with mass politics. During 1917, the tiny elite of 
Russian liberals were drowned in the political sea created by 
the regime of universal political rights. Just like the Tsarist 
administration earlier, Russian liberals were unable to handle 
mass participatory politics, particularly during its most 
turbulent, populist and demagogic phase. As a result, the 
liberals quickly lost initiative to radical socialists and eventually 
became the first victims of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Most of 
the Russian liberals at the time rejected the option of ‘strong 
hand,’ an authoritarian dictatorship that would have been a 
lesser evil to Bolshevism. 
A similar pattern occurred during the second round of 
liberalism from 1990 to 1998. Liberal ideas had phenomenal 
success in mobilizing the public because they were seen as 
an alternative to the failed communist model. This time, in 
contrast to 1917, liberalism in Russia seemed to be ‘on the right 
side of history.’ Yet Russian liberal politicians mishandled mass 
politics in a spectacular way: they refused to form a political 
party until 1993, instead positing themselves as an apolitical, 
almost moral movement. Perhaps a long-term, albeit false, 
association between liberals and the Russian intelligentsia 
played a role in this. Russian liberals, having come to power 
under Yeltsin, showed an intense aversion to organized mass 
politics. Instead of institutionalizing it, they preferred to use 
the liberal press and means of ‘political technology’ – including 
open bribes – to deny victory to their enemies, the communists 
and nationalists.6    
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The new reforms, ardently supported by the professional 
classes in Russian capitals and some other cities, turned out to 
be directed against those classes. In sum, Russian economic 
reforms killed the mass base for liberal democracy – most 
of teachers, technical and humanist intelligentsia, artists, 
dissidents and others who originally championed ‘freedom 
against communism,’ fell victim to harsh market conditions. 
Some continued to vote, desperately, against ‘liberal parties’ 
who criticized economic reforms – such as Yabloko – while 
others shifted to communist and nationalist opposition. Faced 
with rapidly diminishing political ratings, Russian liberals of 
the 1990s reacted to the chaotic privatization of state property, 
that had already been occurring under Gorbachev, by choosing 
the option of a liberal oligarchy, a small group of ‘enlightened’ 
liberal bureaucrats and ‘businessmen’ whose new liberal 
regime was permitted to take over huge chunks of state 
property. It was not a return to the Russian pre-revolutionary 
traditions of entrepreneurship and property. Rather, it was the 
legalization of kleptocracy, a culture of top-down corruption 
and endemic illegitimacy of the elites, the ideas of public good, 
and property rights.7 
6 Historiography of the post-Soviet liberalism has not yet been written. On the 
first attempts of Russian liberals of various strands to contemplate on the recent past 
see Pavel Aven and Alfred Kokh, Revoliutsiia Gaidara. Istoriia reform 90-kh iz per- 
vykh ruk, Alpina, Moskva 2013; Viktor Sheinis, Vzlet i padeniie parlamenta. Perelomnyie 
gody v rossiiskoi politike, 1985-1993, Voll. 1-2, Carnegie Center, Moscow 2005. 
7 This was part of the political strategy of Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais, and 
other young liberal economic reformers in the Yeltsin government. The most frank 
and critical account of this is: Peter Reddaway and Dmitrii Glinski, The Tragedy 
of Russia’s Reforms. Market Bolshevism against Democracy, US Institute of Peace 
Press, Washington D.C. 2001. On the chaotic and uncontrolled privatization of state 
property in late Gorbachev’s years see Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State. Control 
and Collapse in Soviet Institutions, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1998. On 
the property relations in the Tsarist Russia see Ekaterina Pravilova, A Public Empire. 
Property and the Quest for the Common Good in Imperial Russia, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 2014. 
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These two tiny but powerful groups became the only – and 
very precarious – social base for liberalism in Russia, as they 
stood in opposition to communism and reactionary nationalism. 
Some Russian liberals, like Anatoly Chubais, placed their last 
bet in a strong authoritarian leader who would be constitu-
tionally empowered to resist radical and reactionary waves of 
popular resentment.8 In supporting this, these liberals ironically 
contributed to the constitutional platform of Vladimir Putin. 
In fact, the new President did begin to restore Russia’s govern-
ability, but in the process he not only subordinated both 
liberal bureaucrats and new billionaires to his regime but also 
renounced some of the ‘shibboleths’ of Russian liberalism, 
such as freedom of the press and the ‘checks and balances’ of 
state institutions. Today, when architects of the 1990s ‘liberal 
economy’ speak about the need to revive Russian liberalism 
(Anatoly Chubais included among them), their breath-taking 
cynicism should remind everyone that liberalism cannot be 
revived in Russia without a honest and transparent analysis of 
what occurred in the 1990s. Russian liberalism may have been 
doomed by many serious problems. At the same time, as a 
broad political movement, liberalism in Russia was destroyed by 
liberals-in-government.
3. Liberalism and Russian Nationalism
One problem for Russian liberalism was its inability to coexist 
with Russian nationalism, a natural phenomenon in the age 
of mass ideologies and politics. In the ‘first period’ of 1905 
to 1917, Russian liberals equated Russian nationalism with 
the xenophobic and anti-Semitic Black Hundred movement, 
8 On the politics of Russian liberalism under Boris Yetlsin see  Lilia Shevtsova, 
Yeltsin’s Russia. Myths and Reality, Carnegie, Moscow 1999.
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assuming it was inspired by the reactionary circles of the 
Tsarist government. Among Russian liberals, only Peter Struve 
attempted to develop a ‘concept’ of liberal Russian nationalism, 
understood as inclusionary cultural nationalism, based on 
Russian language and culture.9
From 1990 to 1991, the second coming of Russian demo- 
cratic mass politics, Late Soviet liberals took a similarly negative 
view of manifestations of Russian nationalism. To them, Russian 
nationalism was seen only as reactionary and ‘fascist.’ They 
viewed Russian nationalists as defenders of the Stalinist empire 
and a totalitarian past. At the same time, they viewed almost 
every non-Russian nationalist leader and nationalist movement 
as their ‘natural’ ally against the ‘imperial’ state. However, the 
liberals of the 1990s failed to offer or develop any of their own 
concepts of nationhood. Some attempts, by Valery Tishkov and 
others, to form a concept of non-ethnic Russian – Rossiisky – 
civic nation did not find support of liberal mainstream. Like 
their Western liberal counterparts, Russian liberals found it 
easier to deal with the identities of the ethnic and cosmopolitan 
minorities than with the national identity of majority of the 
country.10 
9 Richard Pipes, Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge 1980; Olga Malinova, Liberalnyi natsionalizm (seredina XIX – 
nachalo XX veka), RIK Rusanova, Moskva 2000; Olga Zhukova, Edinstvo kultury 
i politiki: liberalno-konservativnyi proekt P.B. Struve v sozdanii Rossii, in Olga A. 
Zhukova and Vladimir K. Kantor (eds.), Petr Berngardovich Struve, Rosspen, Moskva 
2012, pp. 105-115.
10 The literature on this point is insufficient and highly contested. The con-
frontation between Soviet liberals and Pamyat society in 1986 shaped the standoff 
between the two camps during the perestroika years. When Yeltsin clashed with the 
Russian Supreme Soviet in 1993 and destroyed it by force in October, many Russian 
intellectuals applauded this decision as the only way to suppress the “brown-red 
forces.” On the contested ground of Russian liberalism and nationalism under the 
Soviet regime see Vladislav Zubok, The Idea of Russia. The Life and Work of Dmitry 
Likhachev, I.B.Tauris, London 2017.
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Following an initial romance with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 
most Russian liberals rejected him as a ‘reactionary prophet,’ 
mainly due to his harsh criticism of economic liberalization and 
privatization schemes in addition to his unabashed defence of 
the ‘Russian people’ in the face of liberal reformers. From 
1992 to 1993, Russian liberalism found itself on the side of the 
authoritarian presidency against the threat of a ‘brown-red’ 
coalition of nationalists and communists. Many liberal-minded 
intellectuals applauded Yeltsin’s destruction of the Supreme 
Soviet in October 1993 and three years later closed their eyes 
to the fictitious and manipulated presidential elections of 1996. 
The revulsion between liberalism and nationalism in Russia 
eventually became mutual. Various strands of imperialist 
and nationalist identity-building emerged, often helmed by 
charismatic speakers who presented liberals in Russia as an 
‘anti-populist elite’ beholden to foreign powers, the United 
States above all. The self-identification of Russian liberals with 
the ‘intelligentsia’ served to aggravate this view. One century 
ago, liberals may have been averse to nationalism, but they at 
the very least referred to themselves ‘Russians’ while making 
efforts to reach out to non-Russian ethnic minorities. In the 
1990s, the widespread view among ex-Soviet intellectuals with 
liberal ideas was a sort of national nihilism. Many of them even 
questioned that a ‘true intelligent’ individual in Russia could 
be non-Russian (Russkyi). This national nihilism centred solely 
on Russian national identity – not Tatar, Jewish, Georgian, etc. 
– and contributed to the complete domination of illiberal ideas 
in the sphere of national identity-construction.
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4. Culture, Identity, and Global Liberalism
Most of ideas of liberals in Russia today are borrowed from 
American liberalism. This poses an additional problem in 
adapting it to Russian historical and cultural realities. After all, 
the American official and popular ideology offers freedom of 
the individual from state oppression and the ability to ‘pursue 
happiness’ – above all in the spheres of religion and business. 
American political culture demands complete separation of 
business and religious life from the state. Many political 
conflicts and divisions in American liberalism are caused by 
the tension around this fundamental aspiration. Guided by this 
aspiration, the American state in the 20th century built a global 
business-trade ‘empire’ that surpassed anything that humanity 
had ever before created. 
Russia’s role in this global U.S.-constructed world can 
at best be marginal and complicated. In Russia, historically, 
the Russian Orthodox Church – like the Catholic Church in 
Poland or Islam elsewhere – was a foundational institution of 
Russian statehood and identity. Subjugation of the church in 
the Petrine system added to the tight connection between the 
religion and the state in Russia. Equally significant is that the 
concept of freedom of business based on sanctity of private 
property and civic rights, underlining the economic autonomy 
of an individual, has never been a fundamental aspiration in 
Russian culture, at least since Ivan the Terrible destroyed the 
merchants’ city of Novgorod as a rival of Moscow.
‘Trade,’ ‘business,’ and individual economic entrepreneur- 
ship were tainted notions in Russian culture far before the 
revolution and contributed to the victory of Bolshevism and 
the lasting power of the communist utopia. Instead of aspiring 
to economic and religious freedoms, most of Russians viewed 
them with doubt, suspicion and fear. As the vast majority of 
Russian intellectuals, who were not liberal, have indicated, 
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the main Russian aspiration was to have a strong, stable state 
able to protect citizens from both external threats and internal 
conflicting forces. While most of Americans would prefer to 
fight authoritarianism rather than lose their civic freedoms, 
the majority of Russians would prefer to sacrifice their civic 
freedom for the sake of security and stability. This strong 
cultural-historical pattern certainly creates ‘path dependency’ 
limitations for liberalism in Russia. These limitations affected 
Gorbachev’s reforms, as he hesitated to introduce shock therapy 
style economic reforms in 1990 and 1991. These limitations also 
hastened the demise of Yeltsin-era liberalism, following the 
implementation of shock therapy. 
Liberals in Russia have been not blind to these limitations. 
Yet their answer to them historically has been: ‘Europe and the 
West will help us!’ Both in 1917 and in 1991, liberal publicists 
and politicians hoped that their alliances with western liberal 
democracies would help them drag their country towards a 
liberal ‘progressive’ future. And in both cases, they expected 
that somehow Western powers would understand their plight 
and offer Russia a special arrangement, in order to ensure 
its long-term strategic partnership in the ‘family of civilized 
nations.’ Instead, the country was forced to face geopolitical, 
economic, and financial realities that only further aggravated 
their prospects of liberal transformation. This was particularly 
felt in 1991, when Western countries, guided by a rigid, one- 
size-fits all ‘Washington consensus’ refused even to consider a 
special dispensation for Russian economic reforms. They also 
refused to provide a Marshall Plan to the struggling post-Soviet 
economy, all the while not forgetting to collect old Kerensky 
debts that the liberal predecessors of Gaidar and Chubais had 
made in 1917 in order to continue the war against Germany on 
the side of the Entente. 
The “unsuccess” of domestic liberalism in the 1990s was 
mirrored in the frustrations of those who attempted to 
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implement liberal principles in Russia’s foreign policy. Andrei 
Kozyrev – the most liberal foreign minister the country has ever 
had – expected that Russia would become a ‘second Canada,’ 
a country with special relationship with the United States 
and a place for American investments. Instead, the Russian 
government learned that world politics were guided by two 
sets of principles: liberal rules for members of the club and 
rules of realism for those who are excluded. The story of the 
Eastern expansion ‘by invitation’ of NATO and EU, without 
ever offering the same opportunity to Russia, is well known. 
It confirmed the growing suspicions of Russian political elites 
that international liberalism was not the best option for Russia. 
Instead of a ‘second Canada,’ Russia’s place in the U.S.-led 
global liberal order appeared closer to Argentina, Columbia, 
or Nigeria. Most of the so-called economic liberals, and many of 
the businessmen their policies had generated, ‘voted with their 
feet’: abandoning their own country, they camped their moneys 
and families in comfortable locations in the West. In so doing, 
they acted in the same fashion as the corrupt elites in Latin 
America, Middle East, and other countries of the Third World, 
who tired of their resource-exporting economies to the Western 
market, and with a few exceptions, perpetuated the status quo 
instead of advancing social and economic development. 
The place of liberal practitioners in the foreign policy 
discourse inside Russia gradually became filled by those who 
believed that Russia’s ‘destiny’ was to build up a strong state and 
dominate the expanses of ‘Eurasia.’11 The ideas that Russia was 
an ‘island Eurasia’ were expressed by a wide array of individuals, 
from respectable philosophers like Vadim Tsymbursky to self- 
elected preachers like Aleksander Dugin, Alexandr Prokhanov, 
and Sergei Kurginyan. These ideas deeply resonated with the 
11 Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism. An Ideology of Empire, Woodrow 
Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C., 2008.
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cultural-historical memories and ‘codes’ of the past, with a 
long pedigree of predecessors ranging from Danilevsky and 
Dostoyevsky to Rozanov, Trubetskoy, Savitsky, Vernadsky, etc. 
Their fantastic ideas and plots may appear frightening to Western 
analysts and intoxicating to many Russians, yet they do not provide 
sensible, realistic, and strategic means for Russia to advance 
with their neighbours and other great global powers. Instead 
of pursuing a modus of mutually profitable economic relations, 
these ideas leave Russia only a path towards permanent conflicts, 
tensions, Macchiavellian deals, garrison mentality and wars.
5. The Future of Liberalism in Russia
The immediate prospects of liberalism in Russia are bleak. 
To begin with, the external ‘matrix’ that fostered liberalism in the 
Soviet Union and Russia twenty-five years ago is currently under 
severe strains across the globe: in the United States, Great Britain, 
and in many members of European Union, the liberal consensus 
is cracking, under attack by new nationalisms and right-wing 
populism. The norms and values of liberal society appeared 
to have emerged triumphant after the fall of communism, yet 
as it is often the case, the ‘developed liberal society’ – just like 
its ‘mature socialist’ antagonist in the 70s’ and 80s – proved to 
be ridden with internal contradictions, some of them new and 
some of them swept under the carpet since the 1980s. What 
are the prospects for a healthy Russian liberalism, when no one 
knows what liberalism in Greece, Italy, and France will look 
like tomorrow? It would be naïve to expect liberals in Russia to 
engender meaningful insights on the crisis of global liberalism. 
Tolstoy begins his Anna Karenina by affirming “All happy 
families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own 
way.” In a similar manner, liberals in Russia have their own 
‘unhappy family,’ vastly different from their western colleagues. 
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They are now split into ‘systemic’ (in the government) and ‘anti- 
systemic’ (anti-regime) categories, and dangerously resemble 
the patterns of 1905 and 1991. There exists a lack of meaningful 
dialogue both among liberals themselves and between liberals 
and their critics – conservatives, nationalists, etc. Instead, the 
situation that currently exists is a sort of ‘intellectual war’ 
pitting everyone against everyone. They cannot even agree the 
most basic principles: was there liberal tradition in Russia? Did 
private property exist before the revolution?12  
Unfortunately, liberal thinkers in Russia have not even begun 
to grapple with the fundamental problems of their country’s 
past experience. In order to do so, they must answer certain 
fundamental questions. First, what does a liberal democratic 
alternative to Putin’s hybrid authoritarianism look like? How 
is it possible to make a liberalized Russia governable, without 
the danger of drifting into chaos and conflict? Second, how to 
address the challenge of Russian (Russkyi) national identity in 
a multi-ethnic country where ethnic Russians constitute the 
overwhelming majority? How to form a liberal civic concept 
of Russian nationalism that would simultaneously protect the 
rights of minorities without threatening the political-territorial 
integrity of the country? Third, what can be an alternative 
foreign policy for a post-Putin Russia that would both serve 
to alleviate the current tensions with the United States and 
European Union and help provide Russia a decent place 
in the global liberal order of economy, finances, and trade? 
The future of liberalism in Russia will greatly depend on the 
intellectual and political ability of liberals themselves to tackle 
these important questions.
11 See the debate between the historian Aleksandr Yanov and the philosopher 
Igor Klyamkin, the head of the Moscow-based “Liberal Initiative,” Aleksandr 
Yanov, Artilleriya b’yet po svoim?, Snob, 13 November 2016 (https://snob.ru/pro-
file/11778/blog/114935).
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